The Congress of Democratic Forces that took place in Minsk on 26-27 May 2007 had to answer whether the Belarusian opposition has any hope of becoming a credible political force capable of advancing democratic changes in the country.

Unfortunately, the answer to the question is largely negative.

The preparation for the Congress and even the battle for its summoning was full of intrigues that unwound against a background of clear signs of a deepening crisis of the opposition following the March 2006 presidential elections and the outburst of civic activism that initially raised hopes regarding the future of the democratic movement of Belarus. In the following year, however, the hard-achieved unity of the opposition all but collapsed. Moreover, the opposition proved incapable of reacting to the series of confrontations that developed between the state and society in the last year, or clearly articulate its position on the most pressing issues that would determine the Belarus’s development in the future. Democratic forces largely ignored events, such as a series of “labor conflicts” and hunger strikes by the citizens who fought for their political, economic, and religious rights; almost completely overlooked the Belarus-Russia “oil and gas war;” and all but ignored the local elections of January 2007 that once again ended in a devastating defeat of the opposition.

The opposition leadership spent the entire year since March 2006 in internal bickering and fights over the leadership positions in the opposition alliance. One positive result of the Congress is that in spite of all the antagonism and confrontation, the United Democratic Forces stood. But the list of failures and unresolved issues is far longer indeed. The replacement of the opposition leader Alyaksandr Milinkevich with a collective leadership of party bosses will hardly invigorate the opposition alliance. The proposed Strategy of the Democratic Forces that determines the opposition’s main objective as “seeking a dialogue” with the government was already labeled as an unrealistic “wait and see” strategy that can hardly be attractive for either the part of the society oriented towards the democratic changes or, moreover, the activists who strive to advance this change. The most depressing fact for opposition supporters is that the Congress almost entirely concentrated on leadership issues and forfeited discussion on the topics of political and social importance with the entire country. There was, for example, hardly talk at all about the opposition’s strategy for the upcoming parliamentary elections (scheduled for October 2008 but could be shifted to an earlier date).

Publicist Piotra Rudkouski rightly described the congress’s rationale, its preparation process, and the role of external factors in its implementation as “murky.” Indeed, there are reasonable doubts to trust the statements of some protagonists of the congress that the leadership change in the opposition was necessary to “invigorate the competition” between the new leaders of the coalition in order to make the entire opposition more robust and more in touch with the needs and aspirations of the society. Even though the charges of inaction and passivity against the former single candidate of the opposition in the 2006 presidential elections Alyaksandr Milinkevich are definitely justified, one cannot help admitting that the “collective replacement” of Milinkevich are veteran party leaders who had more than enough time in the course of the last 10 years to furnish their leadership aspirations with some credibility – and failed times and again.

The same can be said about the programmatic documents of the opposition, whose adoption was a formal rationale for the convening of the Congress. The strategy of the United Democratic Forces has as a centerpiece a declaration of intention to “pursue a dialogue” with the authorities (even though there is no clear vision how to bring the government to the negotiation table) The proposal of a dialogue, however, was exactly what Milinkevich was attacked for by his critics after the former single candidate appealed to Lukashenka in February 2007 with the suggestion to overcome differences in light of threats to the independence and economic security of Belarus following the “gas war”. Such inconsistency can hardly be explained except if one assumes that it was not the strategy but Milinkevich who was the real reason for the Congress. Furthermore, while the “wait and see” strategy contains no active component, we cannot see how its implementation can help the opposition to win the majority of the population, as some of its defenders ascertain. In any case, dropping a leader, who, while imperfect and somewhat slow-going, still commands the support in the society 3 to 4 times larger than the ENTIRE leadership that replaced him, can hardly be a good strategy for the head (or vote) hunt.

One can add here that a part of the Congress (movement For Freedom, Young Front and a faction of former political prisoner Mikalaj Statkevich) that opposed the leadership change and wait-and-see strategy and opted for a “radical” option of civil resistance seemed to have put unwarranted hopes for the regime change on radical actions undertaken by the opposition minority. Therefore, we may conclude that the entire opposition camp, instead of considering major shifts in the strategy and tactics, has opted to continue with those that correspond to the habits, visions, aspirations, and perceptions that directed their political behavior in the past. Hence, we conclude that, instead of making a breakthrough in increasing the capability of the democratic opposition to establish itself as a credible political force, the Congress merely made public several progressive crisis tendencies inside the opposition camp that slowly built up over the course of the past year. In many ways, such publicity is a positive factor by itself, as it allows more realistically assessing the conditions of the democratic forces, foreseeing future developments in its camp, and have a foundation from which suggestions for a positive changes within the opposition can be produced.

• The relative success of Alexander Milinkevich during the 2006 presidential elections established him as a towering personality among the rest of the opposition leadership. His ambition to unify the opposition threatened the leadership positions of the party head and the organizational inregrity of political parties themselves, which, far from being full-fledged political organizations in the normal sense of the word, turned into de-facto political clubs legitimating the position and status of their leaders.

• Alexander Milinkevich, while far from being an anti-Russian leader (except in the sense that he refuses to be adopted by the political technologists and king-makers, and thus rejects being a vehicle of implementation of political projects on Belarus originating from Moscow) emerged as a leader who gives credibility to the national and pro-European aspirations of the democratic opposition. At the same time, especially in the aftermath of the “gas war,” certain elements in Russia intensified the efforts to create a client opposition in Belarus. This development was prompted by the sheer absence, so far, of political elements of this kind. The emergence of a leading alternative political personality who made a clear statement that he would abstain from those political activities that would endanger Belarus’s political and economic independence was clearly running contrary to these plans. It is worth mentioning that the activation of “pro-Russian opposition” happened in the moment when pro-independence attitudes in Belarusian society are at the highest point ever.

