RAFIK SAIFULIN,
Political analyst, Tashkent

Today it is obvious that security issues in the broad and narrow sense will be in the limelight, just like geopolitics in general, even though as few as 20 years ago it was suggested the term "geopolitics" be discarded as obsolete. Today no one contends the correlation between security issues and geopolitics. It is in this vein that the article is written. It will raise some points, which are being discussed as to Uzbekistan's stance.

General remarks

Complex and specific situation in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the new independent states in the regions have exerted their impact on internal and external policies of the nascent Republic of Uzbekistan. It has to be reminded that this period is marked by many discrepancies and controversies at the national level in the new independent states of Central Asia, as well as in the inter-state relations, followed by a civil war in Tajikistan, open-ended conflict in Afghanistan, new frictions in the relations among the New Independent States of Central Asia related to the state borders, water and energy issues. Moreover, the Republic of Uzbekistan is the most densely populated state in the region and is adjacent to the zones of the existing or potential conflicts. Besides, new state institutions had to be formed and the priorities for economic and social reforms had to be set.

This situation largely accounted for Uzbekistan's strategic development priorities based on the fundamental responsibility on the part of the Uzbek leadership for Uzbekistan's future and for the whole region. In essence, Tashkent proceeds from the assumption that Uzbekistan plays a stabilisation role in the region due to its geographical location, natural and human resources and historical experience. This approach was obviously treated cautiously by some external forces. However, there are no doubts that the above principle of Uzbekistan's accountability will remain preponderant in the mid-term and provide an insight into the logic of the national leadership's strategy.

Security issues

In fact, this logic in the decision-making processes has not so far undergone any essential changes. In particular, it can be seen at the level of elaborating conceptual approaches to the security issues. For instance:

1. Uzbekistan earlier than many other states raised the issue of the international terrorist threat and religious extremism. Suffice it to recall, at the 48-th session of the UN General Assembly back in 1993 the leitmotiv of the speech made by Uzbekistan's president Islom Karimov was to unite efforts in fighting the global threat of international terrorism and religious radicalism. At that time this call was not given due attention and the situation changed dramatically after the 11 September 2001 tragedy in New York.

Tashkent has always been consistent in evaluating security threats, in this particular case, those posed by terrorism. A complex situation in Afghanistan can be cited after the Taliban moved to the CIS southern borders in 1996. At that time some Uzbekistan's neighbours decided against dramatizing the situation and were even ready to establish relations with the Taliban movement.

After a series of terrorist attacks in Tashkent in 1999 Uzbekistan's leadership found itself in a difficult situation, all the more so that Uzbekistan's Islamic movement was unambiguous in its aggressiveness and was getting increasingly closer to the international terrorist structures, such as Al-Qaeda. In this situation, along with the insufficient attention of the international community to a real threat, which dramatically revealed itself in a year and a half, Uzbekistan specified an action strategy in case the situation deteriorates. Substantial changes were made in the National Security Concept. Military Doctrine was replaced altogether by the Defence Doctrine.

It is no wonder that after the USA waged a war on terror Uzbekistan engaged into this campaign and, more specifically, provided its military air force base in Khanabad to the USA on a temporary basis. Even today Uzbekistan does not underestimate a terrorist threat and is ready to participate in collective international counter-terrorist activities. In particular, it provides its assistance to NATO, namely to the Federal Republic of Germany, so that it could accomplish tasks in its zone of responsibility in Afghanistan.

(2). Among other real threats, which Uzbekistan has consistently recognized, is drug trafficking, drug production in Afghanistan and drug transportation via Central Asian states.

(3). Another permanent regional threat is the complicated situation in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, the situation in this country is far from becoming stable. Weak central power in Kabul, persistent fratricide wars, ethnical and clan conflicts among the Afghans, complete dependency of a significant part of the population on drug production constitute a non-exhaustive list of problems, which neither the USA, nor NATO are capable of solving, all the more so given the US fiasco in Iraq.

The issue of Afghanistan is of serious concern to Uzbekistan not only due to the geographical proximity with this fractured country, but also for other reasons. Some argue that one of the US mistakes is to impose artificial democratic regimes in Afghanistan according to the Western standards. Today it is of no use to impose abstract democracy models on the Afghans when most of the population does not get what they should do. Often the same mistakes are made as during the Soviet military presence, which results in rejecting the West with its values, religion and culture. In some regions people are even nostalgic about Russia, even the former contestants of Moscow.

