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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN ESTONIA
EUGENY GOLIKOV,
Social Scientist, Tallinn
Eurasian Home: “What does the procrastination of the Estonian president election process mean? Is it a sign of the permanent local confrontation of the parliamentary parties for political domination, or does this indicate the significant ideological and program differences in the Estonian society?”
The presidential election transfer from Riigikogu to the Electoral College shouldn’t be regarded as procrastination. This is rather an established procedure typical for Estonian political system.
Before the presidential election many policy-makers, including Estonian President Arnold Ruutel, spoke for the Parliament to elect the president, but for that a qualified majority of 68 votes is needed. The present political forces configuration did not allow neither Riigikogu Speaker Ene Ergma nor EU Parliament Member Toomas-Hendrik Ilves to get the necessary number of votes. So, the issue was passed to the Electoral College as it had been done before.
Another matter is that presidential election brought to light cleavages in the Estonian political space. I should say, this cleavages are more telling and important than the election itself. The main consideration is president’s role in the political life of Estonia, which is an exemplary parliamentary republic, is not of great significance.
The presidential election issue comes to be fundamental only when we consider different concepts of the future socioeconomic and political development of Estonia. Strictly speaking, now Estonia, as, probably, many other New Independent States, witnesses a more and more evident collision of two development tendencies: the purely liberal one advocating self-regulation and seeking to reduce the state’s role in regulating socioeconomic development of the society; and the social-democratic one based on the state regulation. In Estonia a liberal economic model has dominated for the 15 years of the republic's independence. The success of this model is evident: the country’s GDP growth in 2006, for example, is to make up 12 percent. At the same time, social problems have become very obvious, particularly against the economic boom background, of which the lion’s share goes to the society’s top rather than to improve the living standard.
The peculiar feature of Estonian policy in previous years was that all attempts to correct the government’s economic policy were blocked in a simple way, namely through linking liberal policy to the national interests of the Estonian people. The calls to invest more money in scientific research, education and health care, to stimulate the birth rate and increase the pensions have efficiently been parried by the idea that the only liberal economic policy meets the national interests of the Estonians. Those interests consist in preserving Estonian language and culture, ensuring the dominating role of the Estonians in policy-making, etc. So, there was a Hobson’s choice: either you accept the liberal model, or you are not a patriot. The national rhetoric had an effect: cabinets have changed often within 15 years, but the economic policy has remained the same. The patriotic slogans often coming as far as anti-Russian rhetoric are of secondary importance for many Estonian politicians. They are only used to ensure policy that would allow the minority to own the major national resources. And the outsiders are proposed the fairy tales about the Russian Threat and patriotic hymns.
I believe that the key feature of this presidential election is the fact that the “patriotic resource” is being exhausted while social problems are increasing. Another important sign of the pre-election situation was the agreement concluded by the two socially-oriented political forces, Estonian Centre Party and the People’s Union of Estonia. It is noteworthy that Estonian social democrats cannot make up their mind to join this agreement, they are kept by the subjective dislikes and, probably, by deeper economic interests. The present presidential election’s irony is that the both candidates – Toomas-Hendrik Ilves, supported by a three “liberal-patriotic” parties alliance, and incumbent President Arnold Ruutel, who decided to stand for the second term and who is supported by the centrist and populist bloc, are waving with pink flags. But one of them upholds the same tough liberal views, and the other represents the social bloc that is only being formed. Therefore, for Estonia the main context and intrigue of the presidential election is formed not by political contest, but by possibility and necessity to make significant changes in the current policy if the “social coalition” manages to gain momentum and win the presidential election as well as the parliamentary election in March, 2007.
Eurasian Home: “What are the main differences in the programs of the candidates for presidency? How do they see the future of the Estonian-Russian relations?”
According to the tradition of the presidential elections in Estonia the candidates do not set forward their own programs. So the present election was held without the program statements made by the candidates. There is a competition among political figures and forces supporting them, rather than among programs. Let me explain: presidency in Estonia is not an institution charged with authority to independently form and implement the state policy. Another stipulation to the election game is for the president to be unbiased as concerns the program purposes and the actions of certain political parties. But although the candidates are proposed by the parties, all of the Estonian presidents have failed to fully dissociate from the party interests.
As concerns relations with Russia, hardly any Estonian official will risk today to sound explicitly anti-Russian. Though, the intercourse of the two states is currently at a standstill. Russia’s refusal to ratify the boundary treaty and the ensuing tension can in part account for this lull. Another possible explanation is that both Russia and Estonia are not enough motivated to initiate rapprochement: while the relations develop on a daily basis and problems are solved as they emerge, both parties see no ground for close cooperation. Once Estonia felt that it couldn’t talk to its Eastern neighbor on equal terms it acceded to the general European policy towards Russia. And the latter, most likely, hasn’t yet decided if it needs to improve relations with Estonia by itself, and if positive, what to do with the habitual human-rights violation rhetoric. Russia is most likely to make a fresh start in bilateral relations if it revises the patterns of the on-going but slack dialogue. In my opinion Russia’s relations with its smaller neighbors are important as its ‘memorandum of intent’ in its European policy in general; and Europe judges about Russia’s intentions by its policy towards small neighbors, the Baltic States in the first place.
Eurasian Home: “Does the Russian-speaking population have political weight in Estonia?”
Russian-speaking politicians are not very influential nowadays. As a part of the Russian-speaking community they, so to say, found themselves at the crossroads. It’s hard to predict how viable will be the Russian community in 10 – 20 years. The current situation – dying-out, partial assimilation and emigration to the more welfare states – proposes pessimistic prognosis. These factors certainly have an impact on political climate: no large-scale objectives or consolidating ideas are proposed. And the prevailing instantaneous self-seeking motifs can not lay the ground for a balanced policy. As for the general attitude to Russia, I am convinced that many Russians living in Estonia feel connected to it, believe in its revival, though Russia’s stance on current political and everyday-life issues too often fails to be a guideline. And while the Estonian society can’t afford strong axiological alternatives, the most active and skilled members of the community will seek to live and work abroad, which will diminish both the community and its political elite.
Eugeny Golikov was a Permanent Representative of the Estonian Government to the Russian Government in 1991 – 1992.
September 6, 2006
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