 |
THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN OFFICER CORPS
ROGER N MCDERMOTT,
Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC and an Honorary Senior Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University Kent, Canterbury (UK)
As a consequence of Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov’s military reform, the Russian officer corps is arguably enduring the most fundamental changes and challenges that it has faced in the past two centuries. Not only has it been subject to downsizing, the system of military education reformed, fitness tests introduced, and the burden of training duties increased, but other innovations demonstrate the serious drive by the defense ministry to foster a new breed of officer. For the first time since 1917, for example, official chaplains have begun serving in the army, and how these relate to the commanding officer in an effort to enhance discipline and morale will determine and shape the atmosphere within line units.
Challenges exist that will take time to address adequately, and yet the capacity to access and implement foreign experience may help this process, while how successfully these tasks are carried out may also influence Russia’s future standing in the world.
Yet, the danger is that if these initiatives fail, it will not only prove to be a setback to the military, but may damage Russian power aspirations.
Challenges
It appears that some of the challenges facing the Russian officer corps are unique, and in this sense it is difficult to directly apply lessons or patterns identified in the experience of officer training and development within foreign militaries. Some of these relate to the existence of corruption amongst some officers, which apart from draining resources also negatively impacts on morale and discipline. Officers turning a blind eye to cases of hazing among either enlisted personnel are another factor that can undermine military cohesion within units.
While these issues are directly linked to improving the quality of morale, discipline and facilitating the creation of an environment within which officers develop their careers and skills, there are also new challenges created by the implementation by Serdyukov’s reforms.
In future, according to the Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister Army-General Nikolai Makarov, Russian officers must be specialists in military affairs, well-educated and cultured, serving as examples to their subordinates. Of course, these demands are emerging from the drive to modernize the weapons and equipment inventory, as well as upgrading command and control and in general terms adopting network-centric warfare capabilities. Such a technologically and information based military environment necessitates a significantly higher level of education, which equips the officer to meet such challenges.
While both domestically, and abroad, the announced plans to downsize the officer corps by around 205,000 posts provoked controversy and misunderstanding, the restructuring has brought new demands to officers serving at lower levels. Downsizing, as such, has nothing to do with reform. It is possible to downsize the numbers of personnel serving in the armed forces, and yet avoid reform. Serdyukov’s downsizing plans were, however, closely linked to real reform in as much as the ratio changed between officer and enlisted personnel to 1:15. Moreover, fewer officers serving within the new permanent readiness brigades are highly significant: since these officers now have to command real subordinates instead of skeleton units, as was the case before. General Makarov reported that the absence of command experience was a problem when the five day war erupted with Georgia in August 2008. This is an underestimated transformation that has already occurred. Now, as a direct consequence of the “new look” officers can no longer sit idle, they need to meet the real challenge of command.
In practical terms, this means that increasingly the vital element in the character and professional conduct of officers currently serving within the armed forces is leadership, and this will only gain in importance in the future.
That challenge of leadership, which General Makarov and the leadership of the Main Combat Training Directorate have noted in reference to officers training and preparing enlisted personnel, has become more demanding. They need to possess the ability to conduct rapid and professional training, as well having the skills needed to assume the responsibility of command immediately.
For the time being, the Lieutenants, whose numbers have increased, may well be over-burdened by this process. Nonetheless, this may prove to be temporary, as the planned introduction of professional non-commissioned officers (NCO’s) who will be trained at Ryazan in courses lasting 2 years and 10 months will eventually alleviate the training burden on officers. The first graduates from the new NCO training school will reach units in 2012-13. Thus, the future of the Russian officer corps is intimately connected with the development and formation of a new breed of NCO that in time will become the backbone of the armed forces, as it once was in the Tsarist army.
Foreign experience
Similar challenges exist within western armed forces, as increasingly there is a sense of the military having to compete with potentially more lucrative careers for talented young individuals. In the US military, for instance, the current debate mirrors precisely the same themes being discussed and considered in Russia: how can talented individuals be attracted and retained in the armed forces, and those talents honed to meet the demands of the information age? The US Army War College has recently published a series of monographs covering these themes, and in October 2009 it began hosting virtual conferences to examine “The Future of the U.S. Army Officer Corps: Accessing Talent.” Attracting and keeping such talented officers within the US armed forces also revolves around the social packages that can be offered. That involves much more than housing, but access to medical care, educational facilities for their families and even amenities ranging from cinemas to bowling alleys.