However, despite obvious circumstances, no active efforts are seemingly pursued in the West to find a working concept of reforming the Afghan state with due regard for its traditions, mentality and other factors.

Against this background some US experts think it is too early to talk about the Big Central Asia (which means considering Afghanistan together with the Central Asian New Independent States). Extending the number of Central Asian countries (not geographically) will dramatically complicate the already motley regional composition. Creating institutions of regional integration is far from being over. Therefore, an untimely extension of the number of its participants will not only complicate the situation, but may also undermine some promising projects and result in unnecessary political problems.

Countering security threats

Uzbekistan is deeply convinced that none of the Central Asian countries or any of the major external partners is capable of countering the abovementioned threats on their own. It has to be noted that all regional politicians and experts are calling upon fostering cooperation, apart from Turkmenistan that has a different stance. However, the main question for the countries lies in choosing priority areas for such cooperation and in the way they evaluate efficiency of their interaction as to countering security threats.

Thanks to the measures taken, including those at the level international law, potential cooperation pattern is being shaped. Among its participants are the New Independent States, except China. In this respect, the following comments can be made.

CIS. Unfortunately, the hopes pinned on the CIS as the driving force behind the post-Soviet states integration turned out to be unjustified. CIS is turning into a club for political discussion and today is incapable of taking efficient collective measures in all areas of cooperation. However, CIS as a special international tool has not yet lost its raison d'etre. It provides an opportunity for its members to make their stance heard, as well as constitutes a tool for finding partners and cooperation forms on a bilateral basis or within the framework of other organizations, where CIS states are also members.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The Organisation openly demonstrates its ambitions, especially China, and is quite promising given the emerging geopolitical pattern. However, although the SCO formed its institutions, it does not mean that all the SCO members share the same approach as to the organisation's future priorities. Apart from ostentatious military trainings, held mostly by Russia and China, the SCO has so far done little as an organisation countering terrorism, drug trafficking and other threats.

Despite creating a Regional antiterrorist structure within the framework of the SCO, its activities bear few results. Apparently, at this stage its activities should be focused on information exchange concerning the leaders and members of the terrorist and separatist groups and international drug cartels. However, even in this area the SCO is facing some technical issues and diverging members' objectives and tasks.

EuroAsian Economic Community. It is a relatively new and promising organisation, though dominated by economic cooperation issues. Efficient and timely solution of these issues may be positive in terms of palliating social and economic issues at the national level in a given country, which may be conducive to reinforcing internal security and stability.

Collective Security Treaty Organization. This organisation is functionally oriented towards ensuring security. However, many organisational and management issues are complicated by a vast geographical representation of its members, as well as differences in approaches as to what security threats should be recognized as the most important.

Uzbekistan's stance

The first experience, which does not always turn out to be the most successful, of creating the abovementioned organisations is the main reason why Uzbekistan's leadership in its cooperation with external partners favours bilateral ties. It is in accordance with Uzbekistan's law "On External Policy", which says that Uzbekistan will not be a member of any military or political bloc or alliance.

This principle has nothing to do with the principle of neutrality in Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan is a member of some organisations, including those that were mentioned. It has to be noted that all these organisations are not classical military and political alliances, such as NATO or the former Warsaw Pact.

This explains suspension of Uzbekistan's membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in 1992 upon Uzbekistan's initiative, which was due to the growing concern about the worsening situation in Afghanistan after withdrawal of the Soviet troops. After the administration of VladimirPutin came to power it was increasingly clear that there would not be any efforts to make the Collective Security Treaty Organisation a future basis for changing military and political configuration in the CIS. Uzbekistan became its member again. The Senate ratified this decision in March 2008.

Uzbekistan's withdrawal from GUUAM is due to the same reasons, when this organisation was increasingly seen as a political counterbalance to Russia's growing political powers. Uzbekistan's hopes to get economic benefit from its membership were not justified. All these resulted in Uzbekistan's withdrawal from GUUAM.

It has to be taken into account that Uzbekistan considers its participation in the international organizations on the post-Soviet territory as an opportunity to enhance mutually beneficial cooperation on a bilateral basis and find new avenues of cooperation. Unfortunately, as it turned out, even a narrow circle (3-4 countries) of the participants in the promising projects in CIS is not working efficiently enough. Therefore, bilateral treaties are more operational, productive and controllable, whereas attempts to find solutions within a broader framework turn into a talking shop.

From this point, Uzbekistan's developing relations with Russia provide a good example. As it is known, under Boris Yeltsin the relations between the countries were limited to declarations of good intentions and even characterized by mutual reproaches. Time was lost and some opportunities were missed. Today the situation is drastically changing. In accordance with the agreements, the bilateral Russian-Uzbek relations acquired the status of not only partnership relations, but became inter-allied.

