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KYRGYZSTAN AND RUSSIA: SECURITY, COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REGION

ALEXANDER KNYAZEV,
Doctor of History, Professor, Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University, Bishkek

General estimations

In a global dimension the process of formation of a new world order and the new geopolitical configuration, new redistribution of spheres of influence and increase of a competition of the world centers of force are the source of threats for Kyrgyzstan, as well as for all new states of the region.

In a regional dimension the permanent crisis sociopolitical and social and economic situation (as well as comprehension by a part of the population and destructive forces of that fact, that by means of power pressure it is possible to achieve access to the government. A vivid example is the anti-constitutional revolution on the 24th March of 2005) is the significant destabilizing factor. Inconsistent political and economic transformations of the Post-Soviet period have led to the impoverishment of a great bulk of the population of the republic that, besides others, is one of the principal causes of the rising of a number of extremist and terrorist organizations.

In the interstate dimension the following can become the probable causes of wars and confrontations.

1. The interethnic problems caused by discrepancy between the existing borders and the real national-territorial placing of the population. In Kyrgyzia, as well as in all states of region, there are considerable diasporas of ethnic representatives of the adjacent countries. Meanwhile, ethnic diasporas are concentrated mainly in frontier areas.

2. Separatism on social and economic grounds. The standard of life lower in comparison with the neighboring states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) may generate aspiration of national minorities living in frontier areas to territorial reunion with the ethnic native land or separatism.

3. Separatism owing to infringement of the rights of national minorities (with reference to Kyrgyzia it concerns mainly the Uzbek ethnic community).

4. Separatism on the grounds of geographical dissociation of territories within the states of the region. In particular, Osh and Dzhalal-Abad regions of Kyrgyzstan are separated from the other part of the country by the Ferghana range. Their geographic and economic isolation is increased by the ethnic factor.

5. Struggle for power between various political forces, having potential to develop into an armed conflict.

Available economic, human, military and other resources do not allow Kyrgyzstan to effectively counteract to the whole spectrum of security and military threats.

Military security, armed forces

Armed forces of Kyrgyzia were formed on the basis of units of the Central Asian military district that were deployed in territory of the republic by the moment of disintegration of the USSR. At this the organizational-regular structure of formations and units as a whole has not undergone fundamental changes. Armed forces comprise bodies of political and military management, formations, units and institutions of the Ministry of Defence, internal forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State committee for national security, the Ministry of emergencies, National guards, Service of the state guarding, Frontier troops and bodies of military justice of the Ministry of Justice. Koy-Tashsky and Osh brigades formed in 1998 on the basis of the former 8th Guards Panfilovsky division Balykchinsky are the core of the modern Kyrgyz army.

All the units of armed forces are manned on the basis of a general conscription and on a contract basis. As a result of the outflow of officers of the former Soviet Army from Kyrgyzstan in the early nineties the problem of education of command staff became pressing. The Kyrgyz state national military school and the Bishkek higher military school (trains officers in combined arms warfare and technical staff for the Air Forces), established on the basis of the former five-year flight courses of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and also on high State Committee on National Security courses of national security were established to solve this problem. In 1997 the Warrant Officers School was opened. Education under the program for reserve officers is carried out on military chairs of some civil high schools. Preparation of military staff is also carried out on the basis of foreign educational institutions on the grounds of intergovernmental agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan, the USA, Turkey, Germany, China, India, France, the Great Britain, Azerbaijan. The major part of military staff is trained in Russia and Kazakhstan.

Kyrgyzstan is a small poor country[1] located at the intersection of geopolitical and geostrategic interests of three superpowers - China, Russia and the USA. As well as the neighboring Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is the country which has no influence on global processes and which throughout post-Soviet time solves problems of building of the statehood basically at the expense of external donors.

The same remark also concerns such sphere, as provision of national security in all its aspects. Economic, demographic and military possibilities of Kyrgyzstan do not allow to response to probable military threats symmetrically. Whatever armed forces were created, they will not be comparable to the armed forces of any potential or even the hypothetical state-aggressor. Any war, in which Kyrgyzstan may be involved, will be the war with the enemy manifold surpassing its armed forces on any quantitative and qualitative parameters that makes senseless attempts to repulse aggression independently and to preserve territory. Under these circumstances the military security of the republic may be provided only being based on a complex of contractual guarantees and participation in one or another military-political blocks or alliances. The understanding of inability to provide independently the military security of republic from the first days of existence has conditioned the loyalty of the leadership of Kyrgyzstan to all major Post-Soviet defensive unifying initiatives, in particular - the CIS CST of 1992. Over the periode 1990 - the beginnings of 2000th Kyrgyzstan took part in activities of the Treaty up to its loss of effect. In particular, the battalion of the Ministry of Defense of Kyrgyzstan as a part of the CIS peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan was deployed in Ishkashim district and on the whole managed to fulfill the task though its fighting capacity was not full-fledged owing to chronic underfinancing. Some splash in activity within the framework of the CIS CST related to the events in the Batken district of Kyrgyzstan in 1999 though as a whole allied relations were limited to political support and a number of military-technical deliveries from Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan. In 2000 Kyrgyzstan became the participant of the of the CIS Antiterrorist Centre (CIS AC), the Central Asian branch of which was located in Bishkek. In May 2001 Kyrgyzstan has also joined the Yerevan agreement on establishment of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF), regional headquarter of which was also located in the Kyrgyz capital.

The military policy within the first years of independence of the republic was not among the main priorities of its government. The Kyrgyz army had neither concepts of the development, nor sufficient means[2], the elaboration of the military doctrine still represents more likely the simple sum of analytical fragments (it is formally adopted by the decision of the Security Council of the Kyrgyz Republic in March 2002). The chronic lack of means was one of the reasons of development of military cooperation with NATO.

In December 1992 Kyrgyzstan joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (on 30th May of 1997 it was transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). This mechanism was established instead of the planned interblock agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization. The framework document of the NATO's Program «The Partnership for Peace» was signed by the Kyrgyz party on the 1st June of 1994. The whole complex of measures implemented in Kyrgyzstan under the Program «Partnership for Peace» makes for today «the Working program of partnership» which is regularly updated each two years and within the frameworks of "the Individual Program of Partnership» covers concrete actions: manoeuvres, courses, seminars, symposiums, conferences, trainings and other forms of education, as well as the exchange of experience. Within the frameworks of the «Partnership for Peace» Program Kyrgyzstan develops relations with the block member countries in such directions, as training in thesphere of peace-keeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, planning and actions during emergency situations, ecology and sciences, as well as development of military-civil relations. The republic is gradually involved in a block's field of action, more often participates in joint actions. Since the summer of 1995 divisions of Kyrgyz armed forces participate in NATO's maneuvres on fulfilment of peace-keeping operations, in manoeuvres of the Central Asian Battalion with the participation of NATO in the territory of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In March 2001 in Kyrgyzstan within the frameworks of the «Partnership for Peace» Program were carried out the manoeuvres with the participation of NATO's military personnel. In January 2003 was started the implementation of the international project «Virtual Silk way» on the access of scientific and educational communities of the Kyrgyz Republic to the European scientific networks and connection to a high-speed network the Internet. This project is aimed at support of the academic communities of the Central Asian and Caucasian countries and provides the access to information resources of the NATO member countries. In 2007 Kyrgyzstan started the process of a full-fledged joining the Partnership for Peace Program, the preparation of peace-keeping units for participation in corresponding NATO programs was launched. On March 12, 2007 Kyrgyzstan has joined the NATO'sPlanning and Review Process (PARP) program, that provides the intencification of military and technical cooperation with NATO and allows to take part in peace-keeping missions and NATO's actions in the areas of armed conflicts.

Besides the USA the greatest activity versus Kyrgyzstan within the frameworks of NATO and through bilateral military relations is shown by Germany and Turkey. The role of the coordinator of the issues of the NATO's activity in Kyrgyzstan is assigned to the embassy of Germany in Bishkek.

On May 14, 2002, in Moscow at the anniversary session of the Collective Security Council of the CST the heads of member states made the decision to transform the Collective Security Treaty into the international regional organization later known as the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty.

