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RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF CENTRAL ASIA
Central Asia’s proximity to regions that pose a challenge to international security, especially in the form of terrorist threats, has introduced a market of security, or antiterrorist, services, which involve the operation of various actors and alliances. In light of this situation, Tashkent is now facing a difficult geopolitical dilemma: which force should it rely on? Uzbekistan’s strategic partnerships with the United States and Russia are acquiring special importance under these conditions.
A PARTNERSHIP INTERRUPTED
In general, the geopolitical entry of the U.S. into Central Asia, and more importantly the American-Uzbek rapprochement, were largely due to the increased geopolitical importance of the region. It was also motivated by the global terrorist threat, together with the military operation in Afghanistan, started in October 2001.
As follows from numerous official statements, the United States is pursuing three goals in Central Asia:
– ensuring the development of stable, democratic states, including the settlement of regional conflicts;
– promoting the consolidation of friendly relations between the states of the region, on the one hand, and the U.S. and its allies, on the other;
– promoting the development of the market economy in the region, while preventing the unfair exploitation of their natural resources.
Washington worked out its Central Asian strategy in a consistent and systemic manner: in 1992, the U.S. Senate passed the Freedom Support Act, which emphasizes the importance of rendering assistance to newly independent states. Then came the Silk Road Strategy Act, passed in 1999. These documents laid the foundation for U.S. involvement in the region’s affairs. Military cooperation between the U.S. and Central Asia got off to a quick start, due in large part to the involvement of the U.S. Foreign Military Sales Program, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, and the formation of the Central Asian Peacekeeping Battalion (CENTRASBAT). One U.S. analyst commented that, although all of the above and other programs pursued specific goals, the cumulative effect was the formation of relations and procedures with these countries, as well as the creation of local military personnel that had a record of working with U.S. servicemen. Those efforts largely made for the deployment of a U.S. military force in Central Asia when it became necessary for combating terrorism [the author is referring to U.S. military bases at Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan and the Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan, deployed to support the military operation in Afghanistan. – Ed.].
In March 2002, the U.S. and Uzbekistan signed the Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework. This document confirmed Zbigniew Brzezinski’s prediction that there would be the establishment of geopolitical pluralism in the “heartland” of Eurasia, with post-Soviet Uzbekistan playing a key role in Washington’s Central Asian policy. In the Declaration, Tashkent reaffirmed its commitment to implement democratic and market-economy reforms, while Washington affirmed that it would assist with these efforts. In Article 2.1, the United States affirmed that it “would regard with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan.” Were this to occur, the two countries would hold bilateral consultations “to develop and implement an appropriate response in accordance with U.S. Constitutional procedures.” In Article 3.5, the Parties reaffirmed “their goal of expanding and intensifying regional cooperation in Central Asia, and the desirability of providing assistance in strengthening friendly and neighborly relations among the countries of the region.”
Following the disorder that erupted in the Uzbek city of Andizhan on May 13, 2005, the United States reduced its presence in Uzbekistan. The U.S., together with other Western states and international organizations, described the measures taken by the Uzbek authorities to suppress the terrorist riot as an “indiscriminate use of force,” which resulted in numerous casualties among the civilian population. The West demanded an international investigation of those events. Tashkent rejected the idea, saying it was an internal affair of a sovereign state. The West reacted by imposing sanctions on Uzbekistan, leaving it in semi-isolation on the international scene, while its relations with the U.S. deteriorated.
The official Uzbek position blamed Washington for inspiring the Andizhan riot. Soon thereafter, Tashkent demanded that the U.S. military force be withdrawn from Uzbekistan by the end of 2005. Washington’s demand for an international investigation has not changed. Meanwhile, all American nongovernmental organizations have had to terminate their activities in Uzbekistan.
To all appearances, U.S.-Uzbek relations will remain frozen until Tashkent changes its policy. In other words, the normalization of relations between the two countries will largely depend on the subjective factors that predetermined their deterioration, namely, the way the Uzbek leaders perceive U.S. strategy in Central Asia, as well as the essence and nature of the geopolitical transformation of the region.
At the same time, despite the diminished status of Uzbek-U.S. relations, which have declined to a level of simple cooperation, neither Party has denounced the Strategic Partnership Declaration. This leaves room for hope that objective processes will prevail over the more subjective ones.
A NO-ALTERNATIVE FRIEND?
In June 2004, during a visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Tashkent, Russia signed a Strategic Partnership Treaty with Uzbekistan.
