JOHN MARONE, KYIV
ORANGE REVOLUTION II
The sequel to Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, when hundreds of thousands of peaceful street protesters forced the authorities in Kyiv to hold honest presidential elections, seems to be attracting almost as much of an international audience as the original.
And although, like most sequels, Orange Revolution II lacks the excitement and drama of the original, its ending might deliver a stronger punch, the one that was held back the first time around.
In the evening of April 2, the country’s beleaguered president, Viktor Yushchenko, announced to the nation that he was dismissing the parliament and set new elections for May 27.
“Ukraine’s young democracy today faces a new and dangerous challenge, one that requires a firm and immediate response. It comes from a ruling coalition that has exceeded its mandate and attempted to monopolize political power, even at the cost of violating the constitution and ignoring the democratically expressed wishes of the Ukrainian people,” Yushchenko announced on national television.
During Orange Revolution I, Yushchenko was swept into office as the country’s democratic messiah, defeating his political nemesis, current Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, whose fraud-marred presidential bid was condemned at home and abroad.
But Yushchenko didn’t hold onto his hero status for long, losing most of his Orange allies, his public support and much of his executive authority within the first two years of office.
For his part, Yanukovych showed Ukrainians that a strong villain is sometimes more attractive than a weak hero.
The strongman from Donetsk began by leading his party to first place in the March 2006 parliamentary elections, then convincing one of Yushchenko’s main two Orange allies, Socialist leader Oleksandr Moroz, to form a coalition with Yanukovych’s Regions Party and the Communists.
A half year earlier, in the fall of 2005, Yushchenko had alienated his other major Orange ally, fiery femme fatale Yulia Tymoshenko, whose Byut bloc came in second in the parliamentary poll, by firing her as prime minister.
But Yanukovych didn’t stop there: after getting Yushchenko to endorse him as premier last summer, he used his control of parliament to snatch up most of the president’s executive power.
The president was forced to acknowledge the failure of the arrangement he agreed with Yanukovych during his April 2 address.
“It is with great regret that I have to say that the spirit of reconciliation and compromise required to make that arrangement a success has not been reciprocated by the ruling coalition. They have consistently acted in bad faith. Instead of respecting the agreement to share power, they have sought to undermine it by grabbing more power for themselves at every opportunity and with every means available.”
For all its irony and drama, the duel between the two Viktors might easily be relegated to the status of Off-Broadway or London’s Fringe – but the story runs deeper than that.
Yanukovych, who is widely seen as pro-Russian, has halted his country’s movement to join NATO and the WTO, goals that the pro-Western Yushchenko continues to strongly advocate.
One of the things that led up to Yushchenko’s unexpected dismissal of the parliament was the firing of his pro-Western foreign minister, Borys Tarasyuk, whom the constitution says is appointed by the president.
The final straw was when the pro-Russian coalition started luring lawmakers from Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s factions in the hope of creating a constitutional majority that would have been able to override presidential vetoes.
Yanukovych had, indeed, boldly announced a constitutional majority as a goal.
The premier was equally bold in his response to Yushchenko’s April 2 announcement to dismiss the Rada, immediately appealing to the Constitutional Court.
“It is necessary to correct the fatal mistake of the president and wait for a ruling from the Constitutional Court … Until such a ruling is made, the Verkhovna Rada and government must continue to function and there musn’t be any interference,” he said on April 3.
The premier is appealing for a constitutional ruling, because the president argued the parliamentary majority had made itself vulnerable to dismissal by taking on lawmakers from the opposition, as the constitution states that the formation of a majority has to be completed 30 day after parliamentary elections.
Yushchenko made himself vulnerable to the kind of constitutional crisis he is in now – during the uncertain days of Orange Revolution I – by signing a hurried and unclear set of constitutional amendments that transferred significant power from the presidency to the parliamentary majority.
Now he and his political nemesis are asking a high court to settle these complicated issues.
It was, after all, a high court decision during Orange Revolution I, together with the throngs of pro-presidential supporters braving freezing temperatures on the streets of the capital in front of international television audiences, that gave Yushchenko the upper hand over Yanukovych two years ago.
But not many insiders expect the same happy ending during this ongoing sequel.
For one thing, some of Yushchenko’s 2004 supporters are now aligned with Yanukovych, including Socialist leader Moroz and, more recently, one-time Premier Anatoliy Kinakh, who took almost a dozen lawmakers with him when he joined the pro-government faction.
Secondly, the Ukrainian public is not nearly as galvanized as it was in late 2004. The 30,000 demonstrators who have set up camp in the center of Kyiv are mere stage props from Yanukovych’s support base in eastern Ukraine.
True, this time around, Yushchenko is in the president’s chair, supported by the minister of defense he appointed and the head of the country’s intelligence service, but no one seems to know which way the feeble and politically divided Constitutional Court will rule, or if it will rule at all.
Moreover, even if the president does get high court approval to hold snap elections, there is no guarantee that the government will not block them in everything from finance to the compilation of local electoral commissions.
The parliament has already announced the dismissal of the current Central Electoral Commission, which nevertheless continues to go ahead with organizing the snap elections.
At best, analysts predict that Yushchenko will have to reach a deal with Yanukovych to reschedule parliamentary elections for a slightly later date.
At worst, the Constitutional Court could rule against Yushchenko, leading to a mass exodus from his faction and revenge by the pro-Russian majority.
In the mean time, just like in 2004, supporters of one Viktor or another are coming forward.
Lawmakers from Russia’s state Duma released a statement against the holding of snap elections, putting them again on the side of Yanukovych.
Most of Ukraine’s Christian churches – with the notable exception of the one subordinate to the Moscow patriarch, have announced their support for new elections.
International financial rating agency Standard and Poor’s responded to the hullabaloo by revising its long-term rating outlook on Ukraine from stable to negative “based on the deteriorating political climate and the concomitant risks to economic policies.”
As for the voters, a recent poll suggests that as many as 55 percent are against going through another parliamentary poll, more likely out of frustration toward the choice of politicians than a sign that they side with the parliament.
Voter apathy in the face of never-ending political dogfights is hardly surprising. Sequels are by their very nature ant-climactic, often leaving the door open for yet another sequel.
However, the stakes in Orange Revolution II are no less than two years ago, while the difference between hero and villain has been blurred. International audiences are right to have tuned into the continuation of Ukraine’s political drama, as everything from Eurasian geopolitics and European energy security are at stake. Moreover, no one knows how Orange Revolution II will end, much less whether it will be a happy ending for anyone.
John Marone, Kyiv Post editor, based in Ukraine.
April 9, 2007
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