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RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE IN 2006
STANISLAV BELKOVSKY,
Director of the National Strategy Institute, Moscow
Summing up the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space in 2006, we should acknowledge that Russia has ceased to be a regional power.
Before 2006 the post-Soviet space had been fragmented and segmented for about 2 years, i.e. it ceased to exist as an informal formation with the capital in Moscow. Since 2006, Russia has not been a source of legitimacy of the post-Soviet regimes. In the near future the post-Soviet space will be structured by the new subregional powers, such as Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Apart from that, in 2006 the myth that the New Independent States crucially depended on Russia in energy supplies was destroyed. Now it is clear that Ukraine and Belarus as energy transit countries can exert influence upon Russia, because the latter is interested in guaranteeing security of energy supplies to Europe.
Also it became clear that dependence of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan as energy suppliers on Russia was not critical. Many events that took place last year indicate that.
Putting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline into operation means the appearance of a new route from Central Asia to Europe. As oil from the Central Asian countries flows along the pipeline, the route through the Russian port of Novorossiysk will become less attractive.
In 2006 the construction of Nabukko pipeline was more intense. It will be built through the Caspian Sea bottom, Turkey, Hungary, Romania to Western Europe with a branch line to Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine will have an opportunity to get the Central Asian gas that will be supplied to it without going through Russia. Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych back this project.
The death of Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in December 2006 and the changes followed in the government of Turkmenistan livened up the discussion of the construction of the Transafghan gas pipeline. After this gas pipeline is put into operation, Turkmenistan will reduce its dependence on the Russian company Gazprom. The country will need not sell its gas to Gazprom at a price that is lower than the market one. As a result, in 2012 Russia may not fill its gas pipelines with the cheap Turkmen gas.
In the heat of the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute at the beginning of 2006 the world came to know that Gazprom had no capacity for limiting its gas exports, because it couldn’t stop supplies to the EU countries through Ukraine for more than 4 or 5 days.
In 2006 the Belarus-Russia Union project actually ceased to exist. The project was of importance to the Kremlin, because it allowed Russia to keep Belarus as a strategic partner. In many respects the legitimacy of Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime was based on the idea of reviving the “USSR in miniature”.
In 2007 Lukashenka will have to carry out an alternative national project that implies building of a full-format national state.
As early as in 2006 we saw Belarus’ rapprochement with the other New Independent States that have recently been regarded as opponents of the Belarus-Russia Union (Ukraine, Azerbaijan etc.).
In January 2007 contacts between Belarus and the EU have become much more intense. On January 16, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced that it would implement a new strategy towards Belarus that would imply the increase of the level of cooperation with the Belarusian private capital.
On January 18, during his official visit to Minsk PACE President René van der Linden firstly stated that Belarus getting out of the political isolation would guarantee its democratization and successful development. He did not criticize Lukashenka severely. In return, the Belarusian President allowed René van der Linden to meet with some key figures of the Belarusian opposition.
As we expect, Belarus will intensify cooperation with Ukraine in 2007.
In 2007-2011 Lukashenka will most likely make an attempt to democratize his regime. It is possible that the new Constitution will be adopted. The EU will give up the efforts to change Lukashenka’s regime and it will help Belarus to integrate into the European economic and political projects. Ukraine will act as a mediator of the Belarus-EU relations and a new subregional power.
In 2006 Russia ceased to be a geopolitical force in the South Caucasus. Moscow’s efforts to establish a blockade on Georgia seem to be unsuccessful. The country is able to do without the Russian energy resources.
The blockade, imposed on Georgia, led to the economic losses – 1.5 % of Georgia’s GDP. But it is not critical. Before 2006 Gazprom was the exclusive Georgia’s gas supplier, in 2007 it will supply only 35% of the Russian gas to Georgia. Azerbaijan and Turkey have become alternative energy suppliers of Georgia. If the USA gave its consent, Iran could cover Gazprom’s share.
In 2006 the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan worsened. Azerbaijan refused to purchase the Russian gas and didn’t back up the blockade, set up over Georgia.
Deterioration of relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan endangers the interests of Armenia, the last Russia’s ally in the region. Armenia has become dependent not only on the Azerbaijani but also on the Georgian transport corridors.
The replacement of the Kazakh Prime Minister at the beginning of 2007 means that focus of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy will be shifted. The key posts in the Cabinet, which were occupied by the representatives of the old Russia-oriented elite, now are occupied by the officials who intend to develop deep economic and political ties with the USA and China, which indicates that Kazakhstan should not be considered to be a strategic ally or an outpost of Russia either.
Thus, after 2006 Russia remained all alone in the post-Soviet space. Its only allies are the unrecognized republics that also have a number of disagreements with their “elder brother”.
In particular, Russia did not recognize the 2006 referendum in Transnistria that took place on 17 September 2006 (on that date, Transnistria voted to continue its de facto independence and seek closer ties with Russia), although Moscow had forced the Transnistrian authorities to hold the referendum.
Thus, Russia has ceased to be a moderator in the post-Soviet space. And this is a policy followed by the Russian ruling political class for all the recent years.
Such an unreasoned policy makes Russia develop a new positioning strategy in the post-Soviet space in the near future. But there are doubts that this strategy will be developed, while the current political elite remains in power.
The strategy will most likely be proposed after the presidential election in Russia that is scheduled for 2008.
The text is based on Stanislav Belkovsky’s address to the press-conference “Russia in the post-Soviet space: forecast of the future scenarios” that was organized by the Russian News and Information Agency RIA Novosti on January 23, 2007.
January 31, 2007
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