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RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: THE AFGHAN PROBLEM IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
After 2001, when the Taliban suffered a military defeat, lost its grip on power and retreated to defensive positions, the international coalition failed to achieve any noticeable success in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Taliban has been consolidating its positions militarily and politically all the recent years.
The development of the situation can hardly be predicted due to the influence of a variety of different-directed factors, such as the interests of forces acting in the country, the conduct of neighboring states, and the policy of outside players. The United States and its main allies are likely to change their policy and switch from efforts to suppress the Taliban by force to a tactic of reconciliation with some of the Talibs. The Barack Obama administration has several scenarios, but each requires cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbors.
Meanwhile, the neighboring countries can no longer rely solely on the United States. They are seeking a more active independent policy in addressing Afghan problems, which would meet their interests and ensure their security under any developments.
DILEMMAS OF THE RUSSIAN POSITION ON AFGHANISTAN
Moscow’s position on the Afghan issue has been mixed in the recent years.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said in its 2007 foreign policy survey: “If the Afghan campaign ends in failure and the U.S. and NATO leave, the Central Asian countries and Russia will be left face to face with the consequences of the aggravated Afghan problem, primarily the drug and terrorist threat, with an upsurge of fundamentalist sentiments and the destabilization of the region.”
This statement suggests that Russia had doubts about the success of the military operation in Afghanistan back in 2007. The year 2008 did not add any reasons for optimism. Rather, the doubts returned full force.
But let us assume that there is a possibility for a decisive victory of the Western coalition and stabilization in Afghanistan. This would remove the main obstacle to the implementation of infrastructure and transport projects that would help integrate Central and South Asia within the framework of so-called “Greater Central Asia.” The term has been rarely used recently, but the idea lives on. These plans aim to link Central and South Asia by a common energy and transport infrastructure, which would give former Soviet Central Asian republics access to the Indian Ocean. But without a stable Afghanistan (and now we should also add “without a stable Pakistan”) that would be impossible. Yet, something is being done even now – border-crossing points are being modernized, and new roads are being built.
Therefore, Russia by no means is interested in a defeat of the international forces in Afghanistan, as it would create new security problems. But Moscow does not see prospects for a military victory. And if these prospects appeared, they would give a green light to “Greater Central Asia” infrastructure projects that would be economically disadvantageous for Russia.
In these conditions, the Russian Federation has been sitting on the fence. But the worsening of the situation in Afghanistan requires a more coherent approach. In 2007-2008, all Central Asian states grew increasingly concerned about the strengthening of the Taliban. They criticized U.S. and NATO actions but, on the other hand, they showed a growing readiness to help them. At the same time, they grew increasingly dissatisfied with Moscow’s policy. In 2008, the author repeatedly heard critical remarks in Central Asia about the Russian policy towards Afghanistan.
There emerged a situation when the United States and NATO could exploit “the Afghan fears” of Central Asian capitals and meet with more and more understanding there. Traditionally, Washington sought a broader access to the military infrastructure in the region and more active political contacts, which would consolidate the positions of Western countries in general. In other words, by helping the U.S. and NATO to resolve the Afghan problem, the countries of Central Asia recognized their leading role in Afghanistan. In effect, this would imply the extension of U.S. security services to the Central Asian region.
There was one more circumstance that appeared in 2007-2008. The international forces began to experience more and more difficulties with the deliveries of cargoes to Afghanistan. Their main flows always ran through Pakistan. However, several years before, deliveries via the Karachi-Quetta-Kandahar route had stopped, while in 2007 there emerged serious problems with the Karachi-Peshawar-Jalalabad route, as pro-Taliban groups in the territory of Pakistan stepped up their attacks on cargo convoys, destroying or stealing them.
The dependence on the Pakistani transit route can be reduced in several ways. NATO might send more cargo by air directly to Afghanistan, but this would be too expensive. The volume of shipments through the Caucasus and Turkmenistan has increased. The most sensible solution would be to increase transportation by rail through Ukraine (or Belarus) or through Latvia’s port of Riga and farther on to Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The only railway line to Afghanistan runs from Uzbekistan.
Russia and NATO reached a principled accord on railway transit at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, where the parties exchanged letters on the possibility of such transit. However, it was impossible to implement it at that time. NATO refused to negotiate with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, so it had to conduct separate talks with each member country. This is what NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, Robert Simmons, was doing during 2008. However, the coalition succeeded in re-routing shipments of the most vulnerable cargoes bypassing Pakistan, even without opening railway transit. In 2008, fuel purchases increased in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
Moscow found itself in a difficult situation. Assistance to the United States and NATO in Afghanistan implied consent to the spread of U.S. influence in Central Asia. But Russia, which has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure projects in the region, does not view it as an attractive prospect.
It is within the framework of this dilemma that one can consider Moscow’s position on the U.S. base in Manas, Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, Russia is ready to help NATO with deliveries to Afghanistan. But on the other, Moscow was involved in the shut-down of the base, which was part of the coalition’s logistics.