There are grounds to believe that this state of affairs satisfies both parties. The matter is that national security issues, including mutual assistance guarantees in Uzbekistan, depend to a large extent on Russia. This situation reflects shared opinion of Uzbekistan's leadership and the overwhelming majority of the population.

Against the background of Uzbekistan's relations with some of its neighbours, which are not always smooth, Uzbekistan does not see any possibility of close bilateral cooperation with them in the military and technical areas, all the more so that their potential does not respond to its needs. Therefore, in terms of ensuring military capabilities of its military forces Uzbekistan banks on Russia, which means armaments and technologies supplies, as well as cooperation in training personnel.

Close and productive cooperation between Uzbekistan and Russia (far exceeding that with any other state) stands the testimony to it. It can be suggested that such situation will remain in the mid-term if Russia's management keep sticking to its stance on Uzbekistan.

Despite the obvious priority to Russia, Tashkent is trying to diversify its cooperation with other states. One of the most successful examples of such cooperation is with the Federal Republic of Germany. Its military forces may use a southern Uzbek town of Termez and its infrastructure as a transfer point for their military men serving in Afghanistan. Tellingly, such relations do not provoke any discontent with other countries, all the more so that military and political cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Federal Republic of Germany is backed up by a reciprocal desire to develop trade and economic ties, including ways of implementing German investment programs.

Cooperation between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the USA is especially acute because its military and political aspects were given a great impetus at the beginning of the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan hoped that after toppling the Taliban the USA will bring order and stability to Afghanistan. It did nit happen. For the USA it was extremely beneficial to use the Uzbek base in Khanabad to solve their tasks in Afghanistan. However, it was getting clear that Washington was going to take advantage of its military presence in Uzbekistan with long-term geopolitical implications.

On the whole, the USA made some obvious mistakes. Among them are: (1). Washington did not get Uzbekistan's discontent about unrealised hopes of massive material and financial aid from the USA. (2). Washington overestimated the regional countries' dependence on the US political will. The US authoritative style gave rise to explicit and implicit discontent. (3). The war in Iraq exerted a negative impact on the American image. The USA were trying to convince Uzbekistan to take part in it. (4). The USA underestimated the fact that the relations between Uzbekistan and Russia had not only been forgotten, but were needed by both parties and called for their modernisation.

For these reasons a "honeymoon" in the relations between Uzbekistan and the USA ended as quickly as it began. The USA were asked to leave the Uzbek air force base. The USA then turned to their rhetoric accusing Uzbekistan of not-existent democracy and human rights. The events in Andijan were a good chance for the US to turn the EU and NATO against Uzbekistan. Germany did not agree with it. However, even as the country assuming the EU presidency Germany was among the minority.

This resulted in colder bilateral relations. No one won and no one lost. There are some indications that make us conclude that the ambiguity of such situation no longer satisfies the USA, who lost in Uzbekistan a trustworthy partner. In the last 6 months the USA have been taking careful steps to bring relations with Uzbekistan to a new level. In any case, a quick visit by the US Air Forces Central Committee Chief to Tashkent stands a proof to this. Initial measures have already been taken by both parties. For example, Uzbekistan provided its air corridor for supplying cargos to Afghanistan, exclusively humanitarian cargo and only by the German air forces. However, it would be premature to speak about restoring military and political cooperation with the USA in their former format.

The threat to become a victim of geopolitical games or to lose some part of its sovereignty and independence, which Uzbekistan will never accept, accounts for this. 

Along with external factors regional problems should not be discarded. They constitute a challenge rather than a threat. First and foremost, it concerns rational use of water and energy resources. Border issues and similar issues are of secondary importance from this perspective.

Among the internal national issues one can point out those, which any country faces: social differences, persistence of clan structures and regionalism, poverty, limited resources for implementing large-scale projects (searching external investors), religious factors (radicalism).

All social and economic issues may be gradually solved at the national level, increasing the number of external investors is mostly a matter of time, but extremism, especially religious extremism, may require rapid military intervention. The events in Andidjan are a good example to this. The government severely clamped down upon a military coup organized by the Islamic radicals, drug dealers and criminals.

Bearing in mind the numerous victims, it has to be recognized that most part of the population is increasingly aware of the implications the events in Andijan could have produced not only in Uzbekistan, if the riots had not been quashed.

