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UNITED STATES AND NATO RE-ENGAGEMENT WITH UZBEKISTAN
ROGER N MCDERMOTT,
Honorary Senior Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK), Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC
In 2005, following a series of misunderstandings and a general decline in the strategic relationship between the United States and Uzbekistan, the Uzbek government requested that Washington withdraw its Air Force components from Kharshi-Khanbad (K2), which had played a key role in supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Of course, to many commentators, these events were a natural culmination of the tragic events in Andijan in May 2005. A superficial reading of those events, including quick condemnation from the West that appeared hurried and unnecessarily hostile to the regime, links the security ‘crackdown’ on the uprising and the civilian deaths that occurred to the move by the U.S. NATO and the EU to isolate the regime and punish it for what the West claimed as an outrage against innocent civilians. Underlying this assessment, were deep fissures within the relationship that Washington and Brussels had built with Tashkent, which pre-dated the crisis in Andijan and the diplomatic fall-out that ensued. Those tensions, challenges and misunderstandings have assumed a new importance, as the U.S. and NATO now seeks to re-engage with Uzbekistan. Delineating some of these and considering what has changed in the meantime, will serve to show some of the limits placed on this re-engagement as well as recognising that following the military operation launched by Russian in Georgia in August 2008, Moscow is re-emerging as the security guarantor in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, at a time of transition in the U.S. as the electorate ponder the various merits of a McCain or Obama presidency.
Background
The strategic partnership between the United States and Uzbekistan unravelled rapidly following the uprising and government response in Andijan in May 2005 culminating in the Uzbek decision to expel the US Air force from the Kharshi-Khanabad (K2) base in late 2005. That partnership had been under strain for some time, with various signs that the breach would occur. Official Tashkent was unable to cope or plan adequately with the intensity of US and NATO interest following 9/11 and the deployment of western military forces into Central Asia in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. This was complicated further by the adoption of the zero-sum security thinking in Moscow, which increasingly regarded with suspicion the US military presence particularly in Uzbekistan. These pressures on Tashkent related to Washington conducting its defence and security assistance programmes with linkage to political goals such as promoting ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’ issues. The regime had little diplomatic experience to call on when faced with numerous visits to the capital by interested American senators and offers of support from the various U.S. government funding streams. Prior to the events of 2005 a fundamental disparity emerged between how the U.S. State Department and U.S. Department of Defence (DoD) conducted policy towards Uzbekistan. Certain longer term lessons were learned by the Uzbeks, such as their memory of strong pressure from Washington to deploy operationally to Iraq following the invasion in 2003. It was no surprise to official Tashkent to learn of the pressure on Kazakhstan in 2007 from Washington and London to send peacekeepers to Afghanistan; Uzbeks have known that such engagement is based on quid pro quo. U.S. military assistance to Uzbekistan, which also pre-dated 9/11, had determined that the Uzbeks of all the Central Asian militaries were more open to learning new ‘Western’ ways of doing things; on the eve of Andijan Washington and NATO planners regarded the armed forces of Uzbekistan as the most combat capable in the region. This has not significantly changed in the three years since. But the regime has learned that it needs to carefully weigh its exact requirements before re-entering engagement with the U.S. and NATO.
Foreign Policy Issues
Tashkent’s re-entry into the CSTO (deepening defence and security relations with Russia since 2005) and its continued membership of the SCO have not eliminated the deep tensions and concerns felt by Uzbeks vis-à-vis these organisations and their member states. Unofficially, Uzbeks characterize the SCO as an anti-American organisation and are reluctant as a result to actively participate in the drive towards strengthening its defence and security credentials. Their reservations about the CSTO relate to its tendency to be content to hold ‘Soviet style’ exercises rather than developing rapid deployment capabilities using small units to respond to sudden emergencies of ‘terrorist’ inspired events. Washington, despite the alleged human rights abuses involved, remains interested in Uzbek intelligence not least for accessing reliable information on Afghanistan, but also with an eye on Iran. A large proportion of SNB officers speak Farsi, have served in Tehran, and maintain cordial relations with Iranian and other regional intelligence services. They appreciate Washington’s interest and see a quid pro quo in this relationship in light of their interest to learn more about western intelligence tradecraft.
Military Situation
Think tank analysts and policy officials in Tashkent continue to discuss the security objectives Uzbekistan should pursue through its relationships with Western countries and the Alliance. In doing so, they realize that mistakes in the West’s efforts to engage Kazakhstan in military and security cooperation could perhaps be exploited to Uzbekistan’s advantage. Government officials want to replicate Kazakhstan’s experience of avoiding systemic military reform, concentrating on the reform of key formations in order to ‘showcase’ its armed forces and promote a positive image of the country abroad. Also, there is an awareness that the Uzbek military will not become involved in operations in Afghanistan, but has to maintain combat capabilities to deal with any future threat from Islamic militants on its territory. Tashkent looks towards Western countries for access to military training programmes, assistance to its Special Forces and wants to augment the foreign help it currently receives from within the CSTO. They are also keen to learn from Western models of information warfare in order to avoid some mistakes made by the authorities in handling the Andijan crisis in May 2005.
Indicators and variables:
Whether the re-engagement currently underway between the US/NATO and Uzbekistan has any chance of success depends on a number of factors, ranging from domestic politics to foreign policy factors:
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Afghanistan: Afghanistan is an issue of common interest to both parties. The prospects of failure in Afghanistan have forced Uzbekistan to pay close attention to how NATO is handling the situation. While Uzbekistan is willing to explore ways to avoid a failure of the international community in Afghanistan, it has no real solution to offer or the means to turn the situation around on its own. Uzbekistan is therefore expected to and may shift its policies as the situation develops.