On June 28, 2002 the Minister of Defense of Kyrgyzstan Esen Topoev made the first public statement that the aviation component of the CRDF (Collective Rapid Deployment Force of the OCST member countries will be deployed in the military airfield Kant located 14 km from Bishkek. The decision on deployment of the CRDF aircraft at the airfield in Kant was made because the headquarters of these forces were located in Bishkek, hereof followed the expediency of placing of the CRDF military airbase nearby.[3]

The planned structure of the CRDF aviation components (the "Edging" airbase):

The type of aviation equipment

From the Air Forces of the Russian Federation

From the Ministry of Defence of the KR

Fighter-interceptor Su-27

5

 

Ground attack aircraft Su-25

7

 

Military transport aircraft Il-76

2

 

Military transport aircraft  An-26

1

1

Training aircraft L-39

1

4

Multipurpose helicopter Mi-8

 

2

The air group comprised training aircrafts L-39 of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces by means of which the qualification of flying personnel structure is usually supported in places of a constant deployment. On the whole the group allows to solve a wide spectrum of combat tasks. Five fighters Su-27 can provide cover from air strikes of Bishkek, interception of the targets in air sow of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and partially Afghanistan, close support of the transport aircrafts carrying out the airlift of important cargoes. Technical characteristics of the Su-27 allow them to fly over almost the whole territory of Afghanistan, a considerable part of Pakistan and even to reach northern areas of India and provinces in the North West of China. Five Ground attack aircrafts Su-25 can provide air strikes on the targets located within a radius of about 300 km from the Kant airfield. The possibility of interaction of the deployed base with the already existing Russian base in Dushanbe allows the Air Forces of Russia to cover practically all military dangerous areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Pairs of Il-76, as well as An-26 and helicopters Mi-8 of the Kyrgyz Armed Forces are capable to provide transport service of the group, and also the carrying out of search and rescue missions. From the military point of view the selection of the airfield in Kant was not accidental as well. Its location gives the chance to strengthen the group without intermediate landings in airfields of others CIS Central Asian states.[4]

On October 23, 2003 the President of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Vladimir Putin has opened the Russian military base in Kant. The opening of the airbase has created the important precedent in the interstate relations within the frameworks of the CIS. The base in Kant became the first Russian military asset deployed outside its national territory, since time of the collapse of the USSR.[5]

The official reaction of the American administration to opening of the Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan was rather low-profile, however this, most likely, testified to the change of the general approach of the American administration towards Russia. In any case, the deployment of the base in Kant was straightway regarded in Washington as Russia's attempt to return its position in the system surveillance of the air sow in Central Asia.

At the day of opening of the airbase in Kant, on October 23, in Bishkek was signed the bilateral agreement on the order of cooperation on export of military goods to the third countries. Russia had to co-operate with Kyrgyzstan in the military and technical field against the increasing diversification of the Bishkek's relations in this field with other countries.[6]

The military cooperation of Kyrgyzstan is also highly diversified on the whole. The republic is the only country in the world where the military objects of Russia are located in proximity to those of the USA.

On the September 24, 2001 it became known that the USA made to Kyrgyzstan the request to give air sow for carrying out the operation in Afghanistan, on which after long consultations of leaders of the CIS CST member countries «received the positive answer».[7] On December 11, 2001 the upper chamber of the Kyrgyz parliament has approved the government decision to let the USA Air Forces use the "Manas" airport.[8] The decision on granting of the airport for the USA military hardware was coordinated with the Kyrgyz CST and SCO partners. It was referred to approximately 40 aircrafts and 4000 military personnel which have started to arrive to the republic from the middle of December. In the early January of 2002 the full-fledged establishment of a military American airbase in the territory of Kyrgyzstan has begun. The intergovernmental agreement including the note of the USA embassy and the answer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan became the legal basis for the deployment of foreign troops in the republic.[9] In the early May of 2003 the management of the airbase has signed with the government of the republic the lease of an additional ground for the deployment of the equipment and techniques.

The opening of the Kant military airbase (OCST CRDP) became a symbolic event which has changed the character of the Kyrgyz-American cooperation in the military field. A unique situation has emerged in Kyrgyzstan, when the armed contingents of two mutually exclusive military and political alliances (or two countries which are, at least, geopolitical competitors) were based in the territory of one country (and even in the proximity from each other). The implementation of the American strategy demanded more guarantees, rather than the balanced policy of Askar Akayev. Poor and open Kyrgyzstan is a better match for the role of an outpost of the American interests in the region, it should be promoted by a convenient geographical position, insignificance of necessary financial investments, openness to the western influence and weakness of local authorities. Full controllability Kyrgyzstan on the part of the USA should have guaranteed the achievement of a number of geopolitical goals. The opening of an alternative facility called such guarantees into question.

In November-December of 2004 the closed-door Kyrgyz-American negotiations were held during which Americans tried to get the consent to deploy at the "Manas" airport the AWAСS E-3A aircrafts, and at the same time to get the consent of the Kyrgyz party to carry out regular reconnaissance flights along the border with China. The Kyrgyz party by a narrow squeak managed then to refuse persevering offers of the USA, and in the new parliament the president was going to initiate the decision on a withdrawal of the USA base from the territory of the republic territory.[10]

The regime change in Kyrgyzstan which has occurred in March of 2005 along with the changed geopolitical situation in the region made significant allowances in the character of the Kyrgyz-American relations on these subjects.

On July 5-6 in Astana took place the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization the final declaration of which raised the question of terms of deployment in the Central Asia of military bases of “the international antiterrorist coalition” - that is, as a matter of fact, the USA and NATO: “a number of the SCO member countries has provided their ground facilities for the temporary time deployment of military contingents of the coalition participants, as well as the territory and air sow for military transit in the interests of the antiterrorist operation. Taking into account the termination of an active military phase of the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states consider it necessary that the corresponding participants of the antiterrorist coalition defined the deadline of temporary use of the mentioned facilities of the infrastructure and deployment of military contingents in the territories of the SCO member states»..[11]

On July 11 the Kyrgyz President Bakiev declared, that the leadership of the republic will consider the issue of expediency of the deployment in its territory of the USA military airbase, «it remains to be seen when and how the issue of terms of deployment of the American airbases in the region will be considered», - told Bakiev. And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic has informed that the withdrawal of the American military forces from the territory of the republic may be carried out within a half of a year.[12] The position of Kyrgyzstan, thus, was seemingly outlined clearly.

However on July 25 the Minister of Defense of the USA Donald Ramsfeld arrived on a visit to Bishkek. The destiny of the USA military base was the main issue of negotiations in Bishkek. Following the results of Ramsfeld's negotiations with Bakiev and the Minister of Defense Isakov the decision was made that the USA military base can remain in Kyrgyzstan as long as the Pentagon has a necessity to carry out antiterrorist actions in the territory of Afghanistan. The head of the Pentagon promised to sharply increase the payment for the rent of the base and to grant to Kyrgyzstan the interest-free loan amounting to 200 million dollars. In Bishkek Ramsfeld expressed bewilderment concerning the declaration of the SCO member countries; «I do not even know, by what motives they were guided», - said the Minister of Defense of the USA.[13] «The document adopted in the capital of Kazakhstan Astana should be understood, more likely as «the beginning of a dialogue», - declared following the results of Ramsfeld's visit Otunbaeva - the caretaker Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kyrgyzstan, - Kyrgyzstan, is very grateful to the USA for their support within the last years and remains in the ranks of an antiterrorist coalition... The American presence in Kyrgyzstan is favorable to both parties, 45 million dollars, arriving annually in the Kyrgyz budget, is a serious contribution for our country. It is necessary to add here 25 million dollars allocated for refueling».[14] The position of Kyrgyzstan, thus, has utterly changed.

The Kyrgyz-American dialogue on deployment of the military base at the "Manas" airport was continued during the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s visit to the countries of the Central Asia.[15] In particular, the US Secretary of State received the consent of the Kyrgyz party to deploy at the "Manas" airport the major part of the infrastructure and the staff that was withdrawn from Uzbekistan. On October 11 the “Joint statement of the United States of America and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on the presence of the USA military personnel in Central Asia” was signed. The paper underlined that «the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic recognizes the important contribution of the international antiterrorist coalition forces deployed at the airbase Gansi, to strengthening of regional stability. The Kyrgyz party will continue to take part in these and other joint efforts of the international community which struggles with modern challenges and threats to the common security. We support the presence of the coalition forces in the territory of Republic Kyrgyzstan until the end of the operation on elimination of terrorism in Afghanistan - the operation supported by the United Nations».[16] In the end of March - the beginning of April inside the administration of the president matured the decision, which resulted in the statement of president Bakiev on the 19th April. Appearing on the state TV, the president of the republic warned that Kyrgyzstan reserves the right to consider possibility of secession from the bilateral agreement on the deployment of the USA military airbase in the capital airport "Manas" - in the event that the negotiations do not end till June 1, 2006. Bakiev has underlined, that «the settlement of issues concerning the further presence of the military and civil personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the USA in the Kyrgyz Republic» had lingered due to the fault of the American side.