Tellingly, such pressure on terrorists in order to normalise the situation was understood by many countries, including Russia, which also accounts for the even closer relations between our countries.

Ideology of Partnership

A popular idea about the necessity of a multi-vectored policy as the basis for the ideology of partnership does not seem to be the overriding, although important.

Multi-vectored policy is being elaborated either in the official cabinets and analytical centers working for them, or reveals itself in a chaotic way as a reaction to the changing situation and the external forces' actions that go along with it. Apparently, big self-sufficient states and political blocs, determining major regional and global development trends, can choose the first option.

Other less influential members of international community do not have such an opportunity, mostly due to the scarcity of their national resources. However, many of them more and more often resort to elaborating their ideology of partnership with their own vision of a multi-vectored policy. In reality this is just a cover-up of a chaotic external policy in a rapidly evolving environment. Some small Central Asian countries do this.

Uzbekistan has so far refused to adopt such an approach. If the term "multi-vectored policy" was used at all, it was with a different meaning, in particular, with reference to setting tasks in accordance with the principle of priority and precedence. In general Uzbekistan's ideology of partnership is based on the following principles:

Firstly, on the choice of a partner, the extent of partnership and major avenues of partnership, which depend on the national interests. This requires a right approach in finding common interests with the potential partners.

Secondly, on defining topical national issues and similar issues with other states, which would require cooperation with external partners. Obviously, it can mean one or several partners, what can be qualified as a multi-vectored approach. However, it is not quite so because in this case we are speaking about an ad-hoc partnership.

Thirdly, on the multi-layered approach in choosing a partner. In reality sustainable partnership in one area may go hand in hand with the differences in other areas.

Undoubtedly, the partnership based on the above principles is not always long-term and can be considered with scepticism and criticism. The crux of this approach is not "partnership for the sake of partnership", but a partnership for attaining a certain goal at a given stage and at a given period of time. This approach sheds more light on Uzbekistan's ideology of partnership and provides an insight into the logic of those activities, which were taken earlier and are being taken.

One can often hear comments on the vectors of Uzbekistan's policy, which are linked with the geographical scope of Uzbekistan's leader's visits and their frequency. However, this approach is not quite correct. The visits to Russia and Turkey, the EU countries and Japan, China and Malaysia, South Korea and the Arab states do not mean there is some complicated multi-vectored policy. In reality it might mean finding partners to accomplish a certain task. Uzbekistan, like other states in the region, is still acquiring experience in developing relations with its non-traditional partners. 16 years of independence are seemingly not enough for this.

This situation influences the idea of forming a regional partnership structure, which is today far from being an easy matter. There are significant differences in the countries' stance on most issues of regional importance. At the same time no one denies that such problems exist, but their causes and solutions are seen differently. All this is based on the reference to the national interests and a growing national identity. In the long run, everyone agrees that integration processes should be stimulated. They are regarded by many as some unifying processes.

There is a prevailing opinion in Uzbekistan that at this stage integration should be seen as an interaction tool to solve specific problems. Choosing this option will pave the way for the new forms of integration.

However, many initiatives and related multilateral projects were "stillborn" mostly due to the notorious issue of multi-vectored policy, which is pursued in some neighbouring Republics. In reality the newly independent states of Central Asia, on their own or having combined their efforts, are not capable of implementing multilateral mutually beneficial projects in any area as the basis of integration.

In this regard, the attempts to create a Central Asian Economic Community were not totally justified, as well as forming within its framework a Central Asian Central Bank, water, energy and other consortiums, ensuring free reciprocal access to the media and other information sources.

Given the still existent practices of traditional solutions of the present-day issues by short-term bilateral agreements, the same question arises: is the regional integration needed at all, even as the joint implementation of multilateral projects?

Uzbekistan thinks it is necessary, but as a gradual implementation of specific "civilization" projects. The international conference on the Aral sea, which took place in Tashkent in March, 2008, proves this. Obviously, the subject put forward by Uzbekistan was topical and politically correct. However, there was no avoiding some political implications. The range of different ranks of representatives, who participated in the conference, proves this.

This recent example, like many others, has shown vividly the necessity to have somebody who would spearhead integration processes in the region. Only Russia seems to be capable of assuming this role today.

To prove this one can cite examples of a successful cooperation under the Russian "umbrella". In particular, in the military sphere head-quarter exercises are getting more frequent with the participation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 

An association of gas producing countries comprising Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which with Gazprom's support can get important dividends by extending gas supplies to the world markets, has been created.