In the treaty (Article 3), the Parties pledged to coordinate their efforts to build a strong and effective regional security system in Central Asia, and to create bilateral consulting mechanisms to this end (on a permanent basis and if need be).
In a hypothetical situation that is detrimental to their security interests, the Parties, by mutual consent, would enact the corresponding mechanism of consultations to coordinate their positions and moves (Article 4).
The treaty has set priorities for the Parties’ military and military-technical cooperation. These priorities include defense supplies from Russia; maintenance and modernization of military equipment in Uzbekistan; the training of Uzbek military officers at Russian military colleges and academies; joint military exercises; and cooperation within the framework of interstate space programs.
To combat threats to security, peace and stability, the signatories to the treaty would allow each other the use of military facilities on their respective territories on the basis of separate agreements (Article 8).
The Uzbek-Russian treaty differs greatly from the one drafted between Tashkent and Washington in the Declaration on the Strategic Partnership. The Declaration is a more systemic, all-embracing document that has the nature of a treaty, whereas the Russian-Uzbek Treaty on Strategic Partnership is more declarative. Finally, the treaty does not quite recognize the modern tendencies in political thought, which link security to democracy. Nor does it raise the issue of democracy as an integral part of the strategic partnership.
The strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the United States resulted, in particular, in the deployment of an American military force at the Khanabad air base, whereas the Uzbek-Russian strategic partnership manifested itself, for example, in Russia’s membership in the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). In other words, both strategic partnerships served as an expression and catalyst of the geopolitical transformation of Central Asia.
The new global division must give rise to an independent geopolitical specialization of Central Asia. From this point of view, Russia’s CACO membership is undoubtedly an extraordinary geopolitical development, which distorts both the political composition and the geographical configuration of Central Asia. Hypothetically, following this logic, CACO membership could be granted to the United States as well. The awkwardness of Russia’s CACO membership was removed following CACO’s merger with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in 2005.
The establishment of CACO, which initially was known as the Central Asian Commonwealth, was a natural consequence of the Soviet Union’s breakup. It symbolized the restoration of the historical integrity of the region, which was artificially divided at the beginning of the 20th century. Yet, the region still remains disunited due to interstate conflicts, largely brought about by new geopolitical processes. Russia was admitted to CACO by the initiative of Uzbekistan at the organization’s Dushanbe summit in October 2004. The move served as recognition of Russia’s vital interests in the region and the commonality of interests between Russia and the Central Asian countries. Moreover, the decision to include Russia meant that the member countries had failed to solve numerous regional problems, that tensions or mistrust were growing in their mutual relations, and the Central Asian states needed a mediator.
There is a widespread belief that Moscow will not tolerate a long-term and expansive U.S. military presence in Central Asia and will make every effort to compensate for it or counterbalance it. This opinion rests on a simplified and erroneous view of the role of the Central Asian countries. The invitation of the U.S. military into the region was not an act against Russia, because, at the very least, any challenge to Moscow from Central Asia would jeopardize the security of the local states themselves: Russian countermeasures to any unfriendly moves by the Central Asian states would be targeted at the latter, rather than at the United States. All three parties understand this very well. Unbalanced interpretations, based on stereotyped thinking, together with Russia’s membership in CACO and its efforts to create military bases, simply distort public opinion both in Central Asia and abroad.
The Uzbek-Russian strategic partnership must not be viewed as an alternative to the strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and the U.S. Indeed, Russia is regaining its former strategic positions in Central Asia, whereas the United States operates in the region while having to look over its back at Moscow. But can this be perceived as the restoration of Russia’s strategic domination in the region, or is it a responsible effort to strengthen the security of the five Central Asian countries? This remains an open question.
BETWEEN TWO FIRES
The many developments in Central Asia, including Russia’s full membership in CACO, the opening of Russian military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the establishment of allied relations between Uzbekistan and Russia, and the merger of CACO and EurAsEC, are more the result of Central Asia’s retreat than Russia’s offensive.
On November 14, 2005, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Islam Karimov signed in Moscow the Treaty on Allied Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The rapid transition from the Strategic Partnership Treaty of June 2004 to the sealing of allied relations is less symbolic of a new level of bilateral ties and more of a new “defensive” measure taken by Uzbekistan amidst growing pressure from the West.
When we consider the meanings of particular concepts, such as “strategic partnership,”“allied relations” and “alliance,” it becomes apparent that the Uzbek-Russian relationship corresponds to the “strategic partnership” concept. Actually, the Allied Treaty was drawn up specifically for one new article, saying “an act of aggression against either of the Parties by a third state or a group of states would be considered as an act of aggression against both Parties.” Thus, relations between the two countries have acquired a bloc nature. But considering the non-bloc approach that Uzbekistan has assumed in its foreign policy, and the absence of a common external enemy, the establishment of allied relations between Tashkent and Moscow looks as one more extraordinary occurrence.