On July 14, 2006 in Bishkek the negotiations on conditions of presence of the American Air Forces base in Bishkek come to the end. They culminated with the signing of the agreement which defined these conditions for the year 2007 - and that under condition of their adoption by the USA Congress. «The United States intends to transfer over 150 million dollars in the form of general aid and compensation within the year next to the approval of the USA Congress… The Decision on further use of the airbase at the "Manas" airport is subject for consideration in a context of wider, strong bilateral relations», said the joint statement. In other words, the fundamental decision on the status of the base turned out to be simply postponed, that is more likely in the interests of the American side, rather than of the official Bishkek, which aspires to provide due to the base a steady long-term source of pumping money into the budget. In a difficult situation when the USA, on the one hand, could not refuse from their unique base having key significance in the region, but on the other, could not make concessions to the frank blackmail of the Kyrgyz government, American diplomacy managed to find a suitable solution that permited to save the dignity of a great power.

Throughout 2006-2007 the issue of presence of the American airbase in the territory of the republic has come to the fore several times.In December 2006 the parliament of Kyrgyzstan has made the decision in which it recommended to the government to consider the expediency of further presence of the American base in the territory of the republic.[17] In its resolution the parliament recommends to the cabinet to reconsider conditions of the agreement with the USA on the "Manas" airbase, as well as to demand from the American government the extradition of military man Zakari Hatfield, participant of the tragic incident. Besides, deputies have demanded that the security agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic prepare the report on the given incident. However the resolution was not implemented.

The ambivalent approach of Kyrgyzstan to the American military presence in its territory leaves by now the USA the freedom of maneuver and possibility to concentrate on step-by-step achievement of its goals in the long term period. At the same time increases the many-sided dependence of Kyrgyzstan from the OCST and SCO.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization advocating the unconditional observance of the principle of the state sovereignty which is quite acute for the Central Asian states could become the real guarantor of safety for Kyrgyzstan, as well as for the whole region. However the membership of Kyrgyzstan in the SCO is inertial in a greater degree. The new country leadership is incapable to pursue the mature and balanced foreign policy based on national interests. The republic became a source of regional instability where in the conditions of system crisis, criminal groupings, the extremist and fundamentalist organizations operate almost out of hand, where using the western grants the activity directed on destabilization of a situation in neighboring countries is carried out. Substantially it disturbs, in particular, the Chinese government. In its foreign policy the new leadership of Kyrgyzstan - in all critical situations, which to arose after upheaval in March of 2005 - constantly finds itself in a difficult ambivalent situation. As a matter of fact, Kyrgyzstan owing to inconsistency and unpredictability of the foreign policy of the new government becomes the most unreliable element of two fundamental systems of regional security - the SCO and the OCST, and of a regional subsystem of the international relations on the whole.

Border security

Till the summer of 1999 the border security of the republic was provided through the presence of the Group of border-security troops of the FBS of the Russian Federation. At that time for the Republic of Kyrgyzstan  it was the only possible way of protection of the Kyrgyz-Chinese border owing to the absence of financial and other material and technical capabilities, as well as owing to the absence of necessary personnel potential. Nevertheless, in the framework agreement of the 9th October of 1992 the possibility of handover of the border under the protection of forming structures of border security of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was foreseen, the cooperation in the field of a professional training of experts for national service of border security was also provided. On the 28th July of 1999 was started the process of handover of parts of its national border under the protection of the Central administrative board of border security of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which ended on the 26th August of 1999.

According to the intergovernmental documents signed on the 17th July of 1999 in Bishkek, Operative group of the FBS of Russia remaining in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan  undertook the realization of such functions, as rendering assistance to the corresponding structures of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of National Security of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in protection of the national border with the People's Republic of China, provision within its power of parties' agreements on border issues, coordination of actions on national border security, studying of a status of its security, participation in the organization and support of interaction between structures of border security of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan with the states which are not members of the CIS (People's Republic of China), as well as the information exchange on the issues representing mutual interest. «The elaboration of proposals concerning national border security, rendering of assistance in the organization and realization of material and technical support, elaboration of proposals on shaping of a standard legal base in the field of national border security, as well as proposals on perfection of application of forces and means at its protection and preparation of officers and experts for the proxy bodies of the Kyrgyz Party and assistance in this» were among the duties of the OG of the FBS of Russia. The participation in the organization and realization of joint actions for national border security should have been first of all expressed in the form of consultative activity.

Now the national border of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is protected by 11 border-security divisions (including 2 squads of border control). About 70 frontier pickets were established. About 50 check points are operating.

The Border Service of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan has undergone four transformations: In1999-2002 - the SBFP of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and the SBFFC of the NSC of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; in 2002-2005 there was an independent Border Service, in 2005-2006 - the Border Security Forces of the NSC of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, since 2006 and to the present day - the independent Border Service of the RK. The absence of professional border-security personnel allows to appoint army officers - at best, and more often - from militia, customs or tax inspections etc., on supervising posts in the border-security department, unacquainted with the specificity of military and frontier services. It follows herefrom the status of security: it is carried out unprofessionally. On many sites of the border (with the CIS countries) the method of operational cover of borders is more often used, there is an exigency for the buildup of physical security of borders.

The Border Service of the RK intensively cooperates with the USA within the frameworks of programs «Financing of military projects abroad», «Export control and borders security», «Struggle against terrorism», participates in the NATO program «Partnership for Peace». There are also programs of cooperation with border department of the People's Republic of China, Russian government; all these programs have the nature of donor-recipient relations. The project on equipment of checkpoints is implemented under the auspices of the International Organization for Migration. Within the frameworks of the program «Border management in Central Asia» EU (TACIS Bomfer, the Austrian Republic as the supervisor) discussed the issue of opening of a branch of the Police academy for the Central Asia on the basis of one of border-security squads and the Center of training of tracker and special dogs on the basis of nursery of tracking dog breeding of Issyk Kul border-security group.

The length of the national border of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan with the adjacent states makes 4598 km. With the People's Republic of China - 1071,8 km; with the Republic Tajikistan - 990,6 km; with the Republic Uzbekistan - 1308 km; with the Republic Kazakhstan - 1228,3 km.

 The shut off of channels of smuggling through the state border of drugs, weapons, ammunition, explosives, and illegal migration - are among the pressing current problems of the border service. It causes the necessity for the relevant equipment of a number of checkpoints «Bordobo» - on the Khorog-Osh motorway, "Kyzyl-Bel" – on the Batken-Kanibadam motorway, "Ak-Zhol" - on the Bishkek-Alma-Ata motorway. The important problems are the lack of professionally trained personnel and the absence of a base to train them; the absence of the telecommunication systems, automated systems of account and control; weak material and technical support of the border service because of the underfinancing. All this affects the efficiency of reliable security of national border.

Drug trafficking and “criminal integration”

The presence of a criminal component in the modern political processes in the countries of the Central Asian Region is not a specific regional characteristic. In this context the specificity of the region consists in two basic aspects of manifestation of this factor: first - is the greatest role of a clan structure of the society and criminalization of the economic sphere on the whole, second - transitional character of the region in the process of illegal drug trafficking manufactured in Afghanistan.

The Republic of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share one important characteristic: the absence of highly profitable resources promotable on markets. It results in the fact, that at initial stage clans which have taken the major political positions choose privatization, exaction of resources from the budget, as well as the simple racket as the source of personal enrichment. All profitable objects of the economy are under the control of one or other clans, with the basic motives of all internal political life being the opportunities in redistribution of such objects. The organized criminal communities become the direct instrument of the control over the property; the direct contact between politicians and criminal top dogs was established.

At the first stage of independent existence this process manifests itself more brightly in Tajikistan: during the polarization of forces in the Tajik internal conflict and the subsequent post-war period a number of criminal top dogs were directly incorporated in political system and the government sphere. In the Republic of Kyrgyzstan this process originally has latent and less dynamic character.

Events in the neighboring Afghanistan become the determinative factor of criminalization of a political class of the Central Asian countries. By the end of the ninetieth the process of integration of the organized communities related to drug manufacturing and trafficking to the world markets, as well as with their local distribution, entered the new, even more dangerous phase. One way or another almost all organized criminal groups operating in the Central Asian region become involved in illegal operations with drugs. The process of their integration to the international system of drug trafficking with all negative consequences following from here intensified. The spheres of influence were divided, there was a criminal differentiation - one part of the organized criminal groups specialized on drug trafficking from Afghanistan, another was engaged in their delivery from Tajikistan, the third dealt drugs in the CIS states, almost in all large industrial centers of the Russian Federation. The most structurally formed organized criminal groups carried out a full cycle of drug industry from drug smuggling from Afghanistan, through Tajikistan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to the final destination - mainly the regions of the Russian Federation.

 During the first years of existence of independent states the regime of border control on the Afghani border was broken because of the civil war in Tajikistan, and later - by the unilateral activity of Turkmenistan on the establishment of relations with Talibs. At the same time the process of direct involvement of representatives of the state and political structures of the Central Asian countries in illegal drug trafficking has started. The practice of service and battle activity of the Russian border-security structures in Tajikistan and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan gives a considerable number of examples of such involvement.