It should be noted that the existence of the Manas base was an even larger irritant to China. China has deployed nuclear missile launchers in its western area, and the flight time from Manas to these strategic targets would only be 30 to 40 minutes. Also, it was from Kyrgyzstan that intelligence was gathered on Chinese nuclear tests in 1996. So, Beijing is very suspicious about U.S. military presence near its borders. In 2005, China called for shutting down a U.S. military base in Uzbekistan. In case of Manas, China’s role, although not publicized, must have been great, too.
Russia is seeking to organize its interaction with NATO in such a way on the Afghan and other issues as not to allow this interaction to have a “false bottom.” The alliance needs access to Afghanistan. Russia is ready to cooperate, but in that case there is no critical need for the Manas base. Washington’s desire to keep it by all means or find alternatives in neighboring countries is interpreted as proof that Afghanistan is only a pretext for U.S. military presence in Central Asia.
Having expressed its readiness to participate in railway transit, Russia has shown that it by no means undermines the U.S. and NATO’s military efforts in Afghanistan. Moreover, Moscow has placed no formal conditions for the beginning of transit. Russia is really interested in providing assistance to the international forces, which meets the interests of its Central Asian allies, as well. Yet, it cannot be ruled out that Moscow is beginning a larger, long-term game, which may evolve in two directions.
First. If the volume of transit through Russia becomes more or less significant, it will make NATO dependent on Moscow for the first time. Russia does not need to set terms for the transit: once it starts, NATO and the U.S. will proceed from the need to keep it going. If Russia encounters an unconstructive position of the partners on the issues it regards significant, there is always a possibility to suspend the transit.
Second. Transit through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan makes these countries larger players. Moscow is stepping up its policy based on the concept that Afghanistan needs not only a military victory but also the solution of a complex of socio-economic problems. It has to tackle drug trafficking in the first place. The main role in the solution of these issues should be assigned not to the U.S. or NATO but to the UN and other international organizations.
Russia believes that countering the drug threat from Afghanistan must become a priority in international efforts. During the presence of the coalition forces in the country, the drug threat not only has not decreased but has multiplied instead. In effect, the international coalition is buying the loyalty of the Afghan population, closing its eyes to drugs: “Grow poppy, trade in opium, but don’t take up arms.” It is a vicious circle. Part of the drug money goes to the Taliban, which has helped the Talibs to recover after the 2001 defeat. Besides, it turns out that Russia, Iran, Central Asian countries and EU states pay for the partial solution of the security problem, because almost all of Afghan heroin is consumed there.
A more stable Afghanistan in exchange for larger drug trade is a very dubious transaction. Why should it be welcome in the countries to which Afghan heroin is smuggled, with all the ensuing social and criminal problems? In essence, the drug situation should serve as the criterion of success of the international coalition’s actions in Afghanistan.
Power methods alone (the destruction of opium crops, etc.) would not eradicate the drug threat but would only bring about a confrontation with the local population. Therefore, only a complex strategy must be applied – a combination of force and efforts to overcome the social and economic backwardness in the country.
THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION STEPPING UP EFFORTS
All Afghanistan’s neighbors, except Turkmenistan, have the status of members or observers at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It is therefore quite natural to use this format for discussing the Afghan problem and work out an independent SCO position and policy, especially as things have not been going smoothly in Afghanistan.
A SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group has been set up, and on March 27, 2009, Moscow hosted an international conference on Afghanistan under the aegis of the SCO to discuss documents proposed by the Group. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Borodavkin said in closing remarks at the conference that “efforts by the international community in stabilizing Afghanistan need rethinking. In this regard, the SCO Conference has constituted an important stage of the commencement of this work.”
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not a structure open to all. Therefore, the conference on Afghanistan, to which a broad circle of participants was invited, including those previously barred from SCO events, should be viewed as a positive trend. The SCO has shown it is going to play an increasingly active role in Afghan issues and promote an agenda of its own, while cooperating with other interested countries.
Of course, some diplomatic verbal fencing still takes place. For example, the Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime said in its introductory part: “Attaching great importance to the efforts made by international and regional organizations including the United Nations (UN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) to combat the threats of terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime…” There is no mention of either NATO or the European Union here. Later, however, the document corrected the omission, as the closing paragraph stated: “We express our commitment to enhance cooperation with all relevant States and international and regional organizations, namely UN, EU, CIS, CSTO, OSCE, NATO and CICA on matters of common interest …”
The final document, titled “The Declaration of the special Conference on Afghanistan convened under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” begins thus: “The participants in the Conference welcomed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) initiative to organize this forum, expressed their satisfaction with results and noted that the outcome was in line with the efforts of the international community, namely the United Nations, North-Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Organization of Islamic Conference and Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, other international and regional organizations and individual states to counteract threats of terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crimes.”
The discussions on Afghanistan within the SCO framework encompass three main areas, which are often referred to as ‘baskets’: fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, and cross-border crime. The SCO has worked out a range of measures for each area. They are listed in two documents circulated at the Moscow conference – the Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime, and the Plan of Action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime. The SCO thereby demonstrates that it has a specific plan of work, open to other states.
