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A FOREIGN VIEW OF RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM

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ROGER N MCDERMOTT,
Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC and an Honorary Senior Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University Kent, Canterbury (UK)

In the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, as the political and military structures examined the lessons learned from the campaign, the most ambitious, radical military reform agenda since the Great Patriotic War was announced. In October 2008, Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov outlined these sweeping changes, which involved abandoning the principle of mass mobilization and transforming the table of organization from a division-based to a brigade-based structure. As these initiatives were introduced, many questions were raised concerning the aims and motivations that underlay the reform and modernization of Russia’s conventional armed forces.

The recent history of “military reform” in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union provided grounds for skepticism, while some highlighted the curious fact that many aspects of the agenda would be implemented before drafting and passing a new military doctrine; which is scheduled for completion in December 2009.

Nevertheless, given the failure of previous reforms, it became apparent that this latest effort was unique; not only in its scale, but the speed of its implementation. The phrase was soon coined “new look,” to describe the transformation currently underway and avoid unnecessary comparison with previous failed reforms. Clearly passing a new military doctrine was not considered as a prerequisite, in order to overcome those most resistant to change within the military, the priority was to first transform the table of organization. Already, more than half the new brigades have been formed, tested in military exercises, and by the end of this year the process will be completed: the divisions will be gone in all structures apart from the airborne forces (VDV). Combat training and military education are being reformed in order to support these new structures. Arguably, the “new look” military is emerging, and it would now prove too dangerous to reverse these changes.

I would argue that the “new look” is for real, quite unlike those earlier experiments with reform that proved unsuccessful. However, the scale of the transformation within the Russian military is so deep and far reaching, with no military personnel having any experience of change on this scale, that quite naturally, there are a number of key challenges.

Successful Models

Russian policy makers cannot look for examples of successful military reform in either the country’s recent history, or rely on any understanding of such instances in Russia’s more distant past. Indeed, finding successful examples in this sphere entails closely examining the models in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the Baltic States, as these countries managed the transition of their forces. Some lessons can be drawn from the experiences of these countries, although it is of limited value in the Russian context. The reform of these militaries was carried out over a protracted period, using time-phased plans and critically maintaining political support throughout the entire process. Of course, the driving factor in each case was that they all had a clear and specific goal: NATO membership. This does not apply in the case of Russia, however, there is something lacking in the reform planning due to this overall “goal,” which needs to be addressed.

Although the aims of the current reform agenda have been set out in numerous statements by President Dmitry Medvedev, Defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, the Chief of the General Staff Army-General Nikolai Makarov and other service commanders it still lacks cohesion; in other words despite its ambitious scope, it appears piecemeal. In short, these statements promote aspirations, rather than delineating clear objectives. These include: forming permanent readiness brigades, overhauling the command and control structures, enhancing operational capabilities, improving the speed of deployment, etc. Some advance the idea that things will be clarified by passing the new military doctrine, but it is not really the function of the document to guide and shape a reform agenda. In the absence of that overall target for the reforms, other than discussing paradigms, Russia really requires an additional document that encapsulates the “new look” agenda, specifies its objectives, and offers a mechanism for measuring the success of the reforms.

“New Look” Brigades

There is an inter-related set of challenges facing the creation and equipping of the “new look” brigades, all of which will require considerable time and constant political commitment in order to overcome these hurdles.

Defense Minister Serdyukov has specified the aim of reducing the officer corps by 205,000 by 2012, as part of his drive to “optimize” the structures: achieving a soldier/officer ratio of 15:1. The backbone of the new brigades will be the non-commissioned officers (NCO’s), which will require time to educate, train and properly develop. In neighboring Kazakhstan, the United States, United Kingdom and NATO have provided training and assistance in forming NCO’s; which has been carried out over several years. Kazakhstani NCO development is making progress, but it has not yet achieved high levels of success. Arguably, the venture, as in Russia, will require a generation rather than only a few years to implement.

Indeed, as Western military assistance generally intensified toward Kazakhstan, it took time for Kazakhstani officers to accept receiving training from American or British sergeants. They have only gradually realized that in Western militaries initiative and independent thought are encouraged lower down the command structures. This highlights a significant challenge within the new structures in the Russian military: learning to delegate authority and responsibility.