Speaking about official activity of the states of the Central Asia on counteraction to illegal distribution of drugs manufactured in Afghanistan, it is necessary to notice, that this activity is completely directed on counteraction to secondary factors. These are measures of the border and law-enforcement control, it is retaliatory practice, it is job of medical and preventive character. Takes place the struggle against the consequences, instead of one against reasons. The activity of the Central Asian countries on restoration of the Afghan economy is almost fruitless, though the situation on the major part of border areas (especially in northeast provinces - Kunduz, Takhor, Baglan, Bhadakhshan) allows well to implement social and economic projects. Social and economic situation in the Central Asian countries remains the major factor of participation of the population in a drug trafficking. Nowise the secondary factor of development of the "northern" route of drug trafficking from Afghanistan is also the corruption of the state and law-enforcement structures inherent to all countries of the region.

In fact, by the second half of the ninetieth, the structure of drug trafficking through the Central Asian countries takes shape on the whole. With reference to East routes of the Central Asian direction (Tajikistan and the Republic of Kyrgyzstan) it appears as follows. The organization of transit in specific regions (level of provinces, several provinces) is carried out by regional clans which leaders are among public politicians. Directly the issues of organization of transit are solved by local OCG, related to the local officials. The representatives of law-enforcement bodies related to this structure provide transportation cover, securing against accidents. At the level of large regional centers, which are not necessary capitals of republics (Osh in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, in Tajikistan one of such centers is Khujand) is carried out the general coordination, the issues of transit to the neighboring territory, transfer of the cargo from the Tajik suppliers to the Kyrgyz groups, and from Kyrgyz - to Kazakh, etc. are solved here. Herewith, arrested with the subsequent publicity in mass-media separate “drug mules” or small groups are, as a rule, engaged in this activity, spontaneously, not participating in structural transit. Their arrests illustrate the view of anti-drug activity of law-enforcement departments and states on the whole.

Perhaps the most tangible outcome the American military operation in Afghanistan became the boost of illegal drug manufacturing and transit in 2002-2003. First of all, it was related to the expansion of the opium poppy crops in territory of Afghanistan. During the latest period (2005-2007) the theory of direct participation of the USA military men in drug trafficking gains momentum.

Approximately by the spring of 2002 in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, from the very beginning of the ninetieth differing by the low degree of centrality of the state authorities, takes shape the situation when drug trafficking is controlled at once by several actors: the South-Kyrgyz groups related to the leaders of the opposition of that time to the regime of A.Akaev, two (at least) competing northern OCGs, and South-Kazakhstan OCGs. In this difficult scheme there are also interests of the Tashkent criminal clans historically closely cooperating with criminal circles of Southern Kyrgyzstan. And the competitive struggle between tribal criminal structures for the domination in the control over drug trafficking became one of the major factors which have caused events on the 24th March of 2005.

It is necessary to note the intensification of cooperation of OCGs with the Islamic radical organizations as one of the newest tendencies of criminal and political process in the countries of the region, posing the greatest threat to security. In the Republic of Kyrgyzstan this tendency most distinctly relates to the activity of Islamic movement of Uzbekistan, the Uighur separatist Islamic organizations.

Integration initiatives

The multypolarity of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is declared as the defining imperative of its foreign policy (for more details see below). The observance of this imperative caused the participation of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in a number of integration projects.

«The Turkish project». With the disappearance of the USSR the role of Turkey as NATO’s southern flank has essentially decreased, but with the occurrence of new Turkic-speaking states of the Central Asia and Transcaucasia there was a chance of restoration of former greatness and increase of the importance in international affairs. In the early nineties the traditional Pan-Turkish ideas on creation of a «Great Turan» arises again. In December of 1991 Ankara was the first to recognize the new Central Asian Turkic-speaking states, and in January of 1992 the Prime Minister of Turkey Suleiman Demirel has declared the change of the regional status of his country in view of opportunities opening to the latter to define the political future of the CIS Muslim republics. It was supposed to incur the solution of a twofold problem: to provide the necessary level of contacts of the West with these republics and to convince their leaders that Ankara is capable to conduct interests of the CIS Muslim countries in the West.

The Turkish International Development and Cooperation Agency (TIDCA) was established at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate at the state level all kinds of the activity directed to unify Turkic peoples, and in the government there was established the post of the Minister of Relations with Turkic-speaking CIS republics. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (TDRA), the Educational Centre of the Fethullah Gulen Religious Community, the Turan Yazgan's Turkish International Research Center, the Avrasya Bir Fund, the «Turksoi» and etc. intensified their activity in the Central Asian region. The popularization of a Turkish model of development, opposition to interests of Iran and Arabian countries in this region are on the credit side of these organizations.

Professional education of personnel of various specializations for the Central Asian republics became the major direction of Turkish activity. Ankara annually allocates several thousands of grants for education of students and teachers from the Turkic-speaking republics in higher educational institutions and Turkish research centers. In the Republic of Kyrgyzstan this mission is carried out by the Kyrgyz-Turkish University "Manas" and a wide network of lycées functioning in all regions of the republic.

However, on the whole, the policy of Turkey on establishment of the integrated Turkish political and cultural and ideological space started coming to a standstill as early as in the second half of the nineties. The leaders of Turkic-speaking republics began to distance themselves openly from Turkish attempts to unite on this basis. Possibly, the Turkish leadership realized that the political and cultural affinity, commitment of the new independent Turkic-speaking republics to Islam and Turkism were exaggerated, and the state nationalism of the Central Asian ethnos is real.

By the present time Turkey is one of the important foreign policy partners for the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, however, considerably conceding to Russia, China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the USA, Japan, the EU countries. Nevertheless, one may see certain splashes in this activity on specific issues or problems. Thus, the Turkish leadership shows specific and strong interest to the defense industry of the republic, openly offering its services and participation in the activity of the military-industrial complex. The education in Turkey of military personnel for the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and rendering of the humanitarian and military and technical aid are traditional.

«The Kazakhstan project». There is no Kazakhstan project. The Post-Soviet history knows a great number of initiatives of the Kazakhstan leadership which were, as a matter of fact, PR projects. The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia, the Eurasian Union, the «Ten simple steps towards ordinary people» Program, the Turkistan Union, Mini-OPEC, the Forum of the Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, the Central Asian Economic Union, the Project of reforming of the CIS is a short list. All of them are initially conceptually insolvent, utopian. Behind the Kazakhstan initiatives there is an obvious aspiration of the American administration to outgame the ambitions of Astana as a counter to the Russian plans in the region. One tries to set Astana against Moscow. In the field of energy these are the attempts to create the axis Astana-Baku-Tbilisi, all other plans of involvement of Kazakhstan in numerous anti-Russian communication projects. For the USA the implementation of these plans would mean the achievement of essential restriction of the Russian influence in the issues of extraction and transportation of energy resources. It is necessary to consider in the same context the attempts to involve Kazakhstan and other countries of the region in the system of "collective responsibility" on Afghanistan, in full compliance with the «Great Central Asia» strategy.

"Islamist Project"

Integration projects penetrate the Soviet “iron curtain” and excite the minds of the young Muslims in Central Asia, who feel attached to the Islam world. However, a new reformist wave did not focus on the inevitable resurgence of caliphate, remaining loyal to the Hanafi school. They were only calling for restoring common Islamic identity, which dates back to the times when they felt being a part of the Islamic world.

Despite many alarmist projections, Islam has not become a basis for a stable political alliance in any of the Central Asian states. One can not speak about Islam as a national identity factor. A.Malashenko makes a fair note of a particular feature of the Islamic opposition groups in Central Asia: “political Islam is being active because there is no single managing and coordinating center nation-wide, to say nothing about region-wide”. Importantly, any political Islamist movement should have an influential leader to enjoy success. Today there is no such leader in Central Asia. There is not even a candidate to fill the place. The main reason for that is that Islamist movements and organizations in the region are national, that is their activities are limited to a certain state[24].

The idea to create a caliphate proposed by the “Hizb ut-Tahrir” party and similar movements has not been accepted by most local Muslims. Local leaders started their own quest of legitimizing caliphate, starting by refuting ingrained local Muslim visions. Despite the “Hizb ut-Tahrir” party’s propaganda in the region, there are no grounds to state that their ideas have been accepted by the majority.[25] There is no real integration of the Muslims in the region, either. Regionalization (especially, in political terms), closed borders and other factors actually divide the Muslims, impeding their cooperation, to say nothing of unification. Incidentally, in the pre-Russian period Islam was primarily an identity, not an integration factor.