In any case, such projects may create a solid basis for multilateral cooperation in its real form, but not on paper. It seems that such partnership concept is of increasing interest with these potential leaders, such as the USA or Japan, for implementing specific regional projects. This avenue of regional cooperation and partnership looks promising.

Having said this, a broader interpretation of the term "alternative" can be proposed. Undoubtedly, there are many examples when the priority is given exclusively to one external partner does not have any other alternative (mutual exclusion). The acquired, although still insignificant, experience makes it possible to consider alternative complementary with due account of the proposed principles and approaches.

For instance, Uzbekistan's obvious orientation to Russia as regards exploration, production and transportation of hydrocarbons does not rule out the participation of China, Japan and South Korea in these processes. The companies of these countries should not pursue driving Russia out of Kazakhstan, but they have real investment opportunities in Uzbekistan. In this case alternative seen as complementarity is beneficial to everyone.

In any case the entire set of issues linked with the ideology of partnership will still be discussed for a long time, which will pave the way for a broad and multi-faceted concept on this issue. It does not yet exist in its complete format in many countries, which leads to mistakes in choosing a partner.

 Social and political aspects

When analyzing a country's external posture social and political aspects are often linked with the stance of the national elite representatives or groups. National elite in its traditional sense is still being formed in Uzbekistan. What is called political, business and intellectual elite in Uzbekistan is represented rather by individual authorities, who have a chance to exert a certain influence on public opinion and to a lesser extent on the powers that be.

In Uzbekistan there are traditionally several famous families (dynasties), who are respected and enjoy great authority. However, it does not always mean that they are part of what is usually called elite. In public opinion elitism is seen as the leaders' proximity to politics, economics and well-known intellectuals.

This elitism is multi-layered and very often temporary. In politics it comes from the President's entourage to the leaders of local administration (khokim). In economy it starts from the successful businessmen and state officials and goes to bazarcom (head of a big market). In an intellectual sphere it goes from famous scientists, artists and state officials to the heads of departments in a provincial university.

Despite their positions, these elites have a limited scope of influence. While the presidential powers are strong, one can hardly speak about sustainable elite groups in Uzbekistan with their old traditions, to say nothing of the possibility to exert decisive influence on the decision-making. The elites are well aware that their time may be soon up and their touted elitism will be restricted to a certain street or machali (traditionally organized citizens of the same district), although it will be looked up to by the relatives. The principle according to which "when you have at least some authority and finances, you are respected, when you lose it, you are forgotten" is the main explanation why there are no lasting elites in Uzbekistan.

Therefore, if a group pretends to be an elite, it will stress its loyalty to the state leadership, which, in fact, determines a national elite. However, the elites, even temporary ones, pursue their own interests and are trying to show their loyalty at their elitist level. More successful they are in doing this, higher they get in their elitist hierarchy, which paves the way for extending their own interests and ways of achieving them.

The elites' interests are, as a rule, personally motivated. It is not always a pecuniary interest, though it prevails in all the New Independent States of Central Asia. Getting into the elite is often triggered by ambitiousness and vanity and does not always mean an intention to make a contribution to ensuring national and social interests.

In this situation the elites are looking for internal partners not only among then or at their level, but also elsewhere. It constitutes the basis for forming groups in accordance with the corporate interests. Uzbekistan's leadership is well aware of the situation. For example, a young Liberal-Democratic party of Uzbekistan supported by the President I.Karimov and holding leading positions in the legislative system, is called upon to consolidate these growing corporate interests within the framework of the national interests. In this way two objectives are achieved: (1) limiting the influence of the clans, family and local groups and (2) stimulating and developing a completely new elite in Uzbekistan on this basis. This is a credible task, but quite challenging, which will require some time to form new thinking patterns and traditions, especially among the young.

At the same time the elite groups do not limit themselves to looking for internal partners. Many of them are pro-active externally in pursuing their interests, which are quite different in their structure, nature and ways of achieving among the groups.

If the elites strive to firmly stick to the tenets of Uzbekistan's leadership, which deprives them of their own initiative and creativity, business elites are more independent and have more opportunities, but they are running higher risks in developing external partnerships.

In doing so there are often visible differences in the interests of political and business structures. However, everyone is acting properly to ensure their interests. For example, when the relations between Russia and Uzbekistan were quite cold under B.Eltsin, the Uzbek businesses not only kept maintaining their relations with their Russian counterparts, but were trying to find new opportunities. The same applies to the current relations between Uzbekistan and Great Britain. Conversely, against the backdrop of the then favourable relations between Uzbekistan and the USA, there is a growing scandal around the gold producing company Newmont. There are many examples of this kind. However, political and business elites are trying to at least prevent their interests from dramatic overlapping, if not consolidate them.