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Domestic politics: The eventual departure of President Karimov from the political scene may affect Uzbekistan’s internal stability and usher a transition period that would have the effect of cooling Uzbekistan’s foreign relations.
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Synergy between the DoD and State Department in forming and conducting policy towards Tashkent; Tashkent considers that the U.S. has never stopped appreciating the strategic importance of the country, but the hostile stance of the State Department, emphasising human rights issues and pushing the democracy agenda can potentially unravel the relationship once again
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U.S. Diplomats: The personnel appointed to Tashkent are also an indicator in so far as they may or may not promote stronger bilateral relations. The current US Ambassador in Tashkent is respected amongst the Uzbek officials in Tashkent, while his previous postings to Moscow and Kabul give him a uniquely informed insight into how Uzbekistan will feature in regional dynamics
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NATO Diplomacy: Uzbek officials consider the NATO liaison officer in neighbouring Kazakhstan, Tugay Tuncer, as ‘their man’ as he has close links to Turks that are known to Uzbek officials [Tuncer is about to rotate out of this post, but this is also viewed positively as he will return to NATO HQ and according to Uzbeks, he will push for Uzbek interests]. There is some sensitivity over the NATO decision to place the liaison officer in Kazakhstan, though it is hoped this will change by using the once suggested rotational officer idea [placing the NATO officer in UZ/KZ] avoiding any suggestion that the Alliance has a favoured country in the region
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Uzbekistan’s international image: Karimov wants this to improve and will look to Washington and NATO to help achieve this. In particular he needs greater levels of Foreign Direct Investment in Uzbekistan, which is one clear indictor of the re-emerging relations
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Basing: Re-opening the US Air force base in Uzbekistan and reaching mutually acceptable terms; this would be a controversial step and may now be less likely following g the deterioration in Russia’s relations with the West
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Treatment/harassment of US citizens; there is evidence that this is going on at this point, but in fact may serve to indicate an order from the top yet to be rescinded
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Western pressure over human rights, democracy, or offering assistance with political agendas [such as recognition of Kosovo]
Variables:
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Elections in the U.S. in November 2008; Uzbek concern about the impact of a McCain Presidency, as they see him as hostile towards Uzbekistan and Russia
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Suspicion concerning the intentions of Russia; unknown as to whether Medvedev will pursue a new course in Central Asia, if the FSB will engage in ‘games’ in Uzbekistan [as in Georgia]
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Elections in Afghanistan in 2009
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The role of Pakistan: how Pakistan’s ‘counter-terrorist’ strategy will be evolve regarding the Taliban
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Potential negative impact of Afghanistan, should the NATO mission obviously fail
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Possible damage to relations resulting from intense NGO campaigns in Uzbekistan
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U.S. District Court ruling against Gulnara Karimova; Uzbek officials are making increasing mention of this and would like this to be resolved
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Lack of real Western FDI into Uzbekistan, which may promote the interests of those in Tashkent favouring looking towards Arab states, India, etc
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Difficulty accessing NATO or US military programmes open to Kazakhs
Trends:
Uzbekistan is attempting to foster increased FDI into the country, predicated on its assessment that it will benefit as a transport hub as neighbouring Turkmenistan booms economically in the longer term. Countries with which Uzbekistan maintains close relations within the EU such as Germany do not necessarily have a large corporate presence in the country. Siemens and other German companies have now reduced their Uzbek offices to representative ones. U.S. companies involved in investment ventures such as General Motors, tend to reduce their risks by having only the smaller share of the investment. There is more Kazakh money coming into the Uzbek economy and investment interest is growing from South Korea, Malaysia, and Russia.
Assessment
Current re-engagement between the U.S., NATO and Uzbekistan may be characterised as officially cautious and low key. In reality, the Russian military action in Georgia will make Tashkent even more cautious about the extent to which it cooperates in defence and security issues with either the U.S. or NATO and in some ways the relationship is deepening too quickly. This partly reflects the Uzbek perception that the latter half of 2008 represents a window of opportunity to strengthen ties with the U.S. before they experience the potential challenges of dealing with a new presidential administration in Washington. The bilateral relations between U.S. and Uzbekistan will remain vulnerable to sudden fluctuations in the short term, though this could settle down in the next three to five years if and when presidential transition is completed in Tashkent. If more western FDI follows in the interim, this may stimulate a more durable partnership. NATO’s relations with Uzbekistan will fall between balancing its expansion into Ukraine and reassessing the potential membership of Georgia, managing relations with Russia and avoiding the appearance of favouring Kazakhstan as a regional actor. Uzbekistan is an appealing strategic partner for policy makers in Washington not only due to security issues linked to Afghanistan, but in seeking additional pressure on Iran.
Berlin, which has played a pivotal role in keeping open the door for improved Western relations with Uzbekistan, will continue to hold a key position in the calibration of NATO’s re-engagement with Tashkent. What is clear, reflecting on the period 2005-2008, is that U.S. NATO and EU policy towards Central Asia has been fundamentally flawed inso far as Tashkent has been ‘isolated’ in Western policymaking. During this period, Russia has benefited and stands in stark contrast to the Western approach since it arguably has greater ‘regional’ credibility. Tashkent will take a resolutely cautious approach as this re-engagement unfolds, aware of the weaknesses of the earlier model of engagement and witnessing the same Western mistakes in the conduct of defence and security policy towards Kazakhstan, with continued pressure from Washington and London for the deployment of Kazakhstan’s peacekeepers to Afghanistan.
The first version of this article was published in German in Zentralasien-Analysen, 30 September 2008.
October 1, 2008
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