It has to be noted that, according to the majority of experts, religious views and actions of another popular caliphate organization – Uzbekistan’s Islamic movement – are not accepted by most believers in the region without any pressure from local regimes. This stance is traditional for many Central Asian theologians (theologicians) and has been elaborated for many years of umma’s existence in the relationships with non-Islamic political and cultural entities.[26] There is currently no real Muslim integration in the region. Regionalization (especially, in political terms), closed borders and other factors actually divide the Muslims, impeding their cooperation, to say nothing of unification. Islam as an identification factor is no longer applicable. The “Hizb ut-Tahrir”’s activities are ethnically biased. The overwhelming majority of its participants are Uzbeks.

However, the idea of a “United Islamic State” (as “Union of Islamic States”) is seen by many Islamic intellectuals as the most efficient entity to confront the ideological and cultural impact of the West. Similar ideas are seen in the proclamations of the Islamic regional organizations.

Iranian initiatives

At the beginning of the 1990-s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran, having discovered vast untapped markets, became more active in the new states of Central Asia, particularly, in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In general, Iranian impact was limited to exports to the local markets. Tajikistan stands out, to a certain extent. Ethnical and cultural proximity between Tajiks and Iranians accounted for a higher level of relations between Iran and Tajikistan. Starting from 1992 Tajiki-Iranian relations suffered a setback, close at times to mutual alienation. This alienation was based on the popular political and ideological prejudice towards Iran that emerged in the course of the civil war in Tajikistan. The initial intentions of Iranian political elites to dominate in Tajikistan were disavowed by Russia. E.Primakov says that at the initial stage of Russian-Iranian relations on the Tajik issues, when it was clear that Iran had no chances to strengthen its positions in Tajikistan, Iran’s influence and even “physical presence” took a downhill slide. As to the overall strategy, it was concluded that Iran is trying to come out of isolation and to “take part in positive processes at the world arena”.[27] This experience pre-determined the format of Russian-Iranian interaction in Tajikistan in the future, preventing both sides from direct confrontation.

In the following period Iranian diplomacy in Central Asia focused on gradual penetration to all the spheres to get Iran out of political and economic isolation. It has to be noted that the notorious idea of "exporting Islamic revolution" is not an essential element of Iran's regional policy and will hardly be it in the foreseeable future, being just an attempt to reintegrate the region into the historical context.[28]

Potential for regional integration. One has to concur with A.Malashenko's opinion that "the region is far from being uniform in ethnical and socio-cultural terms".[29] Diverse alliances, that are being created despite objective reasons and needs, are typical of the post-Soviet and post-socialist states. This trend stands a testimony to the fact that existing bilateral and multilateral relations are not well-adapted to the new political context, where external centers of power, such as, in this case, the USA, are taking a pro-active stand. Therefore, incompatible partners are forming unions and alliances, forced to do so by the external conditions rather than for objective economic and political reasons. Regional actors are changing their positions without due regard for their real weight and political role in the regional processes. In the long run, it results in new conflicts.[30]

In most pessimistic terms, divergent national interests might increasingly lead to a systematic exacerbation in the relations between the former Soviet Republics, who will forge stronger relations with external partners. In this case, one should forget about any integration. The unanimous decision of all national elites to unite economic and political efforts, to create common market and a regional organization with some supranational competencies (although insignificant) is just unreal and constitutes a travesty of integration. The real integration can start with cooperation on the key issues and regular dialogue, including with external actors. It might take place under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and EuroAsian Economic Community, although it might not be always effective.

The experience of regional integration in Central Asia shows that regional integration is one of the images of the modern political myths. It comes from a Latin word "integratio", which means restoring the entire. In case of Central Asia, this "entire" has been exclusively the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Never has been the population of the region united within the framework of a single state. The Soviet authorities gave a chance to the currently existing ethnical groups to come into being and created for them the foundations of their statehood, no matter how imperfect these might be. However, the Soviet-type unity is not possible now. Many experts, especially from Western countries, point out that integration in Central Asia can be based on common history of different peoples living here for many centuries, on their culture, language, religion, traditions and kinship. However, these factors can not be a basis for their unity because they do not arise from objective needs and national interests. Moreover, new-type relations have been almost forged with due regard for the new frontiers. The revision of these frontiers might have an adverse impact on the population and give rise to the new conflicts.

There can not be a regional leader in Central Asia. There is no country which could assume this role in a way that other countries would agree with it. There are two countries, which stand out in the region in economic, political, territorial and demographic terms. These are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The matter is that neither of them has a full range of the needed leadership prerequisites. However, Uzbekistan is a communication backbone in the region and accounts for more than a half of the regional population. Moreover, emerging national political elites are not ready yet to accept a single leader. If we are to speak about the necessity of regional integration, it has to be stated that this task can be accomplished by an external integrator, which Russia was from the second half of the 19-th century until the 1990-s.

Social security aspects in Kyrgyzstan: migration

During the independence period the scale of migration of the Kyrgyzstan’s population was unprecedented. It can be explained by several factors: economic, demographic, political, social and others. One can also point out the misbalance between the offer and demand for the workforce, as well as poor living standards. The migration of the Russian-speaking population to Russia is caused by the discrimination practices.

It is the economic factors that prevail. A demographic factor is of no less importance. The Republic boasts of relatively high natural population growth rates, which, together with the economic crisis, exacerbate the workforce surplus and influence the intensity of migration flows.

One of the features of external migration is the predominance of the Russian-speaking population among those who leave the Republic. Besides a complicated social and economic situation, it is driven by the lack of career prospects for the so called national minorities. The population structure of most ethnical groups (except for the Kyrgyz) has been characterized by the persistent negative balance of external migration (migration decline). Sustainable migration growth has been typical only of the Kyrgyz population. However, from 2000 onwards this group, which constitutes the majority among the so called "labour migrants"[31], started to suffer losses from migration.

Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been the main receivers of migrants from Kyrgyzstan all along its period of independence. They accounted respectively for 78, 8 and 2.5% of migrants from Kyrgyzstan. Among the non-CIS countries the leading recipients are Germany, Israel and USA (Germany being the absolute leader).

By 2006-2007 labour migration becomes an urgent issue for Kyrgyzstan. According to experts' estimates, in Russia there are about 1 million illegal migrants from Kyrgyzstan. The most frequent estimates among specialists and public officials are 400 000-700 000 migrants.

According to the national Bank of Kyrgyzstan, the citizens of the Republic working in the CIS countries sent more than 350 million dollars to Kyrgyzstan in 2007. However, both financial experts and government officials think that these figures are far from being exact. For instance, in 2006 the money sent by the migrant workers surpassed 500 million dollars, which accounts for half of the country's budget.[32]

Illegal migration is mostly the problem for the recipient countries. Like in any other countries, which supply labour force, state institutions in Kyrgyzstan are indifferent to signing the agreements with the recipient states. They are content with the current state of affairs. Money transfers by the labour migrants, stimulating consumer demand, increase national economy's capitalisation. Legalizing migration process limits the leeway for corruption in the state bodies which might be part of it.

According to the data of the Kirghiz Agency for demography and migration, the major part of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan now work in Moscow, in the regions of Moscow, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and Chita, as well as in the Krasnoyarsk Region of the Russian Federation. Kaliningrad region has also been attracting migrants from Kyrgyzstan for some time now. According to the agency's experts, local authorities are actively supporting voluntary migrations of the compatriots through a federal programme. The possibility to find a job and high levels of remuneration are the main reasons why the nationals of Kyrgyzstan are going to the Russian regions or choose Russia as a place to live in. According to the official data, about 253 000 labour migrants are currently living in Russia. As of 2008, more than 100 000 Kirghiz migrants acquired Russian citizenship.[33] As a result of higher migration rates many specialists left the Republic, which needs them in various sectors of its economy. This deficit of human resources is not made up for by natural growth and becomes an important obstacle to the economic development of Kyrgyzstan. The Russian government set an annual quota of 500 000 migrants per year. It is not been exhausted because the majority of migrants are involved in illegal migration flows.

High internal migration activity of Kirghiz population boils down to several constructive and destructive factors of the current socio-economic situation in Kyrgyzstan. Market relations, private entrepreneurship, commerce as constructive factors are undoubtedly conducive to the transfer of capital and, consequently, to the labour force migration. However, their impact on the intensity of migration flows is not that important as that of the destructive factors. A growing number of small and medium enterprises, agricultural workers and farmers, development of individual labour activities can not compensate fewer working opportunities as a result of the collapse of the socialist system and the subsequent economic crisis. The surplus of labour force, triggered by closing and reorientation of the many industrial enterprises, the liquidation of large agricultural entities, the lack of an efficient state support for the emerging and existing economic entities (and, as a result, limited opportunities for creating additional workplaces) make the population leave its places to find a new job or to change it.

