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IS IT POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE THE RUSSIA-US RELATIONS?
MARIA YULIKOVA,
PhD in Journalism, Fletcher School of International Affairs, Tufts University, USA
US president Barack Obama will travel to Moscow in July this year for his second negotiations round with Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. The first meeting between the two leaders in London in April went well: after a long period of mutual negligence between the USA and Russia, the two presidents managed to start their dialog from a blank page, in the tone of respect and positive aspirations.
Setting aside the issues of economic, scientific, educational and cultural cooperation (those areas that the two leaders described as cooperation between the societies in their joint statement), the presidents decided to achieve agreements on the issues of nuclear arms proliferation, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Russia’s accession to the WTO, relations with Russia’s neighbors (primarily with Georgia and Ukraine) and the correlated issue of NATO-Russia cooperation. There is also the task to overcome the global financial crisis and economic downturn.
The most promising and vital area of the US-Russia cooperation is the nuclear proliferation. As Medvedev and Obama decided to re-negotiate the START treaty before it expires in December this year, both sides are willing to sign a new agreement soon. Negotiations on arms reduction between Russia and the USA have a long tradition tracing from the times of the Cold War and Soviet Union. American and Russian military experts gained much experience in this field, having achieved considerable results in the past. The fact that such a knowledgeable and experienced professional as Rose Gottemoeller, the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, former Moscow Carnegie Center’s director and Deputy Undersecretary of Energy for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation under Clinton’s administration, is leading the US negotiation team, gives much hope for success.
During the International Nonproliferation Conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington D.C., held on April 6-7, Gottemoeller, and Sergey Kislyak, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, showed mutual understanding and expressed optimism and readiness for the productive negotiations on START. Among other issues, Kislyak explained that the base for success in the negotiations between the two countries is the joint decision making. Ambassador mentioned theEuropean Missile Defenses program of the NATO-Russia Council as the example of such decision making mechanism, which led to productive cooperation.
Similar views on the urgency of nuclear proliferation of both administrations, and the past experience in this domain are likely to ease the bilateral cooperation in this field.
As to the other areas of the bilateral relations, the negotiations will obviously be more difficult. While the first meeting of Obama and Medvedev inspired optimism on both sides of the Pacific, the change of American administration, although drastic, is unlikely to lead to a new era of US-Russian international cooperation. There are still many challenges on the way to good relations and successful negotiations.
Obstacle 1: different priorities
In US foreign policy, relations with Russia are important but not the first priority. The problems of Iranian nuclear expansion, Afghan terrorists, and the Middle East are the major foreign policy of the Obama Administration. Russia’s importance for the US is measured by the scale of Russia’s possible assistance in solving these critical issues.
For Russia, the USA is still a major political opponent and desired partner, along with the European Union. Russia’s political elites do not want to give up the USSR’s status of global power, willing to play the major role on the world arena.
So, if for the US Russia is important for solving primarily the problems of Afghanistan, Iran, and North Korea, as well as the arms reduction, Russia wants to see the United States its equal partner and ally for leading the rest of the world in all the areas of international relations.
Obstacle 2: superpower ambitions
Even while expressing support for the new multipolar world order, Russian leadership has continued to approach foreign relations through the “spheres of influence.” It is particularly evident in Russia’s policies towards Georgia and Ukraine, as well as other CIS countries. The most recent example of this approach is the tensions with NATO, caused by Russia’s uneasiness about NATO’s military exercises in Georgia. In fact, Moscow views the post-Soviet space as its backyard: considerable Russian population lives in those countries and the former Soviet republics are still closely tied socially and economically; Russian language is still used for international communication in this region.
Although Obama proclaims his support for multilateralism, it is still difficult to believe that the United States will surrender its superpower status – in fact, this is unlikely to happen. Moreover, NATO’s expansion towards the Russian borders would add to America’s global power rank.
Meanwhile, the American president is trying to show the rest of the world that he is ready to listen to other voices while formulating his foreign policy.