The trouble is that an analysis of foreign military experience can only be useful if it is synthesized and applied carefully within Russia. In other words, while it serves as a useful focus for the discussion, when it comes to applying these features of what proves successful within such militaries, it must be applied within the Russian historical and cultural context.
Defense Minister Serdyukov has commissioned the drafting of a written code of honor. In November 2010 the 3rd All-Army Conference of army and navy officers will take place in Moscow, devoted to the formation of the principles of corporate ethics among Russian officers in the longer-term look of the armed forces. Currently, this debate is being encouraged within units, and this is an important step, as Colonel (retired) Vitaliy Shlykov believes that the writing of the code of corporate ethics will result in a fundamentally new level of professionalism within the Russian military. An ethos, and a code of ethics among officers, takes time to develop. It is a positive initiative to introduce a clear code for officers, however, as American officers say, they need to “walk the walk:” or not simply be aware of a codified approach to their important role, but also live and serve as an inspirational example to their men. Higher standards of justice and moral character are demanded of officers compared with society and those whom they lead, and the formulation of codified document in Russia will no doubt set a benchmark against which officer standards can be outlined and measured, though the longer term task is to encourage a constant striving for excellence among officers through a variety of mechanisms including incentives.
General Shamanov as an example
Meanwhile, there are inspirational officers within the Russian armed forces, with combat experience that are clearly being used to promote a different, more competent image. One example is Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov, the Commander of the elite Russian airborne forces Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska (VDV).
Many question the underlying motives for appointing General Shamanov in May 2009 to command the VDV, a known advocate of reform, and yet following his arrival in Ryazan he has effectively sheltered the arm of service from the reform program. Yet, he arrived with strong credentials, not only as a career paratrooper, but as the officer that had turned around and significantly improved combat training within the ground forces. Moreover, Serdyukov tasked him with instilling the elite spirit of the VDV in the new generation of NCO’s, which are currently being trained at Ryazan.
As a combat experienced officer, with a reputation for achieving set targets, he is an example to his men, and evidently commands their respect. Such examples may become rarer as the new generation of Russian officer is developed in the years ahead. It appears that the defense ministry and General Staff are currently considering the parameters of that future model.
Russian history and the place of the Russian state in the international system
Skeptics of the “new look” point to the demographic trends and problems facing Russia that appear almost insurmountable. Their conceptual approach appears rooted in, if it is this bad, how can we introduce constructive change?” Some western studies have fallen into the trap of prematurely assessing Serdyukov’s reform. One study published in October 2009 by the influential Berlin-based Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik concluded that the current efforts to improve military capabilities will ultimately fail due to economic and demographic issues that will undermine military modernization, while the “new look” will struggle due to the many problems in the Russian defense industry. Nevertheless, it is evidently far too soon to make such forecasts, but the point is that in some influential western think tanks there is an expectance that reform will fail.
Yet, it is clear that the architects of the military reform recognize several key features of both Russian history and its military history. Peter the Great, for example, in the context of an agrarian society, oversaw the transformation of the imperial army partly by drawing on the best available foreign experience and applying it. Equally, despite the many issues and upheavals that has historically confronted the country, Russia has survived and remains influential on the world stage. In the aftermath of the Crimean War, 1854-56, successful military reform was carried out. Successful reform has always been linked to periods of economic growth.
Equally, as Russia seeks to find its place among the leading powers, and recalibrate its relations away from the confrontational approach of the past toward a more dynamic and cooperative one still reflecting Russian national interests it is worth noting the disparity that exists between such foreign policy aspirations and the capabilities of the conventional armed forces. Serdyukov’s reforms are narrowing this gap, and if successful, countries with whom Russian deals will need to strategically reassess their view of Russian power.
Thus far, Serdyukov’s reform agenda has been implemented rapidly and with significant achievements. These are mostly administrative achievements, such as the transition to the permanent readiness brigades. Yet, the challenges ahead are far deeper, and are more connected with the value of the Russian state: its people. More than the introduction of any new weapons or equipment, the future of the Russian armed forces will center on whether the state can harness and develop a new generation of Russian officer, and for each individual that will entail serving as an example, delegating authority, bringing the best out of his subordinates, encouraging a culture of initiative and problem solving: in short leadership.
March 9, 2010
|
|
|