The emergence of the market economy determined attractive and non-attractive zones for internal migrants. Among the first ones Bishkek and Chuiskaya Oblast can be mentioned, which is explained both by a more favourable economic and geographic location of these territories in comparison with the other parts of the Republic, as well as by the Russian population “exodus” abroad and, consequently, by the new opportunities for the newcomers. Different levels of incomes is a feature, which predetermines the flows of internal migration. Higher living standards in Chuiskaya oblast are also a psychological factor, making those people, who are likely to be employed, migrate as well as those, who will join the unemployed. All the other regions in the Republic are not attractive to the migrants and are characterized by the negative internal migration balance. Another feature of internal migration is the inflow of the rural population to the cities, which reflects the dismal state of agriculture and disproportions between the rural and urban standards of living. Another factor accounting for migration dynamism of the rural population is a traditionally higher population growth rate, which exacerbates disproportions between labour resources and the demand for them.

Large-scale internal migration results in several adverse trends, which may influence regional stability and security. One of them is linked with the increasing marginalization of urban population. Another one boils down to the distortions in ethnical and territorial domaines.

The ethnical composition of internal migrants is almost homogenous. The mobility of some ethnic groups is due to their part in the total population. The Uzbeks make an exception. Their nomadism is closely linked with agriculture as the predominant form of activity. The Uzbeks are extremely inactive in terms of migration. As a result, the ethnical structure in Southern Kyrgyzstan, where Uzbek population is growing faster than other ethnicities, is not very changeable. A certain “uzbekisation” of Southern Kyrgyzstan is taking place, which might lead to the claims of autonomy and trigger separatist movements (“Kosovo syndrome”).

Actors of influence in the internal and external politics and their impact in political practices

During the 2004-2005 election campaign which resulted in coup d’Etat on March 24, 2005, the same organizations were implementing election programs among various population groups (especially among the young voters, who later became the driving forces in coup d’Etat), such as USAID, «Freedom House», Peace Corps, US International Republican Institute, NDI, «East European Democratic Center») and «Counterpart Consortium». Such organizations as «Internews Network», «Eurasia Foundation», «CIMERA» (Switzerland), «Open Society Institute» («Soros Fund»), Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), were working with the media. Important analytical work was carried out by the US financed International Crisis Group.

US National Democratic Institute was providing financial, technical and teaching support to almost all opposition parties and organization in Kyrgyzstan. In total, the USA created in Kyrgyzstan a network of organizations uniting not only opposition forces, but the forces that could be used up to the US liking. Direct support by the US Embassy and other US organizations came to the surface in the last months before the parliamentary elections. Appropriate public opinion and climate had been forged. There are about 5000 NGOs in the Republic (they are not always registered). They can be found in almost every village. As a rule, they are small, but they do exist to receive grants and international aid to fight for the freedom of media, to combat AIDS or to profess the foundations of children education. “It could have been impossible without this kind of support," – E.Baisalov, one of the opposition leaders, said - "American money financed civil society centers all over the country. NDI alone has 20 centers. These human resources provided Kirghiz opposition with financial and moral support, as well as infrastructure for professing ideas among the population".[34]

Massive education assault was applied to the young population by the network structures, while President’s and governmental policies were very lenient towards it. The number of colleges, institutes, colleges, lyceums, internship programmes and training courses reached absurd levels. Without any internal back-up all the educational facilities existed thanks to the support of the above network structures accomplishing the tasks they set. Traditional social patterns were being destroyed by the educational centers and NGOs, including the world outlook basics. They also contributed to the public refusal to accept the state of affairs in the Republic (pointing out those who are responsible for it), higher hopes and demands for life, which were impossible to achieve in that Republic. The network structures (including those, created by NGOs and the media) were supposed to provide a critical mass of people, who were ready to take part in protests (under various slogans and for various reasons depending on the circumstances and regions). As regards communication, their task was to maintain a certain level of social activity, to render the situation acuter, focusing public attention on the real problems, making the situation concerning conflicts more difficult in psychological terms and providing direct communications among various radical network organizations. At the cognitive level the activities of these organizations were supposed to make people understand that there is not way to live like that anymore or that life became unbearable. Socially, their task was to find and involve ethnical, social, regional, religious and other groups, mobilizing them to use radical methods under the circumstances of the building up chaos.

Kurmanbek Bakiev’s coming to power was a serious US foreign police mistake. Due to some subjective reasons, he turned to Moscow, as well as to Beijing and Tashkent, to a larger extent than Ascar Akayev. USA needs to even the score because such changes are of geopolitical interest to the USA and concern the existence of the US military base at the “Manas” airport.[35] Western NGOs opened a new stage of working with NGOs and opposition. Currently the USA are trying to create a new and more tenable opposition in Kyrgyzstan. This tactics is multi-faceted. It can be used as a means of pressure on the incumbent authorities. It can also be used, in case of emergency, to change the regime.

As to the lobbying groups, which do not come from the USA, they are rudimentary and reveal themselves spontaneously only in certain situations, most often when lobbying economic and investment projects.

Elites and identity issues: nationalism, tribalism and regionalism

Like in all traditional societies, there is an original “two-sided” political culture in the post-Soviet states in Central Asia, when traditional forms of power co-exist with the official institutions. Change of hierarchy in one of the systems usually goes along with changing status in the other. The leaders of the traditional hierarchy, who are not represented in the official political institutions, often exert important impact on decision-making. Parallel structures often enjoy greater influence on their partisans, than state structures, influencing directly public and political development of their states.

This specific feature in the post-Soviet Central Asian states, which is present today, played a decisive role on forming the first forms of statehood in the former Union republics after the collapse of the USSR. Political power in the present-day Central Asia is the not the product of the classical European political process. It comes from the nomenklatura’s ability to consolidate itself during the independence period and to keep the instruments of state management. It was the case with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Both in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan political power is the result of compromise among the main traditional clans. During the Soviet times Central Asian Republics preserved tribal relations, which in the 90-s developed further. After the collapse of the Soviet Union a half-feudal system of social relations came to its second existence, making the tribal factor even more important. Moreover, a Tajik or Kirghiz clan is not just an influential family or group of families, it is rather a regional entity, which can be used by a politician in a political competition.

Along with transforming the traditional links of initial socialization, which lived through the Soviet era and which still existed at the turn of 1980-1990-s, a tribal and clan system is being reanimated. Kyrgyzstan once boasted of rudimentary democracy, namely military democracy. Its underlying procedure, elections, is not new to the Kirghiz either. Even after Kyrgyzstan joined the Tsarist Russia, elections did not disappear. Nor did the family representation. It was the most convenient self-organized and self-controlled hierarchy. Not only Russia, but also Great Britain tried to keep in its annexed territories such management pyramids that survived the winds of change.  In the USSR the system of family hierarchy was, if not destroyed, largely deformed. After the collapse of the USSR democracy was chosen as a no-alternative way of political development. However, time distance from Kyrgyzstan’s military democracy to the present-day democracy, which was supposed to be implemented, is too large. A long evolutionary process is needed, which should be realized by the society, to see tangible results. Military democracy, composed of autonomous families and clans, saw them united and electing a chief only in case of emergency. Chief’s competencies were limited by the emergency’s duration (more often it was a war with an external rival). This democracy was too simple and even primitive to serve as a mechanism of government. However, its elements leading to the chaotic fragmentation of the Republic, are quite obvious in the present-day Kyrgyzstan. Creation of political parties seems absurd. As of June, 20 2006 82 political parties were registered in a country with 5 million people.[36]

In Kyrgyzstan, where most politicians are ambitious activists, defending regional, family, tribal or personal selfish interests, but not national or party interests, it was natural that these people wanted to get prestigious (hence, well-paid) jobs in public sector for themselves or their partisans, including relatives. Copied democratic institutions come in handy. These longings of a group of people, taking part in Kirghiz politics, serve as an incentive to all the movements for changing the voting system and relations between the Parliament and the Government. To make political process at least a little bit more systematic a rigorous system of government from the center is needed. Only executive power can play this role in Kyrgyzstan.

In Kyrgyzstan, like in other Central Asian states, the majority of the population has no idea what is a state, democracy and what the functions of the political institutions are. The so-called political elites, including the opposition “counter-elites”, considering themselves as culture triggers seemingly overestimate their competencies. The influence of a representative of this group spreads at most on the fellows from the same area (from a certain tribe or family), controlled media, which circulation does not exceed 10000 and a pair or two of NGOs. As a result, the number of such people, who identify themselves as national politicians, far exceeds all the reasonable public needs. None of the opposition parties or organizations or other more or less organized political groups has its main attribute, i.e. a clear-cut programme in the face of the needed changes and geopolitical realities. All these parties and other forces have the same feature, i.e. social composition: an elite group, whose interests clash with the governing elite and who is supported by marginal social elements and regional clans. In rural parts of the country where the Soviet patterns, based on the territorial principles, disappeared and new patterns are not created, tribal structure re-emerge. Sometimes it takes such a low form that they mostly resemble sub-ethnical entities, which are typologically very close to criminal structures. Many of hem appeal for external support. Most of them suffer from various complexes, typical of political neophytes.