Obstacle 3: lack of confidence
The major characteristics of the George Bush era in US-Russia relations were the absence of regular negotiations and the lack of communication between the two states. Controversial and aggressive policies of both Presidents Bush and Putin caused bad relations, complete ignorance of the US administration towards Russia and anti-Americanism in Russia. Obviously, it will take time and efforts of both sides to restore mutual trust and positive inclinations.
Taking into account all these issues between the two countries, anticipating a major turn in the bilateral relations soon would be somewhat wishful.
Nevertheless, the common grounds are still there, and the change of American leadership is likely if not turn around, at least improve the bilateral relations to some extent.
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As NATO’s eastward expansion and the missile shield in the Czech Republic are the two stumbling blocks between the two countries, the US administration should prove to Russia that it won’t move in the direction of implementing these projects. If NATO suspends its exercises in Georgia, and replace the missile plans in Eastern Europe with a new international security structure, which would include Russia as the equal partner, Russian leadership will be likely to become more cooperative. Ultimately, these measures won’t compromise American external interests: Georgia and Ukraine are not ready to join the western military alliance, requiring much assistance and improvements of their military forces; and the missile shield in the Czech Republic and Poland is too costly for the US, particularly now, in times of economic and financial crisis, so replacing this project with another one does not look as a major concession.
Diplomats on both sides also recommend that President Obama repeals the Jackson-Vanik amendment, denying its "most favored nation" status to non-market economies that restrict emigration.
Iran
Rose Gottemoeller, recently appointed US Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, and expert on the US-Russia relations, insists that the urgency of nuclear threats, including the Iranian nuclear problem, generates the necessity for progress on a track that is kept “walled off” from other issues.”
In 2006 Russia finally supported the UN Security Council sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program after arguing against bringing the issue to the UNSC in 2005. Although Russia helped Iran build its nuclear facilities in Bushehr, it has slowed down its recent S-300 anti-aircraft missiles deal with Iran. These developments suggest that Russia may change its policies towards Iran, if this country keeps sustaining from an open and honest dialog on its nuclear program with other nations.
Moreover, in 2006, the Russians first proposed that instead of building indigenous facilities, the Iranians should suspend their enrichment of uranium and join the newly announced international fuel services center that Russia was opening at Angarsk in Siberia.
Trying to build neighborly relations with Iran, Russia proposed the international fuel services center in order to relieve Iran of its perceived need to enrich uranium and escape the expense and environmental burden of dealing with spent fuel and nuclear waste. The project has gained broad international support, with a significant number of countries as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) expressing willingness to participate in such centers.
Iranians rejected the proposal but did not shut out the possibility of discussing it in the future. Reintroducing this project to Iran may create some new opportunities for the US in dealing with this country without using military force.
Another way to ease the relations with Iran is to cooperate with it on solving the problem of drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Discussion of those problems has begun and will probably continue.
According to Gottemoeller, a US-Russian initiative to engage the Iranians in fighting narcotics smuggling could be “the effort that would bring results to the inner sanctum of the Iranian leadership”. At the same time, this could have a significant confidence-building effect and may open up another important channel of communications with Tehran. It may also serve as an entrée for a steady broadening of the agenda, e.g. into the realm of public health and addiction treatment and into other areas of illegal trafficking that have been difficult to address, such as small arms and human trafficking.
As there is a rising alarm in Tehran over the torrent of drug dealing, human trafficking and violence connected to the mayhem in the region across Iran's eastern border, the Islamic Republic already decided to join the United States in to two international conferences on Afghanistan.
In case the USA opens its market for Russian arms, this would also help the United States to gain Russian support in the policies towards Iran.
Afghanistan
While supporting the closure of the US air base in Kyrgyzstan, Russia offered its own transportation routes to Afghanistan for NATO supplies. Although the USA would probably want to diversify its supply channels to Afghanistan and find another partner, the prospect of using Russian routes is increasing the probability of more productive cooperation between the two countries.
The lessons Russia has learned from its Afghanistan war in the 1980s could provide important experience for the current US operation there.
North Korea
Currently, cooperation on reducing the threat of North Korean nuclear facilities looks rather difficult, as the recent visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Pyongyang did not bring the North Korean diplomats back to the negotiation room. Yet Russia is still committed to facilitate the talks on North Korean nuclear programs.
