JOHN MARONE, KYIV
UKRAINE’S INDEFENSIBLE POSITION - IN THE WAKE OF GEORGIA
Ever since it was handed independence in 1991, Ukraine has sat on the fence like a country coquette with her back to her jealous ex-husband Russia, from which the country’s ‘elite’ have nevertheless continued to get rich on cheap gas, while batting her eyes at the glamorous West, which offers lots of nice gifts but never a firm proposal of marriage. However, that fence no longer provides a comfortable seat, much less an opportunity to play off geopolitical suitors against each other.
Just down the road, little Georgia, another former Soviet possession with a mind of its own, has found itself occupied and dismembered by the Russian army, and no one is coming to its aid. Unlike the fickle Ukrainians, Georgians are united in their preference for a Western alignment. And now they are paying the price for this preference.
It doesn't matter if one is inclined to sympathize with the Russians, who feel they are being encircled by an aggressive foreign military bloc (i.e. NATO). Indeed, besides the allegedly broken Western promise to refrain from extending NATO to the Russian border, who's idea was it to plant a missile defense system in Central Europe while the US is tied down in two wars? And it's hard to argue that the leaders of Georgia and Ukraine are only representing the wills of their people when both men have Western wives.
On the other hand, Mikheil Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko were elected in fair, democratic elections. Georgia and Ukraine are, after all, sovereign nations, regardless of their histories or geographical locations. If the Kremlin wants respect, as its president Dmitry Medvedev claims, it might try more seduction and less abduction. And considering the plight of Russian democracy and free speech, the country should start by cleaning up its act at home. At the very least, there could be a more equitable distribution of the revenues from oil and gas exports. Lastly, Moscow's insistence on the parallels between South Ossetia and Kosovo are absurd if not profane. But I guess that's the kind of international principles the Bush administration should have expected after its truth-challenged invasion of Iraq.
Regardless, like it or not, the redrawing of borders in Europe is now in vogue, which forebodes nothing good for Ms. Ukraine.
On August 26, the Kremlin made its recognition of Georgia’s secessionist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia officially.
Next in line could be Crimea, which was a part of Russia until Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev presented it to Ukraine.
Already, Moscow loudmouths like Mayor Yury Luzhkov have challenged the ownership of Sevastopol.
The Russians not only have lots of (paid) support among the local population but a fleet parked out back in case things get ugly.
And who’s going to stop them, if things go from bad to worse? The invasion of Georgia wasn’t sparked off by a hot summer or captivating Olympic contest. It was timed by the Kremlin to broadly precede the free-up of US troops in Iraq a few years down the road, and more narrowly - a meeting of NATO foreign ministers at the end of this year, during which Ukraine and Georgia might have been offered a membership plan.
In between, there is Ukraine’s presidential elections, scheduled for early 2010. None of these events are sharply defined on the calendar with specific consequences for Moscow. Nevertheless, taken together, they represent a limited window of opportunity for the Kremlin to kick the US out of its backyard.
It’s not even clear whether the Russian move will backfire, with, for example, NATO uniting around Ukraine’s membership bid, and Ukrainians around their country.
However, such hopes ignore the geopolitical natures of Russia and Ukraine, and more importantly the relations the two states developed during all those years of marriage.
Moscow didn’t intend to scare its former bride, but to show the Ukrainian people how passionately it cares – especially in comparison to the seemingly empty gestures of security offered by Western suitors.
This type of approach, of course, wouldn’t be possible if a large percentage of the Ukrainian population didn’t already support Russia to one extent or the other: on, for example, language, culture or even Kremlin policies themselves.
Also, the Kremlin doesn’t have “to take” Ukraine, but merely keep NATO, the EU or the US from moving in. Moscow only has to play up to the most natural and to-date best demonstrated of Ukrainian characteristics: fence sitting, the reluctance to take a stand due to weak leadership as a result of internal division based largely on personal interests.
For example, no one should be surprised to hear support for Russia’s military adventurism from Ukraine’s Communist Party, who have consistently all but called for a return to the Soviet Union.
The response from the eastern-looking Party of Regions took a little longer, but (no doubt following appropriate pressure from Moscow) also left little surprise.
“The Russian Federation’s recognition of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence was a logical continuation of the process that was started by Western countries in relation to the recognition of the independence of Kosovo,” party leader Viktor Yanukovych told a Ukrainian news agency on Tuesday.
Following the failure of his fraud-filled grab for the presidency in 2004, which the Kremlin tellingly recognized, Mr. Yanukovych looks set to try again under the same banner in 2010.
More surprising was the half –hearted condemnation of Moscow by Ukrainian Premier Yulia Tymoshenko, who also has presidential ambitions.
Having built her career on fiery, provocative rhetoric, in which the Kremlin has been a favorite foreign target, the supposedly pro-Western Tymoshenko has suddenly become more diplomatic if not restrained in her choice of words.
“We absolutely support the territorial integrity of Georgia, and all decisions taken counter to this position will absolutely not be supported by us,” she told a briefing on Wednesday.
For comparison, Ukraine’s pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko flew to Tbilisi during the heat of the conflict to stand side by side with the leaders of Poland and the three Baltic states in vociferously condemning Russian aggression.
More recently, Mr. Yushchenko said Ukraine had become “a hostage” of Russia by hosting the Russian Black Sea Fleet on Ukrainian territory.
In short, even Ukraine’s pro-Western politicians are divided on how to deal with Russian aggression for what can only be called personal reasons.
Add to this the fact that Russia can bring the country’s economy to its knees by once again abruptly raising gas prices – a lever it can also use to diffuse European support for post-Soviet democracy – and Ukraine’s predicament becomes pretty clear. The prospect of these threats in itself will be enough to cool foreign investment - one of the few things keeping Ukraine’s economy afloat.
And then there is the unrecognized Dniester Region, formally a part of Moldova but lying adjacent to Ukraine. That would be a no-brainer for the Russians, especially if the US elects a president short on foreign-policy backbone.
The situation is such that the heroic support that Yushchenko has shown for Georgian independence can only be called a little too little and a little too late. The window of opportunity to unite the country around strategic goals in energy, diplomacy and economics was wasted amidst infighting in Ukraine’s pro-Western camp. Even before Yushchenko, the country’s politicians were largely occupied with enriching themselves at the expense of the state instead of building a new country. Ms. Ukraine is not going to be pushed off her fence in any way that would suggest violence or disrespect. That’s not necessary. Instead, she and her people will come to the slow and sobering realization that they are being fenced in by their northern neighbor on all sides – creating a thoroughly indefensible position.
John Marone, a columnist of Eurasian Home website, Kyiv, Ukraine
September 1, 2008
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