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RUSSIAN - GERMAN RELATIONS
IGOR MAKSIMYCHEV,
Senior Fellow at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences
WILL RUSSIAN-GERMAN RELATIONS SURVIVE?
Germany is gearing up for the possible victory in the early Bundestag elections due in September of the Christian Democrat-Christian Social Union and their allies in the Free Democratic Party. Apart from guessing who will be in the team of CDU head Angela Merkel, some commentators point to possible changes in Berlin's policy. If Merkel is elected chancellor, it is difficult to give a straight answer to the question of the form Germany's relations with Russia would take, but we can assume that the opposition coming to power does not mean an abrupt policy volte-face unless absolutely needed.
The decisive thing in foreign policy is whether partners' interests are in conflict. No such danger seems to be in sight at present. A partial change of course, when one coalition replaced another, has occurred only once in German history. About 35 years ago, the Social Democrats and the FDP, which won the 1969 elections, made noticeable changes to West German tactics regarding the USSR and East Germany, under the slogan of "Change through Rapprochement." Over 30 years this Ostpolitik led to the unification of Germany (the return of the CDU/CSU to power in 1982 did not see a revision of Willy Brandt's course).
A fundamental revision of relations with Russia is hardly possible now, but there may be gestures stressing the difference between the new leader and her predecessor. In 1986, Helmut Kohl equated Mikhail Gorbachev with Josef Goebbels, because they both had a "gift of demagoguery." This happened for the first time in the history of relations between West Germany and the USSR. But two-three years later Kohl and Gorbachev were good friends, right up to the time when Boris Yeltsin succeeded Gorbachev. Then the new Russian president became Kohl's best friend, and they often went to the banya (Russian bathhouse), together. When Gerhard Schroeder came to power in 1998, he declared that the epoch of joint banya sessions was over, and from now on he would talk tough with Moscow.
But the reality in Russia under Vladimir Putin was very different from what it had been. There were no more zigzags in foreign affairs and repeated appointments of new prime ministers, and no more presidential absences on the alleged grounds of "working with documents." After 2000, Russia stopped increasing its debt and began repaying it even ahead of schedule. The main creditor no longer had to talk tough to Moscow. Putin did not invite his guests to the banya. The very first meeting between Putin and Schroeder revealed common ground between them. The new Russian president spoke German well and preferred to do without an interpreter. But the main thing was that both Schroeder and Putin, not economic experts, were faced with their countries' need for serious, though unpopular, economic reforms. They had to look for a golden medium between economic imperatives and voter support. That brought them closer together. Genuinely friendly relations between Schroeder and Putin appeared later, during the preparations for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which coincided with the last Bundestag elections.
Germany's involvement in the Balkan war - waged by NATO without a corresponding decision from the UN Security Council - seriously undermined the positions of the Social Democratic Party among its traditional electorate. For Iraq, the chancellor categorically demanded prior UN approval. Schroeder made this decision without any consultations. But it was important for him not to find himself in international isolation, especially as the CDU/CSU immediately accused him of spoiling relations with the "older brother." The support for Germany's position by France and Russia was not only of legal, but also of immense moral significance.
There was no intention to create an "anti-American front," but there was a need to bring the U.S. back to pursuing a predictable policy. This is where the Europe-wide interests lie, as well as the profound causes behind the emergence of the Franco-German-Russian alliance. In this alliance, close contact was established between the German chancellor and the Russian president. It was due to the three countries that the voice of Europe was heard worldwide, for the first time after World War II. The omnipotent United States had to heed the voice of the European "dissidents." At the same time, the chancellor's refusal to join successive anti-Putin and Russophobic campaigns in the West was based not so much on friendly relations with the Russian president as on the fact that Schroeder, as head of state, was well informed about the situation in Russia, about the processes going on there and about Putin's actions and intentions. This convinced him that he had to resist the pressure coming from the German media, which in fact continued the "Eastern March" started by the Reich way back in 1914.
It is too early to guess what kind of relations will develop between Angela Merkel, if she becomes chancellor, and Vladimir Putin or his successor. Her current promises to keep a distance from the Russian president and to criticize him over Yukos or Chechnya may be regarded as inevitable pre-election gestures. The assurances, following these gestures, that strategic partnership with Russia will be maintained, gives hope that such gestures will cause limited harm. The hopes of the Russophobes that the "experience of living in East Germany" filled Merkel with hatred for Russia and Russians are in vain. As a member of the CDU leadership in East Germany in the past, and then of the CDU in united Germany, Merkel saw what sacrifices Russians can make for the sake of partnership with West Germany. In any case, it is very important that she is not a Russophobe. And it is not clear how "the experience of living in East Germany" may influence her attitude to modern Russia, which after agreeing to German unification and the withdrawal of troops from Germany in a short space of time, broke with its socialist past and is now proceeding along the path of market and democratic development.
However, it is alarming that the prospect of a change of power immediately led to ugly developments like the granting, by the German migration department, of political asylum to a Russian criminal on the grounds that he is allegedly being persecuted for supporting the Yabloko party. Anyone who knows anything about Russia will see the Russophobic idiotism of such actions. However, CDU "specialists" on Russia's affairs like Bundestag deputy Friedbert Pflueger began to spread rumors that fear caused by persecution of democratic ideas reigns in political quarters in Russia. If the future CDU/CSU-FDP government heeds the nonsense uttered by Pflueger, then there are grounds for worrying about the future of Russian-German relations. However, this is unlikely.
Overall, politicians when in power differ considerably from politicians when in opposition. For a serious person, power means responsibility for the country's future, for the future of Europe and the world. So, if the government in Germany changes, the original "cooling" will quite rapidly be succeeded by normal relations between the states, on which the building of Greater Europe from Reykjavik to Vladivostok largely depends. Of course, it would be better to do without a ‘cooling’ period at all, but if the new German authorities wish to have such a period, Russian-German relations will survive it as well. In any case, there are no grounds to feel dejected if Merkel becomes chancellor.
Source: RIA Novosti
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