• The opposition coalition that was formed in the run-up to the 2006 presidential elections was indeed hardly workable ad-hoc alliance of forces that differ on the most fundamental issues of politics and economy. This unworkable coalition required some external impact to be assembled. It appears that the coalition, rather than its workability, has become a major point of concern for the sponsor organizations who underwrote the Congress regardless of the feasibility that the UDF in the shape and with the agenda as it was formed after the May congress can hardly be a workable body. It appears that the imitation of success has become more important than the success itself not only within the opposition itself but also among the part of the democracy promotion community that adopted the political parties.

The fact that Russia begins to play a more active role in shaping the opposition political landscape in Belarus can hardly be doubted. It is possible to reconstruct the rationale in the following way. It can be very easily identified that a large part of the Russia’s political elite, media, and expert community are confident that the oil and gas price hikes following the winter “gas war” between Belarus and Russia will shake the economic and political foundation of the existing political regime in Belarus, and will accelerate its transformation and perhaps even its collapse. Given the fact that attempts to create a loyal “pro-Russian” opposition in Belarus failed so far, at least a part of the political elite decided to prepare for Lukashenka’s”doomsday” in advance, apparently setting a stage for the critical moment of political transition in Belarus so that the new post-Lukashenka elite would be compliant with economic and geopolitical interests of Russia’s ruling elite. Following this logic, one can consider the change of the guard at the top of the opposition’s leadership as a mere “cleansing of the field” for a more ambitious political project in the run-up of the 2011 (or possibly 2010) presidential elections. None of the four current co-chairmen of the UDF Council (including its de-facto leader Siarhej Kaliakin) will be a centerpiece of this project, though.

However; even if we are correct in the assumption that the project of creating the “pro-Russian opposition” within the framework of the party-based coalition is indeed underway, we may conclude that it is based on profoundly incorrect assumptions regarding both the stability of Lukashenka’s regime and capability of the Belarusian opposition to act effectively in the new configuration.

• First and foremost, we do not foresee, in the next several years, crisis tendencies in the economy or the power system that will indeed create a window of opportunity for the transformation or collapse of Lukashenka’s regime. The “doomsday forecasts” are usually based on the sheer exaggeration of the degree of economic losses that the Belarusian economy will suffer in the aftermath of the oil and gas price hikes (see, for instance, our analysis of the first results of the oil and gas war). Moreover, such forecasts usually reject the very possibility that Belarus’s government will adjust to the new economic realities, even though it is obviously trying hard to do so right now. If anything, the decision to cut back social benefits shows that it is capable of pursuing politically unpopular measures. Last but not least, such forecasts completely discount the ideological and propaganda resource of the Belarusian authorities.

Thus, for the first time ever in the Belarusian history, a vast majority of Belarusians declared to independent pollsters that they will be ready to withstand economic difficulties in order to preserve the independence of Belarus. This ideological shift, in spite of its far-reaching implications for the future political dynamics, is hardly accounted for by the politicians and analysts either in Belarus or Russia.

• Second, political projects presumably masterminded on the opposition field do not stretch beyond the “party” segment of the opposition, whereas a vast majority of the opposition force is represented by the civil society mostly unengaged by the political parties. This segment of the opposition force has a lower hand in the internal political fight and coalition games within the UDF. The reason is that it remains in the “grey” legal zone or is outright prohibited, and any sort of activities that will ensure its adequate representation in the coalition building process (the very membership lists, for example), put civil society under the attack of prosecution. It is even possible to conclude that by delegalizing civil society and deregistering most of the local party branches (but preserving legitimate status for the central party offices), the authorities simply programmed the Belarusian opposition for the irritating for the opposition base’s elitelevel intrigues at the governing bodies of the UDF and hardly adequate to the current political situation party-based politics (this inadequacy can be easily confirmed by the strange ideological alignments within the “party” and “pro-Milinkevich” camps of the UDF. For example, the split between the “party” and “pro-Milinkevich” camp can hardly be explained by itself by the division between pro-independence or pro-European and pro-Russian, or left and right parts of the opposition. While Milinkevich’s camp is clearly nationally-minded, there are strong leftist (Statkevich’s faction) and liberal (embryo Freedom and Progress party) elements in it, whereas the party faction is a motley coalition stretching from the nationalist right (BPF) to the Communist Left).

The reality is, however, that most rank-and-file opposition activists who do the practical work during the real-life political campaigns are concentrated in the civil society sector. This segment of the opposition is hardly manageable by the same party discipline that ensured party leaders a smooth conduct of the Congress according to the scenario worked out by the Council of UDF. The gap between political leadership and the base can bring forward a disaster for the opposition of a magnitude similar to its failure during the 2001 presidential elections, when, at the end of the day, only several hundred people showed up to the streets to protest alleged violations of the electoral process.

We can therefore conclude that the formation of the “pro-Russian opposition” (if such a project is indeed being implemented) has taken a false start. The project will most likely end in a failure at a time when, while not reaching a critical point, the process of accumulation of crisis tendencies in the Belarusian economy and its government system will be well underway, and when the demand for real alternatives for Belarus’s future will be maturing. Analytical and expert community should start today in order to be prepared for this moment when the real window of opportunity for change in Belarus will open.

Vitali Silitski

Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, June 5, 2007

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