It is within the frameworks of these three “baskets” that the SCO has proposed creating “security belts,” mentioned in the Statement. It said, in particular: “We call for joining the efforts of all States and organizations concerned aimed at creating the ‘anti-drug and financial security belts’ in the region.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted in his speech at the Moscow conference that “in this spirit – through joint work with Kabul, not by creating any ‘sanitary cordons’– the SCO and CSTO suggest creating antinarcotics, antiterrorist and financial security belts.”
The grouping of Afghan issues into three ‘baskets’ is already yielding fruit. Yet, there is one void that needs to be addressed. The above documents clearly stated the necessity to achieve the solution of Afghanistan’s socio-economic problems. Lavrov emphasized: “We are convinced that to stabilize the situation a comprehensive approach is needed which combines the military suppression of terrorists, extremists and drug dealers with a wide-scale program of economic and social rehabilitation.” However, social and economic issues do not fit into any of the three ‘baskets’ and have to be mentioned separately, “on the sidelines.”
The Plan of Actions says at the end – and outside the main text of the document – that “The SCO Member States will further develop their bilateral trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, engagement in international efforts to provide assistance in its economic recovery, and will explore opportunities for implementing joint projects aimed at social and economic rehabilitation of this country. In this regard, the SCO Member States will consider the proposal of the Republic of Tajikistan to sponsor an international conference of Ministers of Economic Affairs in Dushanbe.”
The documents of the conference and the Russian minister’s speech promote the Afghan authorities’ role in addressing problems in their territory. “Russia is in solidarity with the people and government of Afghanistan in their efforts to ensure security and put an end to terrorist activities and attempts by extremists to control individual areas of the country and create parallel power structures there,” Lavrov said. Russian and SCO officials consistently emphasize that Afghanistan is an independent country with a capable government and that the international community’s task is to “assist the Afghan government.”
Phraseology like this clearly expresses support for Afghan President Hamid Karzai and sets frameworks for international efforts, i.e. helping the legitimate president of Afghanistan. It implies that actions that have not been agreed with him do not meet the spirit of the international operation.
The final document of the Moscow forum underscored the importance of “sustained international efforts” which should be “comprehensive” and proceed “under the leadership of Afghanistan and the central role of the UN.” The document also stressed the need for closer coordination of operations with Afghan authorities “in consultation with the Government of Afghanistan.”
DRUG THREAT IN FOCUS
The Afghan drug threat and the necessity to step up efforts to combat it were the main subjects at the Moscow conference. Sergei Lavrov directly linked the issue of security in Afghanistan to drug trafficking: “Of special significance is the fight against the traffic in drugs, from which the proceeds go to finance terrorist activities.”“Afghan drug trafficking has become a major security threat for the countries of Central Asia and the Russian Federation. Efforts that are being made to combat this evil are so far insufficient” he added.
The conference actually placed responsibility for failures in combating drug trafficking on the coalition forces, rather than the Afghan government. The final document “acknowledged the progress of the Afghan government in reducing the cultivation of poppy, despite limited resources at its disposal.” This wording implies that the Afghan authorities are doing their best, whereas there may be complaints about the coalition’s efforts.
The Russian foreign minister pointed to the need “to substantially enhance the effectiveness of external support for the efforts of the Afghan authorities to combat illegal drug production and smuggling.” Lavrov expressed hope for “the practical realization of the decisions to increase ISAF [International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan] antinarcotics operations, adopted by the NATO countries’ defense ministers in Budapest in October last year.”
The Statement by the SCO member states and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime sent a clear message to international forces: “We welcome the fact that ISAF in cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan joined the fight against drug production and proliferation in Afghanistan and support its wide-ranging participation in multilateral efforts in this area. We consider it important that the UN Security Council takes this into account when discussing the ISAF mandate next time.”
The wording of the final document of the Moscow conference is softer. Yet, it repeatedly mentions terrorism, the production and trafficking of narcotics, and organized crime. That is, it points to a link between security problems and narcotics, as well as to the need for the ISAF to step up its efforts to combat narcotics trafficking in cooperation with the Afghan authorities.
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The monopoly of NATO and the United States on the solution to the Afghan problem seems to be drawing to a close. In the past six years, it has failed to bring the desired result. If the current trends persist, a situation similar to that in the Middle East may develop in Afghanistan and Central Asia: no chance for settlement, while the hotbed of tensions generates a demand for U.S. security services.
NATO and the U.S. should continue to bear responsibility for providing basic military security in Afghanistan. But the solution to the complex of socio-economic problems should be found in a broader international context, with the direct participation of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Russia’s proactive policy is not aimed at undermining U.S. positions. Moscow simply wants the Afghan problem to be resolved comprehensively, in the interests of all.
Ivan SAFRANCHUK is Editor-in-Chief of the Bolshaya Igra (The Great Game) magazine dealing with politics, business and security in Central Asia. He holds a Doctorate in Political Science
“Russia in Global Affairs”, July – September 2009
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