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ZERKALO NEDELI: FOREIGN POLICY QUARTET: CACOPHONY OF TACTICS OR HARMONY OF STRATEGY?
On the eve of 2007 we put seven questions to Ukraine’s most competent and influential persons in the field of foreign policy: twice minister of foreign affairs Borys Tarasyuk, twice ex-minister of foreign affairs Anatoliy Zlenko, ex-minister of foreign affairs Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, and ex-first deputy foreign minister Olexandr Chaliy. None of them has had an easy time steering Ukraine’s foreign policy.
Today, these four prominent diplomats happen to play in different teams, influencing substantially the positions of two leaders – President Yushchenko and Premier Yanukovych. However, they are unanimous that Ukraine’s foreign policy is, as before, hostage to its internal policy. There are more similarities than differences in their answers, and that inspires some “cautious optimism” about the possibility of political consensus in the near future. Yanukovych says that he and Yushchenko have “a common strategic vision of the country’s future”. If only their diplomatic counselors would come to terms and persuade the two leaders to walk in step on the road to the declared goals…
Borys TARASYUK , Minister of Foreign Affairs
1. What was the biggest success in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
In my opinion, the main achievement of 2006 was that Ukraine reached high dynamics of political relations with the European Union. In this context, the most important event of the year was the EU-Ukraine summit in Helsinki on October 27 where the sides initialed the agreements on simplifying the visa regime for Ukrainian citizens and on readmission.
Among other weighty achievements, I would note the first session of the Ukrainian-Russian interstate commission that laid a solid foundation for deepening Ukrainian-Russian relations; the abrogation of U.S. trade sanctions against Ukraine and the Jackson-Vanick amendment; Ukraine’s election to the newly established UN Human Rights Council. Ukraine’s regional policy was successful in 2006 as well: the informal association GUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova) transformed into a full-fledged international body – the GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development with the permanent secretariat office in Kyiv.
2. What was the biggest failure in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
I wouldn’t say Ukraine’s foreign policy “failed” in 2006. In fact, there were no failures this year: the diplomatic service consistently pursued the course set by the President.
I would say there are some tasks that remain unfulfilled – mostly for objective reasons. One of them is accession to the WTO in 2006. On the other hand, we have managed to come very close to this goal and we are expecting to join the organization next year.
Another negative fact is the total slowdown in the process of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration despite the successful development of the intensified dialog on NATO membership and reforms within Ukraine. I would attribute it to the inability of the leading political forces to reach consensus on this politicized issue, the exploitation of anti-NATO rhetoric, and the speculations around a national referendum on joining NATO.
I’d like to note that these problems arose for reasons beyond the Foreign Ministry.
3. Who or what prevented Ukrainian foreign policy from being consistent and predictable in 2006?
Ukrainian foreign policy was consistent and predictable in 2006. At the same time, it was subjected to tremendous influence of internal processes like the protracted post-election formation of the government. Ukraine actually became hostage to political rivalry. It wasted too much time and missed too many opportunities in relations with other countries.
Besides, Ukraine was unable to act consistently on the international arena due to the absence of consensus among the branches of government on certain issues of foreign policy, like accession to NATO.
4. What are the main tasks for 2007? Which nations should be in the focus of Ukraine’s foreign policy?
The main tasks are the following:
- to complete the WTO accession process;
- to complete the talks with the EU on a new enhanced agreement;
- to speed up the conclusion and enactment of the EU-Ukraine agreements on a simplified visa regime for Ukrainian citizens and on readmission;
- to secure upward dynamics in relations with NATO, implement the NATO-Ukraine Target Plan for 2007, and complete the four-year state program of informing the public on Euro-Atlantic integration;
- to deepen relations with the strategically important nations: Russia, the USA, and Poland;
- to take an active part in regional cooperation formats;
- to maintain partnership and good-neighborly relations with the neighboring countries and constructive economic cooperation with all countries of the world;
- to protect the rights of Ukrainian citizens abroad and strengthen ties with Ukrainian communities abroad that are an important component of Ukraine’s international image and authority.
5. Ukraine’s membership in NATO is a stimulating factor in internal political and socioeconomic reforms. It would enable Ukraine to participate directly in decision-making on issues of international peacekeeping and on developing European and Euro-Atlantic security. It is beneficial for the national defense industry in terms of foreign investment in research and development, modernization, and diversification projects and increased assistance to our scientific institutions. It would give Ukraine additional guarantees of its security, territorial integrity, and border inviolability under the Washington Treaty. It would entitle Ukraine to effective practical assistance in emergencies, accidents, etc.
Ukraine’s membership in the EU is a civilized choice in favor of United Europe that is developing on the principles of democracy, supremacy of law, respect for human rights, market economy, and high political, economic, legal, and social standards.