During the second conference of the North Caucasus Military District NCO’s on 30 April, 2007 Major-General V. Milovanov, North Caucasus Military District military procurator, complained about NCO crime. In the first quarter of that year junior commanding officers accounted for one crime in every three recorded within the district and he asked what kind of authority or personal example could be offered when in 2006, 500 NCO’s went absent from their units or failed to return from official leave on time. The current reform program plans to significantly raise standards among NCO’s.

Every spring and autumn the draft brings new recruits into the Russian armed forces that reflect wider problems within society; commanders complain about the health, fitness and stamina of recruits. It is worth noting that this year will witness the first drafting of young men born in the 1990’s, known as Russia’s “time of troubles,” this will form the conscription pool until 2019. Unless the brigades are gradually professionalized, this will prove to be a persistent problem.

The approach toward “Kontraktniki” needs to be reformed as a concept. In order to attract quality personnel, pay, housing and social conditions need to compete with civilian alternatives.

Equipment and weapons currently used by the “new look” brigades are dated and desperately in need of modernization. Unfortunately, this will demand greater sustained state investment in modernization, which is most likely to be a lengthy process. Nevertheless, since the brigades are smaller in size, it might prove possible to prioritize key structures for fast tracking the introduction of new weapons and equipment, exploring ways of designing “force multiplier” systems for example.

Clearly, the modernization of the equipment inventory will take considerable time and expenditure. Yet, given the state priority on defense spending aimed at strategic deterrence, enhancing intelligence collection and procuring naval or air force platforms, it is unclear how the conventional forces will be adequately modernized, and within what timescale.

As this process unfolds, it will also be necessary to minimize waste, duplication, corruption and promote financial accountability in defense spending. This is about more than just throwing money at the military, in the hope that it somehow improves; it must be more far reaching and systematic.

The morale and discipline of personnel serving within the new brigades will also be crucial, as the reform proceeds. Former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov reduced the length of service for conscripts, in order to reduce the impact of dedovshchina. Clearly more is needed to eradicate this malaise entirely. The moral and ethical vacuum that resulted after the removal of the political officers from the Soviet structures is now being addressed by introducing chaplains. This initiative was announced in July by President Medvedev. These chaplains will represent the four main religions in the country: Russian Orthodox, Muslims, Buddhists and Jews. However, in order to contribute to raising the standards of discipline and morale, these chaplains will need to be empowered with authority to discuss not only religious issues. Military personnel should be able to discuss social and other issues with their chaplain, without being referred back to the commanding officer.

Informational Challenges

It is noticeable that the Russian media and military press present widely divergent views of the “new look” agenda and implementation. On the one hand, there are those loosely classed as the “disaffected,” some retired officers or those being civilianized as a consequence of downsizing the officer corps: naturally these portray change negatively. On the other hand, service commanders tend to either exaggerate the importance of their own branch of service, or present an unrealistic vision of the extent to which they will soon see modern equipment and weapons systems in large quantities. We are entirely unaware, in this black and white media representation, of alternative views. What positive views are held by those serving within the new structures? Have they noticed any improvement? Thus, the Russian state is faced with an informational challenge: to ensure the overall success of the reform entails maximizing the level of support within the military itself, as well as within Russian society. This demands more than simply a public relations exercise, but without addressing these challenges even those serving within the reformed military will likely hold negative or unrealistic perspectives on reform.

I would suggest that in a number of key areas of the reform underway, such as developing an NCO cadre or promoting professionalization, Russia will require foreign assistance. This is not a negative reflection on the country, and it is clear that elsewhere within the CIS, other states such as Kazakhstan, have benefitted by identifying the aspects of their military programs that require specialist assistance from partner nations.

Moreover, there are Western countries that are willing to help; which might also promote stronger levels of cooperation. In July 2009 the UK defense ministry offered to support the Russian military reform program in Russia, drawing on its own extensive experience of reform. It is not in the interests of the West, for example, to see the present military reform in Russia fail, no-one wants to see the Russian state with inadequate conventional forces, which risks lowering the nuclear threshold.

Faced with having to choose between personnel or equipment modernization as the priority task: the MoD has chosen to focus on the former, and then only gradually rebuild the outdated and exhausted equipment inventory. By the end of 2009, those serving within the Russian armed forces, and those familiar with its history and development will be unable to recognize the “new look” military: the reform is real, but the challenges it will yield are immense.

September 7, 2009




Our readers’ comments
Roger Hamburg 08.09.2009 23:14
I wish them well.I served in the U.S. army in the coldest days of the cold war 1960-61 and the topic is familiar to me b...

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