Structures of influence on Uzbekistan's internal and external policy are quite vague and under-developed. For example, lobbyism, which is popular in the West, does not have its roots and traditions in Uzbekistan. This does not mean that there are no attempts to exert some influence on the authorities by business elites. However, they tend to take traditional forms (family relations, friends, presents and bribes, which gives rise to corruption). As a rule, national interests are not taken into account. As to these actions as such, they pursue specific and obvious subjective goals.

The role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is also weak. Like any other civil society institutions, they are still in the making. Uzbekistan, like other New Independent States after the collapse of the USSR, faced the problem when using external financial resources by NGOs made them tools in the hands of external actors to be used for pressuring Uzbekistan, including for organizing one more "colour" revolution. Uzbekistan's rigid stance and counteraction to such intentions were used by some Western circles to fan anti-Uzbek feelings. The situation with NGOs in Uzbekistan is evolving quite slowly. When there used to be a solid financial support from abroad for the NGOs, their number was growing and young dynamic people were attracted to work for them. Today usually disinterested enthusiasts with solid experience in forming civil society work there.

Uzbekistan has a legal and normative base regulating NGOs activities, their rights and scope. However, there is seemingly a growing need to modernize the rules of material and financial support for NGOs. In this case more efficient NGOs will emerge, which will not position themselves as grumbling freethinkers (which is not promising today), but as the partners to the state and thus influence internal and external policies.

Social aspect is extremely important in developing partnership, especially with Russia. According to many public opinion polls, people are convinced that friendly relations should be maintained with all countries, but first and foremost with Russia (on average 70% of the population).

Such approach has been recently buttressed by an increasingly popular issue of labour migration. Given that there is a surplus of labour resources in Uzbekistan, many Uzbeks, especially those who are poorly qualified, consider Russia a certain Klondike.

However, Russian-Uzbek relations should not be limited to searching job opportunities by the Uzbeks in Russia. It would be incorrect and not objective. Without any doubts Russia and Uzbekistan have close historical, traditional and developed humane relations. Suffice it to say, Russia is an absolute leader when it turns to informational and cultural coverage in Uzbekistan.

One more trend has to be noted. There is phased national educational programme in Uzbekistan, which is extremely important for the Republic because more than half of its population are people younger than 20. At the same time in late 90-s well-off families tried to send their children to study in the prestigious Western universities. This trend is still valid today, but there is also a growing tendency to get education in the leading Russian universities. Apparently, in the near future this will only be more favoured.

Partnership relations with and without Russia

When the question is raised in this way, alternative is considered in terms of mutual exclusion. Globalisation makes such approach highly unlikely even for the world centers of power or given countries, whose leaders overestimate their importance, which might result in their partial or complete isolation.

Such approach is unacceptable to Uzbekistan. Due to the above reasons Uzbekistan currently sees one of its external policies priorities in Russia, which is in keeping with the spirit of the established inter-allied relations between the two states. However, Uzbekistan is not ambiguous about the fact that it intends to develop relations up to the partnership level with any states which might be interested in this. Moreover, it maintains dialogue with the states, whose leaders are, to put it mildly, not quite loyal to the Republic of Uzbekistan. Cooperation opportunities with many states are being looked into in various areas.

In this regard the most plausible mid-term scenario of developing partnership relations on the part of Uzbekistan is as follows:

1. The general strategy as well as the principles of external political and economic activities will not undergo any essential changes.

2. The priority will be given to relations with Russia, provided its new leadership will keep to its strategy based on absolute reciprocal equality. Russia's dominance in Uzbekistan and in the region on the whole boils down to several objective reasons, such as dynamic cooperation in the military and political spheres, as well as in the economic sectors, which are vital to the Republic of Uzbekistan. This cooperation is reinforced by tight humanitarian relations. It is highly unlikely that the situation will change in the mid-term.

3. Russia's presence does not hinder the development of complementary areas of cooperation and making new partners to implement bilateral and multilateral economic projects. Furthermore, these processes are already under way without any detriment to the Russian-Uzbek relations.

4. Finally, one should hardly expect that in the mid-term a country from the region can become a leader in Central Asia. It is not that there are no aspirants, but other states may not agree with it.

To cap it all, the proposed scenario can turn out to be likely if the partners will be building their relations on the principles of tolerance, moderation and balances interests.

April 25, 2008

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