Ukraine’s membership in the WTO is an opportunity for the national economy to integrate with the global economic space. It would help secure fair market competition, reduce the level of protectionism and corruption, and encourage effective entrepreneurship. It would give Ukrainian consumers a wider choice of competitive goods and services at competitive prices. It is a prerequisite for establishing an EU-Ukraine free trade area and Ukraine’s eventual accession to the EU.
Ukraine’s membership in the [Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan] Common Economic Area is yet another attempt to launch an effective mechanism of economic cooperation among the post-USSR nations. At the same time, Ukraine’s participation in the CEA should be regarded as one of the ways to deepen economic cooperation and approximate Ukraine’s economy to the level of the EU neophyte nations and, eventually, to reach the strategic goal – membership in the EU.
6. Does Ukraine need a new law on principles of foreign policy?
The Constitution of Ukraine defines two directions in Ukraine’s activity on the international arena: “principles of foreign policy” and “principles of external relations”.
Article 85 of the Constitution empowers the parliament to determine the principles of foreign and home policy. Such principles do not necessarily have to be determined through legislative acts – the parliament may do so through resolutions. At the same time, Article 92 stipulates that the principles of external relations must be determined exclusively through laws.
7. What should be changed in the Constitution to make the procedure of preparing, adjusting, adopting, and executing decisions in foreign policy more comprehensible, transparent, and effective?
The Constitution distributes competences in foreign policy and external relations among the president, the parliament, and the government. I don’t think it is expedient to change this distribution. In my opinion, such issues could be regulated through by-laws or regulatory acts within the constitutional competence of each branch of power.
Olexandr CHALIY, Deputy Chief of the Presidential Secretariat
1. What was the biggest success in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
It was the commencement of the Yushchenko-Putin Commission’s work.
2. What was the biggest failure in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
It was the signing of the so-called “gas agreements” [with Russia] on January 4. That day was a “Pearl Harbor” of Ukrainian diplomacy.
3. Who or what prevented Ukrainian foreign policy from being consistent and predictable in 2006?
Nobody but us did. A different answer would be an attempt to shrug off responsibility. The main negative reasons were the populism of the political forces that ran for parliament, the enactment of the constitutional reform, and the absence of historical experience in exercising a foreign policy based on the Constitution and consensus in society.
4. What are the main tasks for 2007? Which nations should be in the focus of Ukraine’s foreign policy?
The foreign policy must correspond to the national interests in word and deed.
There will be the following challenges to Ukraine’s national interests:
1. The Transdniestrian conflict.
2. The new global redistribution of energy resources, especially on the European continent.
3. Tougher competition after Ukraine joins the WTO. This factor will determine Ukraine’s ability to realize its foreign political course.
4. Proper protection of rights of Ukrainian citizens and businesses abroad.
The key tactical tasks for 2007 will be:
1. Completion of the WTO accession process.
2. Commencement of talks on a new enhanced agreement with the EU.
3. Effectuation of the Yushchenko-Putin interstate commission.
4. Institutionalization of the Ukraine-USA strategic dialog through establishing an interstate commission similar to the Yushchenko-Putin commission.
In 2007, Ukraine’s foreign policy should concentrate on restoring strategic balances that would meet our national interests within the Brussels-Kyiv-Moscow and the Moscow-Kyiv-Washington triangles. Ukraine can succeed in such a “triangular diplomacy” if it intensifies cooperation with the neighboring countries, Germany and other key European states, China, leading Central and South-East-Asian countries, Latin American countries (primarily Brazil), the Arab world, and African countries.
5. Ukraine’s membership in NATO is an issue that should be addressed after a national referendum and when Ukraine meets all membership requirements.
Ukraine’s membership in the EU is a national dream we have to strive for, but we have to understand that it is unfeasible for the nearest decade. It’s not just about Ukraine’s ability or inability to meet EU membership criteria. The reason is the EU is institutionally unable to accept Ukraine.
Ukraine’s membership in the WTO is a full-scale institutional integration with the global economy. I believe that Ukraine will join the WTO in 2007.
Ukraine’s membership in the CEA is Ukraine’s participation in the Common Economic Area “on principles of selective levels and time terms of integration in accordance with WTO norms and rules; at the initial stage – establishment of a CEA free trade area without limitations or exemptions “.
6. Does Ukraine need a new law on principles of foreign policy?
Yes, it does. A new law has to determine principles of Ukraine’s external relations.
7. What should be changed in the Constitution to make the procedure of preparing, adjusting, adopting, and executing decisions in foreign policy more comprehensible, transparent, and effective?
Nothing should be changed. It’s only a matter of abidance by the active constitutional norms. The Constitution sets a clear and transparent mechanism of preparing, adjusting, adopting, and executing decisions in foreign policy. All branches of power involved in these processes should enable a positive thinking. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be the coordinator in these processes.