In Kyrgyzstan, like in any other Asian society, paternalism is deeply-rooted. The majority of the population believes in the state as the system of just redistribution of social benefits that paves the way for the country’s prosperity and well-being. This belief is largely personified and is linked to a specific leader, but not with the quality of political and law systems.

Kyrgyzstan as a country without historical traditions of an independent state saw the events on March, 24 2005 put an end to a legitimate political process. No stable political formations make it possible for many people, pretending to be part of the political elite, to try to become national leaders.

Kyrgyzstan, like all other post-Soviet states except Russia, started building an ethnocratic state, where a titular ethnic group becomes predominant in all spheres of life. The majority of all citizens, who do not belong to this group, are excluded from political, social and cultural life, as well privatization and big businesses.

The concept of “nation” is interpreted at the lowest and most primitive level in the today’s political life in Kyrgyzstan, in particular, at a biological level, when nation is considered to be a stratum united by blood. This approach is reflected in the preamble to the Constitution. Distancing themselves from other ethnic groups by blood principle, the Kirghiz start dividing themselves into “blood families”, which results in tribalism and can be traced in politics, business and other spheres.

One of the consequences is that Kyrgyzstan is turning into a monoethnic country. Today the Kirghiz occupy 70% of the territory. High school education in Russian is far from being available everywhere. The number of Russian schools has plummeted. The quality of education in schools and institutions of higher education is worsening. According to the law “On Education” in its new form (2007), the state is no longer responsible for teaching citizens Russian, Uzbek and other languages spoken in the Republic. Intensive “derussification” in cultural and linguistic terms is under way, triggering external migration.

At the same time Kirghiz society lacks a clear-cut identification. Its refusal to form a civic identity, despite the ethnocratic social and political realities, has not resulted in forming an ethnical identity (ethnic nation). Therefore, tribalism trends are gaining ground in the Republic, which are the basis for clan structures and further obsolescence of the entire social and political system.

Multi-vector foreign policy and the resulting uncertainty

Kyrgyzstan’s multi-vector foreign policy reflects the intention of the ruling elite to have the necessary leeway in its relations with the world. This approach is extremely pragmatic, when each of the foreign partners gets certain preferences, but when priorities are extremely vague and none of the great powers has the decisive role. Russia has played this role “by default”, but this is the question of time, in particular, as regards changing generations of politicians and electorate. Apparently, governing circles in Kyrgyzstan understand that the country’s development and stability hinge upon an efficient integration system with Russia, bilateral relations with the USA and a combined approach to its relations with China. However, foreign policy tools should be in conformity with the actual state of relations with each of the leaders. Kyrgyzstann elite is not capable of doing so.

In the country’s decision-making process the aspect of subjectivity should be taken account of and not only at the highest state levels. In the conditions when authorities are not centralized in the Presidential administration the position of some agencies is of great importance. It is usually determined by personal foreign policies penchants of their managers.

Short-term foreign policy vision became evident when heads of states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted a declaration on July, 5 2005 in Astana. All the foreign policy steps of the Kyrgyzstan’s elite prove its firm intention to benefit from differences among the foreign actors, without showing strategic political thinking, but short-term pragmatism. It is the days of the multi-vector policy are gone.

The main threat to Kyrgyzstan’s security and even statehood is the lack of an elaborated strategy for state development, including in terms of threats and risks. There are also internal threats, such as the lack of efficient state institutions, which is proved by an unconstitutional change of power in 2004, stable social structure, which would be adapted to the present-day realities, ethnical, tribal and social differences among the population. Problems with political and economic consistency arise from them.

At the same time Kyrgyzstan experienced for several years a special mechanism of supporting alternative elite by means of foreign aid. Easy and accessible grants attracted different people who were dismissed from their posts and who understood what Akayev’s regime is all about. In this respect, it is of interest to look at the former opposition. A year after the coup d’Etat in March the majority of its leaders are in opposition to the new regime. It proves one more time that consolidated national political forces can not exist under the conditions of the regionalized clan structure of the society and that there is no national political elite. Some part of the elite is largely oriented to the West. Therefore, as a new generation of politicians will be coming to the fore, the change may take place in a natural way. For the time being, a basis for a “new stage of strategic partnership“ between Kyrgyzstan and the USA is being created, first of all in the area of information and education.

The desire of some Kyrgyzstan’s political leaders (supported by the majority of the voters) to develop closer relations with Russia is driven, first and foremost, by the increasing understanding and unofficial recognition of the fact that Kirghiz ethnocratic state is untenable. Intellectual paucity of the Kirghiz elite is obvious. It is at a loss as to what it should be doing to make Kyrgyzstan a full-fledged independent state. Therefore, it turns to the recent past, when the Republic was doing good being sponsored from the Union center. Nominations by the same Union center did not make it think about all the tribal and clan issues, which have a decisive impact on Kyrgyzstan’s internal policies. The parliament has been calling for a year now for initiating the process of joining Russia as an autonomous region.

Some conclusions

1. Potential military threats and other connected threats caused by global, regional and intrastate problems and conflicts of different kinds encourage military and political integration among the Central Asian states to create an efficient multi-profile system of regional and national security.

2. Central Asia is a geographic, rather than a geopolitical entity, which is characterized by the absence of any political or economic uniformity. There are serious political, economic and other differences among the states in the region, which are exacerbated by the border, territorial and resources claims. All of these impede political and military integration.

3. The concern to fall under a political, economic and military dependency from Russia and China, no real external threat and no need to collectively secure common economic interests delays integration processes within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

4. The USA is opposing integration to enfeeble the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and to turn Central Eurasia into its zone of influence.

Under these circumstances the states of the region will be trying to develop bilateral ties with the third states hoping to strengthen its security guarantees and to ensure more intensive economic development and, in its turn, the stabilization of the internal political, social and economic situation, which is one of the main conditions for the governing elites to preserve their power. TheKirghiz example shows that it is the USA and their allies that will become the partners for these states.

Banking on external partners inevitably leads to interstate competition for investments and foreign aid, exacerbating the existing interstate claims and conflicts. It can give rise to the power, economic and other kind of pressure and destabilise the regional states internally.

Taking account of the US geopolitical intentions, it can be assumed that closer relations between them and the Central Asian states will provoke a negative reaction from their main geopolitical competitors (Russia and China) and the consequent pressure on the states, which might result in damaging the foundations ofthe Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

Adhering to the foreign policy checks and balances system is one of the most likely trends in Kyrgyzstan in the short-term and mid-term perspective. However, due to some subjective reasons in its relations with the main foreign actors since 1991 Kyrgyzstan has been reacting spontaneously to the current events and trends. There is no elaborated foreign policy strategy or program-related system policy. The fact that the country has no strategy at the age of globalization, when a small fragile country is exposed to external threats and to the increasing geopolitical rivalry in the region, constitutes one of the major threats to the statehood.

April 2, 2008

____________________________________

1 In 2007 population amounted to 5 million 248 thousand, labour population was 3 million and 29 thousand. The surface is 198,5 thousand square kilometers. Density of population is 24 people by 1 square kilometer. The ratio of urban and rural population is 38% to 62%. In accordance with the World Bank’s projections the population will grow by 1,3 million by 2025. Unemployment rate was 11% in 2007.

2 Current military budget ($40,4 millions) does not exceed 1,5% GDP.

3 Kabar. — Bishkek, 2002. — 28 June. Aerodrome “Kant” is less equipped than “Manas”, but in military and technical terms it has some advantages in comparison to the US base because it was built for military aircraft. During the Soviet times there was a training camp of the so called “Five flying courses, where pilots from almost 60 countries were trained and pilots from the members of Warsaw Pact got advanced qualifications. Moreover, “Kant” is a base where a large contingent can be deployed in a relatively short period of time (up to 100 000 soldiers).

4 Pro-American and nationalist opposition press in Kyrgyzstan reacted strongly  to the event: “Airbase in Kant will be undoubtedly a symbol of Russian presence in , but nothing more…So, Russia intends again to deploy its military contingent in . What will it mean to our country? Good or bad news? Time will show.”— Ким А. Кто защитит безопасность Киргизстана — США или Россия?// Моя столица. — Бишкек, 2003. — 18 April. «Jogorky Kenesh has not yet ratified the agreement, nut Russians feel already at home, thinking they will stay here forever.…». — Bishkek Times. — Бишкек, 2003. — 24 October. “Believing Russians, might have told the Americans to leave the country. But it can’t do it because the country largely depends on the US grants… So far no one has been near the US aid. It is highly unkiley that the Russians who came to Kant will pay 7000 USD for each flight. They are unlikely to give anything to the Kirghiz. On the contrary, they have not yet forgotten their habit to command.”— Аалам. — Бишкек, 2003. — 14 October.

