REFERENDUM RESULTS IN KYRGYZSTAN

TAMERLAN IBRAIMOV,
Director of the Center for Political and Legal Studies, Bishkek
The results of the referendum on the Constitution, which was held in Kyrgyzstan on October 21, were quite predictable. The point is that the results of all the four referendums held under former President Askar Akayev were pleasing to the authorities. Those results were achieved by hook or by crook, through bringing pressure to bear on election committees and through electoral fraud. Current President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and his team used the groundwork laid. So, there could be no doubt that the turnout would be high and the result would be good for the authorities.
Speaking about what was submitted to the referendum and why, I can say the following. In the past two years there has been infighting between the President and the Parliament in Kyrgyzstan. The bottom line was the issue of the government formation and its accountability. The President was really happy with the 2003 Constitution, according to which the government is accountable to the President with the President’s keeping aloof and the government’s being a whipping boy. The Parliament (except the pro-president group) tried to make the country a parliamentary republic as the issue of the government formation and responsibility is borne by the Parliament. This problem is old enough, and, in one or another form, is familiar to many countries including the post-Soviet countries.
However in Kyrgyzstan the process of the constitutional reform took a wrong shape when the two new Constitution’s versions in succession were passed in a short space of time. Meanwhile, a lot of rallies were held to make President Bakiyev carry out the reforms. Sometimes because of those rallies, the country was on the brink of an armed clash. At some moments the President concluded agreements with the Parliament, at others he went back on his word. After all, the majority of the population that tried to understand the cobwebs of the constitutional standards became enmeshed by them. Some opposition policy-makers’ coming over to the President’s side poured oil on the flames. The common people’s thoughts were in a whirl – whom to believe and what to believe in? Those events resulted in the population’s apathy and disbelief in impending changes. With those attitudes the President took the political initiative and made a clever move – he submitted the draft Constitutions and Еlection Сode to the referendum (when preparing to dissolve the Parliament and hold the elections according to the new rules).
Many policy-makers and experts realized from the first that those two laws are extremely voluminous and hard to understand, but all those articles’ importance to the country is enormous. Many political leaders and common people repeatedly said that such bills cannot be submitted to a referendum because if the citizens fail to understand their mechanisms, they cannot vote for the bills sensibly. Submitting the reforms to the legislators was an option. However President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s opinion prevailed that the country is tired and it is time to put an end to the political games. And the referendum was held.
According to the Central Election Committee, 2.4 million people (76 percent of voters) supported the new Constitution and the Election Code. The turnout was 80.64 percent (to believe the Central Election Committee). A number of non-governmental organizations, which observed the voting (Interbilim, Taza Shayloo, etc) report that the turnout was much lower – about 30-40 percent of voters. Those NGOs stated numerous violations of the election laws during the referendum. The official data and the data provided by some independent organizations differ greatly. Proceeding from this information one can say that the official referendum results allow President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and his team to think that the population supported him and his initiatives. The true voters’ will is unclear and it will be so, like it was under Askar Akayev, until the new president comes to power.
The other potential consequences of Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s initiatives on the constitutional reform and the new Parliament’s formation are as follows:
1) The President will form a puppet Parliament, intimidate the opposition and, in the short term, safeguard himself in order to prolong his term of office after 2010.
2) In the parliamentary elections the President will encounter a relatively consolidated opposition and will have to put up with its presence in the Parliament, which will make it much more difficult for him to implement his plans to rule the country over.
3) The President will get a new puppet Parliament, but unsettled economic and social problems will make him still less popular. This, in its turn, will lead to a discord in the Parliament. Many officials and politicians in Kyrgyzstan (and in other countries too) are extremely flexible and are ready to change their convictions.
Other scenarios are also possible, but while considering them one should bear in mind that the Kyrgyz President has no significant resources (petrodollars, etc) to solve the economic and social problems, and, to put it mildly, I do not think that the President and his team are good managers. Apart from that, the new Constitution, which was passed in the referendum, lacks any efficient mechanisms for settling potential conflicts between the President and the Parliament, and creates favorable conditions for abuses on the part of the President. If the President will take advantage of these chances is a question of time.
This way, the implemented reforms do not lay down the institutional foundations of the long-term stability in the country, but create semblance of such institutions that would be effective for a short space of time.
Kyrgyzstan’s opposition does not always have the system vision of the country’s development either, which causes the difficulties of the political process in the republic. The opposition is mixed and uncoordinated. In many respects, the opposition’s behavior will depend on the President’s exerting pressure on it. As the pressure becomes stronger, the opposition will acquire more incentives to be united. If the President intimidates the opposition and subjects it to repression, the situation can develop outside the law. Most likely, this will cause the retaliatory violence on the part of the opposition, which can be the end of the complicated, long-term, incomplete but still democratic processes in the country.
Forecasting the parties’ chances of being elected to the Parliament is a thankless task, particularly, if to take into account that the voters’ real attitudes differ from the opinion of those monitoring the vote count at the elections. In the elections the large-scale vote fraud may take place and what’s called the administrative resource (the built-in advantage) may be used. One can assume very carefully that the pro-president party Ak Zhol will take 30-60 percent, Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (Almazbek Atambayev) – 10-15 percent, and the opposition parties Ak Shumkar (led by Temir Sariev and Kubatbek Baybolov) and Ata-Meken (Omurbek Tekebayev) will get the rest votes. At least, those parties are famous enough and have supporters in all seven regions of the country.
October 25, 2007
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