Kostyantyn HRYSHCHENKO, adviser to the Prime Minister of Ukraine
1. What was the biggest success in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
Undoubtedly, it was the adoption of the bills required for WTO accession. Also, the emotional confrontation in relations with Russia abated. Ukraine began to restore its positions in Central Asia and set a pragmatic key in relations with the EU and NATO.
There is one more fact worth mentioning: this year the U.S. Congress abolished the discriminatory Jackson-Vanick amendment, although Ukraine had long deserved that decision.
2. What was the biggest failure in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
It was the gas contract signed in January. Our economy will feel its negative impacts for a long time. Those agreements show graphically that effective protection of national interests is a matter of professionalism, not partisan peacockery, political complexes, or grabbling ambitions.
3. Who or what prevented Ukrainian foreign policy from being consistent and predictable in 2006?
Our main problem is that the foreign policy is both an object and a subject of political competition within the state.
The Prime Minister and the President have a common strategic vision of Ukraine’s future. They only differ in approaches. This is what the head of government says every time. Of course, Ukraine would benefit a lot if the two leaders joined forces. It is also clear that the continued provocative gambling on their tactical differences only benefits certain selfish functionaries in both camps.
At the same time, I should note a positive trend: in the changed environments of political reform, the political forces are beginning to seek compromise solutions. This internal compromise tends to make foreign policy a consolidating factor.
4. What are the main tasks for 2007? Which nations should be in the focus of Ukraine’s foreign policy?
Firstly, we must finally find formulas of compromise solutions and join the WTO.
Secondly, in relations with Russia we can and must start filling the declared formula of strategic partnership with pragmatic contents.
Thirdly, we must build our relations with the European Union and the Euro-Atlantic community consistently and pragmatically, instead of building castles in the air. Illusions don’t give us anything, they only put us in an awkward position before our partners.
In its sixteenth year, Ukraine must learn to behave the adult way. Ukraine must finally see that the world is not only the West and the East, but that there is also the North and the South. We must understand that the philosophy of international politics is no contract with a marriage agency. It is a search for synergy of different interests. Relations with China, India, Brazil, South-East Asia, and the Middle East must go further than declarations.
We can fulfill these and other tasks only with good diplomatic tools. Therefore, we must stop destroying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and disorganizing the diplomatic corps. We must restore respect for the ministry both in and beyond the country. We must restitute its policy-making and coordinating functions. The tasks and criteria we set for our embassies and diplomatic representations must have a practical dimension.
5. Ukraine’s accession to the WTO gives Ukrainian producers equal rights and new opportunities in the economic market that accounts for 98 percent of global trade turnover. It means new jobs and higher incomes, a wider choice and higher quality of imported and domestically made goods, and lower prices. Membership in the WTO will make Ukraine play by transparent economic rules and will narrow the field of shadow businesses and corruption. It will help civilized investors to discover Ukraine. It means free competition, which both stimulates and challenges national producers. It stimulates innovations, entrepreneurship, expansion of production, and quality. It challenges the habit of parasitizing on prices and protectionism enjoyed by monopolies. However, we must remember that accession to the WTO is not an automatic guarantee of well-being. It is only a big chance to attain such well-being by working very hard.
As far as our accession to the EU is concerned, I think this aspiration is the very field where public consensus is ripening. Unfortunately, due to a number of objective and subjective factors, it is only an ultimate strategic goal rather than an immediate political task. Therefore, we should become clever egoists and use all available resources to attain the Copenhagen criteria. We should strive for European values, traditions, rules, and living standards instead of dreaming of a miracle.
Every time Ukrainian politicians raise the issue of accession to NATO, they put Ukrainian democracy to the test. Those who are for it must be aware that a decision like this concerns each citizen of Ukraine. Those who are against it must also be aware that the people’s choice can only be conscious. Nobody has a right to act on the nation’s behalf behind the nation’s back just because he has his own slant on that score. The issue of accession to NATO must become a subject for nationwide public discussion. At the same time, we must make all institutions cooperate with NATO in pursuit of national rather than narrow partisan interests.
As far as the CEA is concerned, we should draw a line between accession to existing international bodies and participation in establishing new ones. In the former case, we can’t impose our rules. We can only weigh the advantages and risks of joining this or that company of nations. In the latter case, we have some political room for maneuver and possibilities for seeking a compromise of mutual benefits that would satisfy the stakeholders and wouldn’t harm their national interests.
6. Does Ukraine need a new law on principles of foreign policy?
No law can be a panacea, but under the present political circumstances, we couldn’t do without such a law.
7. What should be changed in the Constitution to make the procedure of preparing, adjusting, adopting, and executing decisions in foreign policy more comprehensible, transparent, and effective?
I don’t see any procedural obstacles in the Constitution to concerted decision-making. What we really lack is a political tradition of reaching agreements, an operational mechanism of adjusting political positions. I don’t see any hidden loopholes for legitimizing non-transparent decisions. The Constitution has a number of “safety devices”.