Actually, Moscow proved to be very much involved and willing to ease the tensions between North Korea and the West. Last year, the United States stopped sanctions against North Korea. Banco di Macao released $25 million in North Korean assets that had been frozen because of counterfeiting and money-laundering violations by Pyongyang. Nevertheless, international banks were reluctant to handle the transfer because they were concerned about being held liable under the USA Patriot Act.
At this point, Russia stepped in. Moscow asked the United States for full guarantees that Russian banks would not face Patriot Act penalties if they helped with the transfer. Washington gave those guarantees, and shortly after, the Russian Central Bank received the funds from the U.S. Federal Reserve and transferred them to the North Korean Foreign Trade Bank. North Korea then resumed the shut-down of Yongbyon—leading to the destruction of the reactor’s cooling tower in June 2008.
Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization
Accession to the WTO is critical to Russia and its political leadership, as it is an important step in integrating the Russian economy with the rest of the world. Continued transition towards a modern market economy will facilitate government efforts for greater diversification of the Russian economy. Adherence to the multilateral trading rules will also impose limitations on the role of government in the domestic economy, which will improve competition and bring about further liberalization of the Russian economy. WTO membership will also help Russia to participate in the creation of future common trade rules and thus to promote its interests.
The main task that remains is negotiation on the multilateral memorandum for Russia's accession. The West wants to make sure that Russia is really enforcing its new legislation in defense of intellectual property rights. Russia still insists on its right to introduce far higher domestic agricultural subsidies than the European Union and the United States are prepared to accept, which is the question, typically left to the very end of the negotiations.
A new issue is the role of the enlarged state enterprises in the Russian economy after the last two years of substantial renationalization. This concerns particularly the three big state energy companies, Gazprom, Transneft, and Rosneft, and comes up against the European Energy Charter that Russia refuses to ratify.
The remaining barrier on Russia’s way to WTO is the Russian embargoes against Georgia and Moldova, prohibiting substantial imports of wine and fruits from these two countries, citing sanitary problems.
If Russia does not cease its embargos against Georgia and Moldova, these countries have little choice but to refuse to conclude bilateral protocols with Russia. These two countries could either mobilize other WTO members against Russia's accession or declare that they do not recognize Russia’s WTO membership.
Meanwhile, for the United States and other trading partners, Russia’s accession to the WTO could increase stability and predictability in Russia’s foreign trade and investment regime.
Basically, what the Russian negotiators expect from their American colleagues is the ability to listen to them and respect. Although Russia’s gross domestic product is about ten times smaller than the that of the US, and the Russian defense budget is about four percent of America’s, Russians consider themselves the citizens of a great nation, if not a superpower, but of a big country, former empire, and monstrous USSR, which used to challenge the United States. Russians are also proud of their leading role in the victory over fascism in the past century, the achievements of the Soviet Union in science, the space-system engineering, particularly, and arts.This is why in order to achieve consensus with the Russian leadership, American diplomats should discuss all the major decisions and actions in the areas where their interests cross with those of Russia with their Russian colleagues.
Russia, for its turn, should refrain from anti-Americanism and cease seeking equality with the US in all the international areas. Dmitri Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center suggests that the attempts of Russian leadership to establish an “equal relation of strategic partnership” with the U.S. are doomed to fail. “The quantitative and qualitative balance in relations can and will change, but to insist on equality from the outset is clearly unreasonable. It would be enough to obtain equal conditions in areas where such cooperation is possible and taking shape,” Trenin affirms.
Instead of fighting “American imperialism”, whether in all seriousness or just for show, Russian leadership should focus on carrying out the comprehensive modernization that will ultimately decide its place and role in the world, including its relations with the U.S, the expert says.
Keeping this in mind and negotiating professionally, the US and Russian diplomats have some positive prospects in various areas of the bilateral relations.
Ultimately, the major and most immediate goals of the US and Russian leadership is to work out comprehensive strategies and clear priorities for the bilateral relations. The task will be accomplished when the leaders of the two countries will speak the same language.
May 29, 2009
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