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ZERKALO NEDELI: FIELD REPORTS
This week all those involved in the current stage of the permanent Ukrainian political crisis played a kind of make-believe game. Inside Ukraine the President made believe a coup d’etat and in Europe he made believe “a normal democratic process.” Yulia Tymoshenko pretended to be putting forth her utmost efforts for restoring the democratic coalition and denied any other steps or intentions, waiting for her “brothers-in-arms” to own up to their mistake. The opposition leader [Viktor Yanukovych – A.B.] pretended to be an onlooker, gloating over the end of “the Orange era.” The governors feigned whole-hearted support for the idea of direct presidential rule, pretending they knew what it was. Local councils imitated concern over the President’s “undemocratic steps and methods.”
In fact, the political leaders happened to get into their voters’ shoes for a while and choose the lesser evil. It is only their confusion that can explain the Brownian motion of negotiators from all camps during the past week.
Viktor Yanukovych, who had spoken positively about a prospect coalition with the Tymoshenko Bloc, was taken in hand by the Lyovochkin-Firtash and Akhmetov-Kolesnikov groups – the owners of RosUkrEnergo and Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd. who are not at all happy about the possible alliance with Tymoshenko. After threats to “quit,” the traditional envoys from the Regions Party reappeared on Bankova. Yanukovych, who never trusted Tymoshenko, was told again by his advisers that she would deceive him and run for president. Now, while MPs from the Regions Party faction work at and vote for bills together with members of the Tymoshenko faction, their bosses are looking for alternative options.
Tymoshenko, for her part, is in no hurry to speed up her rapprochement with the RP. She has two reasons: she does not want to lose a part of her electorate in the west of the country for good and she is afraid of a revolt inside her faction. U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s visit, on which some members of the agonizing coalition pinned their last hopes, failed to produce any positive results. In a word, Tymoshenko has not made her final stake yet, leaving other options open.
Opinion polls were supposed to give answers to some questions. The RP was more hopeful than others as it expected the poll to demonstrate a spectacular rise of its rating and a crushing fall of Tymoshenko’s rating. Its leaders and most members were so sure of such returns that they began to sharply incline to the preterm election offered by the President. They even had a plan: skillfully imitated “negotiations” with Tymoshenko would make her believe in their honest intentions and persuade her faction to vote for a coalition with the RP, and then the RP faction would say nay. After that the preterm election would be inevitable and the TB would have no chance to win it.
Tymoshenko was no less eager and anxious to see returns of opinion polls – both “ordered” and independent. As it turned out, they all were practically the same and showed that the RP had nothing to be happy about and Tymoshenko had nothing to worry about. Firstly, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology asked respondents: “You may know about the fierce rivalry between President Yushchenko’s camp and Premier Tymoshenko’s camp. Which do you think is right for Tymoshenko to do?” 24.6 percent of respondents chose the option “Resign” and 54.5 percent said “Stay in office.”
Secondly, the recent developments have only brought Tymoshenko to the top of ratings whereas before the start of this political season she was second after Yanukovych.
According to the polls, in case the parliamentary election took place next Sunday, the TB would collect 24.1 percent of votes; the RP would collect 23.3 percent; the Communists and the Our Ukraine would collect 3.8 percent each; the Lytvyn Bloc would collect 3.4 percent; the People’s Self-Defense led by [Interior Minister] Yuri Lutsenko and the nationalist party Svoboda [freedom] led by Oleg Tyahnybok would collect 1.1 percent each; and the Progressive Socialists led by Natalia Vitrenko would collect 1 percent.
It would be interesting to see the chances of the Chernovetsky Bloc (which, regrettably, was not listed in the questionnaires), because the RP counts on it along with the Lytvyn Bloc and the Communists as possible coalition allies in the new parliament.