As to preparing and executing decisions, this problem has two aspects: restoration and modernization of Ukraine’s foreign political institutes and responsible cooperation among the president, the prime minister, and the parliament.
Now that the constitutional reform has taken effect, we can see that the Organic Law needs some improvement. Sooner or later, challenges of real life will necessitate corrections. Then the rights and duties of the constitutional subjects will be complementary, not contradictory.
Anatoly ZLENKO, advisor to the Prime Minister of Ukraine
1. What was the biggest success in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
Ukraine’s success or failure in foreign policy should be viewed in the context of complicated internal political processes in 2006. The Verkhovna Rada elections, lengthy and chaotic formation of a coalition, inconsistent implementation of the political reform and as a result aggravation of the relations between various branches of power and the whole number of other issues have been in the focus of attention of international community and have had a negative effect on Ukraine’s international policy. They have also undermined the system of stable relations of our state with other states. Despite all of these drawbacks we can consider that the main achievement of Ukrainian policy in 2006 was normalization of Ukrainian-Russian relations, which resulted into a long-awaited visit of the Russian president Putin to Ukraine. A course towards predictable and mutually beneficial cooperation between Ukraine and Russia is in line with the national interests of our state.
2. What was the biggest failure in Ukraine’s foreign policy in 2006?
Failure is the default of foreign policy, which may have far-reaching consequences. That is why this term is rather radical and unacceptable. Since there was more of ideological rather then realistic approach to foreign policy in Ukraine, it produced certain shortcomings and drawbacks in foreign policy. Unbalanced efforts in the Western and Eastern directions caused loss of attention to a whole range of promising sectors.
3. Who or what prevented Ukrainian foreign policy from being consistent and predictable in 2006?
Foreign policy has become a hostage of internal political processes and depends on changing circumstances; naturally it could not be implemented without full understanding of the nature of these processes, which in its turn caused significant errors in the priority areas. This made an impression that foreign policy of Ukraine lacked consistency and predictability in 2006. Due to this foreign policy has lost its avant-guard role and active involvement in the formation of state
4. What are the main tasks for 2007? Which nations should be in the focus of Ukraine’s foreign policy?
Maximum efforts should be taken to ensure favorable external relations for Ukraine to overcome the economic crisis and maintain stabilization on the energy market. The attention should be focused on the economization of foreign relations and continuation of the course for European and Euro-Atlantic integration.
Ukraine should focus its attention on strengthening its strategic partnership with Russia, the USA, Poland and the EU countries. More attention should be paid to such vital areas as new markets and new sources of foreign investments. At the same time Ukrainian foreign policy should become a part of global development.
5. Ukraine’s membership in NATO should be the result of a conscious choice of the people, who understands such concepts as promotion of the democracy standards of a civil society, market economy, increase in the level of guarantees of political independence, territorial integrity and stability of borders, active assistance of participation of our state in the new architecture of Euro-Atlantic security. At the same time one should realize that the expansion of Ukraine’s strategic partnership with NATO will contribute to its security and stability.
Ukraine’s membership in the EU is the factor consolidating Ukrainian society and important factor for increase in living standards of Ukrainians due to concentration of the efforts on internal reforms and transformation and adoption of the European rules and standards. Yet the actual abilities of Ukraine should be considered.
Ukraine’s membership in the WTO means joining to global economy that will facilitate Ukraine’s participation in the system of regulation of global economy and protection of Ukrainian national interests.
Ukraine’s membership in the CEA means possible increase in its economic potential based on the principals and standards of the European Union that should expedite the process of European integration.
6. Does Ukraine need a new law on principles of foreign policy?
The Verkhovna Rada resolution “Basic areas of foreign policy of Ukraine” of July 2, 1993 is one of the baseline documents regulating foreign policy of Ukraine. This document has fulfilled its main role of strengthening of Ukraine as an independent state. Revision of new internal and external realities, adoption of the new Constitution of Ukraine in 1996 put the need of adoption of a new law on basics of the foreign policy of Ukraine high on the agenda. Such document should harmonize the basics of foreign policy with the Basic Law and international commitments of Ukraine. Moreover, the Constitution of Ukraine requires that the “basics of the foreign policy” should be defined “exclusively by the law of Ukraine.”
7. What should be changed in the Constitution to make the procedure of preparing, adjusting, adopting, and executing decisions in foreign policy more comprehensible, transparent, and effective?
The acting Constitution of Ukraine has a number of provisions on foreign policy. Clear adherence to these provisions and at the same time completion of the political reform will secure Ukraine against unnecessary shocks in the state and unnecessary complications at the international arena.
“Zerkalo Nedeli”, Ukraine’s International Social Political Weekly, 30 December 2006 – 5 January 2007
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