Russia’s active participation in Central Asian affairs was certainly desirable and expected, just as was the Uzbek-Russian rapprochement. Yet, this does not give grounds for distorting the geographical configuration and political composition of CACO, which is intended to unite only those countries from the immediate region. Unfortunately, the latter failed to demonstrate their genuine independence and long-awaited unity. On the contrary, they showed that they needed an intermediary for solving conflictogenic regional problems, thus belittling and ignoring the value of regional integration.
Some analysts argue that the disunity of the newly independent states in the ex-Soviet Union, resulting from their sovereignty, only brought about the disruption of economic ties between them, in addition to their loss of international prestige and control over their borders. Generally speaking, the disunity demonstrated how unprepared the regional states were to adequately respond to new challenges and threats. Now, these analysts argue, the Central Asian countries are coming to understand the present realities and see the advantages of strengthening their relations with Russia. In particular, Uzbekistan has made a foreign policy turnaround toward the Russian Federation at the expense of its relations with the U.S. In fact, however, the existing problems stem not from the sovereignty of the Central Asian countries; rather, the problems stem from the distorted and hypertrophied interpretation of its essence. Otherwise, sovereignty and independence would turn into values that are bargained away or put up for sale.
In the opinion of many experts, Tashkent was guided by the principle “bases in exchange for aid” in its cooperation with the West. However, this approach quickly turned to disillusionment in Uzbekistan, which received “too little aid and too much criticism.” But this is a very simplified view. Countering terror is a common task and common interest of the participants in the antiterrorist coalition, i.e. a task and interest of independent significance.
The desire to receive benefits that go beyond the counterterrorism struggle will lead to the commercialization of this sphere of international security. It seems that Tashkent itself contributed to the commercialization of participation in the counterterrorism campaign. Meanwhile, the granting of its air space and military base to the international antiterrorist coalition was a specific contribution by Uzbekistan against Afghanistan, a front in the war against terror. The lease of its territory and bases to the coalition was important and advantageous for Uzbekistan. It helped strengthen the security of the country and the whole of Central Asia. Unfortunately, this form of Uzbekistan’s participation in the international antiterrorist coalition has been terminated.
The above prompts the conclusion that the issue of U.S. economic aid to Uzbekistan should be separated from the issue of their joint struggle against terrorism. Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s strategic partnership with the United States should not be interpreted that Tashkent is opposed to a strategic partnership with Russia. Each of these fields of Tashkent’s foreign policy has significance and prospects of its own, and it would be a strategic mistake to sacrifice either of them for the sake of the other. Anyhow, Uzbekistan is now a strategic partner of the two former (or still present?) geopolitical rivals – the United States and the Russian Federation.
Meanwhile, a unique situation is shaping up in the region. Washington and Moscow, traditional rivals in the “big game,” now have a real opportunity for coordinating their Central Asian policies on the basis of their common strategic interests. These certainly include non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia; the elimination of drug trafficking in the macro region of Central and South Asia; the eradication of religious extremism and international terrorism; the limitation of the conventional arms race in the region; and the prevention of global ecological disasters, for example, the drying up of the Aral Sea. The goals and policies of the U.S. and Russia in these spheres do not conflict with each other. Moreover, they can be mutually complementary and may unite Central Asia, which was divided as a result of the geopolitical struggle between UK/U.S. and Russia/Soviet Union as they fought to expand their spheres of influence.
One’s attitude to the unification of the region is actually a litmus test of the true intentions of the external geopolitical players. The Central Asian countries are now objects of global politics. Their transition from being “objects” to becoming “subjects” is possible only through full-fledged regional integration. Noteworthy in this respect is the Treaty on Eternal Friendship between the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, signed on January 10, 1997. This document actually means much more to these countries than any of their separate treaties on strategic partnership with outside powers.
In early 2005, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed establishing a Union of the Central Asian States. He said that the Treaty on Eternal Friendship between Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan “can serve as a firm basis for such a union.”
Clearly, strategic partnership must be established, above all, between the states of the region themselves. Perhaps, this is the best way to solve the strategic dilemma in Central Asia.
Farkhod Tolipov, Ph.D. (Political Science), is an associate professor at the National University of Uzbekistan in Tashkent
“Russia in Global Affairs”, № 4, October – December 2006
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