5 De jure Russian airbase in Kyrgyzstan is part of the Rapid Reaction Collective Forces in Central Asia. However, the base is financed by Russia and  de facto it is part of the Ekaterinburg-based Ural Air-Force and Air-Defense Army according to the official documents.

6 Kyrgyzstan’s Defence Ministry received small arms, equipment and radio communication means. Moreover, within the framework of military services repair works of Mi-8 helicopter are expected. — Шварев В. «Шквалы» из Бишкека// Независимое военное обозрение. - М., 2003. — 31 October. — С. 6.

7 Leader of a parliamentary faction “ regions” Tursunbai Bakir uulu did not agree with the decision, saying that “strikes against Afghanistan will not solve the problem of international terrorism which exceeds the limits of a single state.” In his opinion, Republican leaders take a “short-sighted foreign policy stance” as regards the situation in Afghanistan.— АКИпресс. — Бишкек, 2001. — 2 October.

8 “Manas” airport is equipped in accordance with the first category standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization. Its capacity is 1700 passengers per hour, its airstrip is 4200 by 60 metres.

9 Note of the US Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic. Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, № 542/01. Note of the Foreign Ministry of the Kyrgyz republic, № 011-19/247. Full text in.: Князев А.А. Афганский кризис и безопасность Центральной Азии (XIX — начало XXI в.). — Душанбе: Дониш, 2004. — С. 395-397.

10 Князев А.А. Государственный переворот 24 марта 2005 г. в Киргизии. Изд-е 3-е, исправл. и дополн. — Бишкек, 2007. — С. 69.

11 ITAR-TASS. — М., 2005. — 5 July.

12 AKIpress. — Bishkek, 2005. — 11 July.

13 RIA Novosti. — Bishkek, 2005. — 26 July.

14 Quiring Manfred. Wir befinden uns zwischen zwei Fronten// Die Welt. — 2005. — Juli, 26.

15 C.Rice’s visit was an attempt to neutralize “Russian factor” which is gaining importance at the same time: extending Russian airbase in Kant and the emerging dialogue between Russia and Uzbekistan. There was question of deploying AWACS radiolocation aircraft in “Manas”. In August 2005 commander of E-3A of NATO early prevention and control paratroopers forces mayor-general Harry Wintenberg, who is in charge of NATO AWACS, admitted that the issue is of importance to NATO. Deploying AWACS in Manas may pave the way for military operations in Iran, Afghanistan and Western China. In this situation, Bakiev showed himself as a person, who is not capable of taking important political decisions.

16 URL: http://usinfo.state.gov. In November 2005 negotiations between and US and Kyrgyz delegations started to revise the conditions of US military base. Major issues discussed are linked with financial aspects of the US military presence and do not take into account regional security interests.

17 The deputies drafted the document because of the incident, which happened on December 6, 2006, when an American soldier killed a Kyrgyz.

18 Князев А.А. К истории присутствия пограничных войск Федеральной пограничной службы Российской Федерации в Киргизской Республике// Вестник Киргизско-Российского Славянского университета. Т. 3, № 4. — Бишкек, 2003. — С. 29-44. Сумароков Л.И. История российской пограничной охраны на Тянь-Шане и Памире. — Бишкек, 2006.

19 Князев А.А. К истории присутствия пограничных войск Федеральной пограничной службы Российской Федерации в Киргизской Республике// Вестник Киргизско-Российского Славянского университета. Т. 3, № 4. — Бишкек, 2003. — С. 29-44.

20 Князев А.А. К истории и современному состоянию производства наркотиков в Афганистане и их распространения в Центральной Азии. — Бишкек: Изд-во КРСУ, 2003.

21 According to Zamir Kabulov, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Afghanistan, Manas Airport may become a terminal for drug trafficking in Afghanistan and abroad, may be to the airbases “Manas” in Kyrgyzstan and “Injirlik” in Turkey. — URL: http://www.wps.ru/ru/pp/military/2007/12/28.html

22 Князев А.А. К вопросу о криминальном компоненте современных политических процессов в странах Центральной Азии. В печати.

23 Only some regional integration projects are considered here. On some of them see documents of the conference, which took place on 26-28 June 2007 in Khodjent, Tajikistan. (Проекты сотрудничества и интеграции для Центральной Азии: сравнительный анализ, возможности и перспективы/ Под ред. А.А. Князева. — Бишкек, 2007).

24 Малашенко А. Ислам и политика в государствах Центральной Азии// Центральная Азия и Кавказ. — 1999. — № 5. — С. 64.

25 Бабаджанов Б.М. Халифат глазами местных богословов: история и современность// Проекты сотрудничества и интеграции для Центральной Азии: сравнительный анализ, возможности и перспективы/ Под ред. А.А. Князева. — Бишкек, 2007. — С. 198.

26 For more information: Бабаджанов Б.М., Муминов А.К., Олкотт М.Б. Мухаммаджан Хиндустани (1892-1989) и религиозная среда его эпохи (предварительные размышления о формировании «Советского ислама» в Средней Азии) // Восток (Oriens). — М., 2004. — №5. — С. 19-33.

27 On E.Primakov’s visit to Kabul and Teheran//Дипломатический Вестник. — М., 1993.— № 15-16. — С. 65.

28 Iranian concept sees Central Asian states as a united cultural zone with Iran It is also considered that the unity between the Central Asian and Caucasus regions (Asiaye Markazi va Ghafghaz) is based on such common factors as similar security interest in the Caspian and the membership of these countries in OEC (Organisation for Economic Cooperation). — The Process of Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus// The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, VI (3&4).

29 Малашенко А.В. Тупики интеграции в Центральной Азии// Проекты сотрудничества и интеграции для Центральной Азии: сравнительный анализ, возможности и перспективы/ Под ред. А.А. Князева. — Бишкек, 2007. — С. 16.

30 Князев А.А. Интеграционные проекты и геополитическое соперничество в Центральной Азии// Проекты сотрудничества и интеграции для Центральной Азии: сравнительный анализ, возможности и перспективы/ Под ред. А.А. Князева. — Бишкек, 2007. — С. 12-13.

31 According to the research carried out by the Public Opinion Center “El-Pikir” in spring 2006, 83% of labour migrants are ethnical Kirghiz. Among the migrants from Bishkek 40% have higher education, unfinished higher education – 2% and high education – 23%; 11% of the migrants from Chuiskaya oblast have higher education, 23% - unfinished higher education, 49% - high education and 17% - unfinished high education. Educational level among those who leave for Russia and non-CIS countries is higher than those who leave for Kazakhstan. It is due to the fact that those leaving for Kazakhstan are seeking employment in agriculture, i.e. residents from rural areas, in particular, from Southern Kirghizia. Those who leave for Russia are mostly urban citizens. The age pattern of labour migrants looks the following way:: 18-25 years— 25,5%; 26-35 years — 55,5%; 36-45 years — 15%; 46 and more— 4%. — Regnum. — 2006. — 12 May.

32 Российская газета - Центральная Азия. — Бишкек, 2008. — 14 February, № 4588.

33 Российская газета - Центральная Азия. — Бишкек, 2008. — 17 January, № 4564.

34 The New York Times. — New York, 2005. — March, 30.

35 On July, 11 two employees at the US Embassy in Kirghizia were sent out from the country. Foreign Ministry said “the decision was taken on the basis of facts, provided by the special services“ that testify to “regular interference into the state’s internal affairs in a way which is incompatible with the diplomatic status and international law norms”. «It can be regarded as an attempt to intimidate the Embassies and make the civil society silent. “The USA will be maintaining contacts with all the crusts of the Kirghiz society, including the official government representatives, opposition, NGO and communal leaders,”– such was the reaction of the American Embassy. — See Князев А.А. Государственный переворот 24 марта 2005 г.в Киргизии. Изд. 3-е, исправл. и дополн. — Бишкек, 2007. — С. 220-221.

36 «…In Kirghiz society people have identified themselves in accordance with the family/tribal principles, but not in the party basis. Hence, a Kirghiz feature of political parties, which are formed by the relatives, members of the same tribal group or locals. Analysing the composition of political parties, headed by the leaders, stands the testimony to this phenomenon. The majority in the party “Atameken” are southerners, whereas the party “Arnamys” is mainly constituted by the northerners. In public conscience there is a clear identification of the parties by the regional origins of their leaders. Moreover, it does not depend on whether there are activists from other regions in the leading group.». —Богатырев В. Место и роль политических партий в киргизском обществе// Политические партии в Киргизстане. — Бишкек: Институт общественной политики, 2006. — С. 8.



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