The polls showed that Tymoshenko and Yanukovych stand nearly equal chances of being elected President of Ukraine: 25% and 24.6% respectively. More importantly, Tymoshenko has managed to make one-third of Ukrainian voters believe that her presidency is inevitable. The KIIS asked, “Who do you think would be elected President if the election took place next Sunday?” 34.1 percent of respondents answered “Tymoshenko.” The option “Yanukovych” collected 25.6 percent – nearly equal to the number of his supporters. Yushchenko is seen as the winner by 6 percent (0.8 percent fewer than those who are ready to vote for him). Moreover, Yushchenko got the voters’ answer to the question he often puts to himself: is running for the second term worthwhile? 16.2 percent of respondents said he should run for president and 72.5 percent said he should not. These eloquent figures practically coincide with those obtained from the poll conducted three weeks ago by TNS Ukraine at the ZN’s request. 71.4 percent of respondents said they did not trust Yushchenko as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and only 22.2 percent said they did. Still, in spite of such returns, Bankova keeps playing its game and the President must be planning a series of meetings before announcing a breakup of the democratic coalition.
Bankova is looking for a way out. Yushchenko sounds confident about the preterm election, being unsure of its outcome for him. He tries to bring his former allies back under his wing. Members of the Yedyniy Tsentr [united center] are already returning to the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense. Bankova sends out signals of readiness to negotiate to the people whose services, shoulders, and professional skills Yushchenko has not needed for too long. By far, there is no line of volunteers in sight…
Yushchenko has not given up on the idea of a grand coalition with the RP and the Lytvyn Bloc. However, there is one serious obstacle in the person of parliament speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk. As a potential candidate for presidency (with his current rating barely reaching 3.5 percent), he is in the FOV of both the pro-presidential force and Akhmetov’s headhunters. It is rumored that some well-wishers in Yushchenko’s entourage try to make him jealous to Yatsenyuk. They advised him to pull Yatsenyuk down to less important positions like Interior Minister or National Bank Governor. Hopefully, this time Yatsenyuk will be asked which he wants.
Bankova has more difficulties with Yanukovych, who is definitely set for premiership. Seceding from the coalition, the Our Ukraine explained: the Tymoshenko faction voted in unison with the RP faction; Tymoshenko did not side with Georgia in its conflict with Russia; she was not active enough in driving Ukraine toward NATO. Now would it be logical to ally with the RP that calls for recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia and is strongly against rapprochement with NATO?
Seeing the favorable returns of opinion polls, Tymoshenko regained her composure. Now she takes the probable preterm election more calmly. She is perfectly aware that in a coalition with the RP it is her and not Yanukovych who is likely to sustain electoral losses. On the other hand, a coalition between the RP and the OU – whether in this or the next parliament – is death to Yanukovych’s rating. Moreover, the Kremlin would not approve of it and so the doors to Putin’s and Medvedev’s offices would be open to Tymoshenko. In other words, today Tymoshenko is choosing between retaining her premiership with vague prospects for regaining her electorate and retaining her electorate with high chances for raising her rating in the south and east of the country ahead of the presidential race. In the event of a preterm election it would be difficult for her to find satellites for a coalition in the new parliament. Otherwise, it would make no sense for her to press for stronger powers of the “chancellor.” Some bright heads in her entourage have far-reaching plans: “What’s so bad about the snap election? We would save our reputation. Yushchenko would lose his last voters as the initiator of unpopular early elections. The new government would start working in late February or early March – seven to ten months before the presidential election. It wouldn’t be difficult to win and then the new president could withdraw her faction from the parliament, dissolve the parliament, call an early election, and get the majority in the new parliament.”
Yet, none of the above scenarios is fully feasible. The politicians keep playing Twister, knowing that they risk falling on their heads. Even the initiates do not venture to give forecasts, the most pragmatic ones are unable to choose the best option, and the most nerveless simply quit. The people interest “the high negotiating sides” exclusively in quantitative electoral terms rather than as objects of care and efforts for raising social standards. The business sector interests them exclusively as the consumer basket of political forces rather than an economic segment which is losing its capitals due to the global crisis aggravated by the Ukrainian crisis. So what? Why change the goals or approaches as long as the voters and the businesspeople are ready to play their assigned roles? The reports from the sociological fields only prove that this question is rhetorical.
The poll was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on September 1-7, 2008 in all administrative regions of Ukraine and involved 2,036 respondents.
Yulia MOSTOVAYA
“Zerkalo Nedeli”, Ukraine’s International Social Political Weekly, № 34 (713), 13 — 19 September 2008
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