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ANOTHER TULIP REVOLUTION IN KYRGYZSTAN?
ALISHER KHAMIDOV,
Fellow at the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C.
The developments in Kyrgyzstan are claiming much of our attention. We're still receiving controversial reports and updates from Kyrgyzstan. Many of us are grappling with similar questions: What's happening in Kyrgyzstan? Are we talking about another Tulip revolution? How are the current protests similar or different from the Tulip revolution? So what are broader patterns here?
In an effort to make sense of what's happening and increase your understanding of the current situation and the conditions that led to it, here is my take on current events.
Some observers are drawing strong parallels with the current instability in the country and the Tulip Revolution in March 2005. While there are definitely some similarities, there are also some substantial differences.
Similar to the Tulip revolution, the current round of protests are a result of increased authoritarianism of the incumbent regime and regional exclusion. As was the case with former Akaev regime, Bakiyev's rule sidelined important elites and their constituents. Growing corruption, nepotism and usurpation of economic and political power in the hands of a small circle of people not only alienated powerful elites but also broader segments of Kyrgyz society. Similar to the Tulip revolution, what we see now is the pervasive weakness of state's security apparatus to restore order and restrain protesters. We see reports of how policemen are being beaten up or changing sides. We also see reports that suggest that dual-power scenarios are emerging in some parts of the country where crowds of protesters are appointing governors and regional administrators.
The difference between the current protests and the Tulip revolution is that while the Tulip Revolution was initiated by a group of well-positioned but disgruntled elites and their supporters in the Southern regions (Jalal-Abad, Osh), now the protests erupted mainly in the poor and remote Northern regions such as Talas and Naryn, residents of which have long voiced complaints of exclusion.
There are other remarkable differences between current protests and the Tulip revolution.
First, triggers for protests differed. Unlike the Tulip revolution, when the triggering factor for mass mobilization was Akaev regime's efforts to block a number of wealthy opposition elites from gaining seats to the parliament, the current protests were triggered by simmering anger at the grassroots level.
In particular, three factors served as triggers for the mass dissatisfaction to erupt in protests.
1. Immediate trigger was the arrest of several opposition leaders by Bakiyev regime in relation to mass disorder in the town of Talas where protesters occupied a government building.
2. Economic sanctions by Moscow such as the introduction of higher prices for gasoline. The move was seen as Moscow's way of punishing the Bakiyev regime for reneging on a 2009 agreement according to which Kyrgyzstan was to receive close to $2 bln in exchange for evicting the U.S. base out. Bakiyev got some portion of Russian money, but then extended the lease for the U.S. base under a different status. The Russian were really angry.
3. The exclusion of a number of important northern elites in the Kurultai, or informal gathering of all Kyrgyz, by Bakiyev administration last March.
Second, the role of opposition elites in mobilizing protests was not as central as it was during the Tulip revolution. During March 2005 protests, protests were organized by wealthy elites who felt that their bids to gain seats in the parliament were threatened by the incumbent regime. Such elites then mobilized their supporters in their towns and villages relying on localism networks and offers of cash. Protests that we have now are sporadic and chaotic. In many ways, the protests appear to be more uncoordinated grass-roots revolt by disenchanted population than an elite-driven and planned campaign. As a result, the speed with which protests erupted and spread was surprising. It was surprising not only to the international observers, but also to many locals. The incumbent regime and some opposition faction leaders seem to have not appreciated the extent of popular anger and were themselves taken aback. In other words, because there was no credible information about the distribution of power before the protests, there was little room for opposition factions and the incumbent regime to negotiate and come to a negotiated settlement.
What we see now is that the incumbent regime is now talking to some opposition factions in an effort to bring calm. However, it seems like neither the government nor opposition factions are in full control of crowds of uncontrollable youth. Already, there are reports of destruction of property and marauding in Bishkek and regions which have seen protests. This is a bad sign for opposition factions because it discredits them.
What are likely scenario of events?
1. A dramatic scenario is that the Bakiyev government will fall in the next several hours or days. Because opposition leaders are not in full control of protesters, the country will plunge in anarchy and chaos that will last for a few days if not weeks.
Because Bakiyev still retains a large political following in the Southern regions, especially in Jalal-Abad, his birthplace, counter-protests may erupt in the South calling for reinstatement of Bakiyev. This will increase the risk of regional confrontation and possibility of civil war.
2. A less dramatic scenario is that, the Bakiyev administration, while seriously weakened by the protests, may come to a negotiated settlement with opposition factions, and both groups will work to calm protesters. Some reports suggested that the incumbent regime has agreed to release opposition leaders. Russia and some neighbors such as Kazakhstan may provide good offices and assistance (not military, largely diplomatic) in this regard. It is possible that Bakiyev might resign as part of the negotiated deal.
Whatever the outcome, it is clear that Kyrgyzstan has plunged into a deep chaos. It will take months, if not years to recover from this. The concern is that instability in Kyrgyzstan is already spilling over to its neighbors. Kazakhstan has closed borders as scores of Kyrgyz are trying to cross the border and find refuge in Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan is most likely to follow the suit.
April 7, 2010
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