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MOSCOW HAS TAKEN A STEP TOWARDS TBILISI… WHAT COMES NEXT?!
ZAAL ANJAPARIDZE,
Political analyst, Tbilisi
What is the underpinning of the widely covered by the Russian mass media return to Georgia of Russian ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko who was recalled in September 2006?
The facade of the ambassador’s return to the country of accreditation intended to impress the general public failed to hide some telling facts. The main Russian federal TV channels broadcasted the President Vladimir Putin’s personal parting speech to Kovalenko filled with reconciliatory pathos. But the fact that the latter had to make a detour going to Georgia via Armenia, the only Russia’s strategic partner in the South Caucasus, caused a strange feeling of ambiguity.
Putin’s words about Russia intending to “undertake all possible measures that people living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia expect from us,” and his statement at the joint press conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel that “solution of the status of Kosovo should set a universal precedent applicable to the resolution of the conflicts in the post-Soviet space,” don’t witness to the Kremlin’s intention to improve relations with Georgia indeed. It is quite evident what actually the breakaway regions and their cardboard governments are expecting from Russia.
While the official Moscow, obviously, thinks that the ball is on the Georgian side, Tbilisi doesn’t seem to be considering any reciprocal steps. The Georgian political establishment and particularly the ruling party consider that Russia’s reconciliatory move to be a victory of Mikheil Saakashvili’s team and their policies. To a certain extent, they are right. It is telling that the Russian ambassador returned to Tbilisi just on the threshold of the debates over the Russian-Georgian relations that had been scheduled for this week in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly.
The debates that threatened to become one more Russia’s political humiliation have been adjourned. But as the differences in bilateral relations haven’t been ironed out yet, Russia will have to account for its actions against Georgia before the European political community. But it is fair to say that according to some sources, the confidential PACE report on the issue criticizes the Georgian top officials for their actions during the so-called “spy scandal” that triggered the crisis that was well near the full-scale conflict.
Now that the Russian ambassador has come back to Georgia, the bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia will return to the logic of the “cold war” they have been following for the last ten years. Russia has overestimated the effect of its sanctions against Georgia. The intimidating forecasts under the catchy headlines “The fate of the Saakashvili’s regime in Putin’s hands”, “Will the Saakashvili’s regime live to celebrate Christmas?”, etc. It seems that the Kremlin officials have finally counted and compared their losses and gains from the sanctions against Georgia and ruled out that they better to loosen the grip.
Another reason why Russia strives to normalize bilateral relations, even for show, is that Georgia intends to rekindle the issue of withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers from the conflict zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
But all that Russia can wait in response is a slight hushing of the anti-Russian rhetoric from the official Tbilisi. Apart from the support of the Western community, especially of the U.S. government, Georgia gains new reasons for feeling more secure and confident in its interaction with Russia – it has gradually been gaining new markets for its products embargoed by Russia, and diversifying its energy suppliers. On January 14 the first portion of natural gas was delivered to Georgia via the Baku – Tbilisi – Erzerum gas pipeline from the BP’s Shakh-Deniz field.
January 27, 2007
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