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UZBEKISTAN: KARIMOV IS EXPECTED TO KEEP PRESIDENCY
ABDUMANNOB POLAT,
Independent Consultant, Washington, USA
On December 23, Uzbekistan will vote for the head of state, while nobody doubts that incumbent President Islom Karimov will win a new seven-year term.
Karimov has been the Uzbek Republic’s leader since June of 1989 until March 1990 as head of the Uzbekistan’s Communist Party, and President ever since. Along with him, candidates for the post include three individuals: non-partisan legislator, who is head of the State Center for Human Rights; also two of the existing four officially registered parties were able to add their leaders to the list of candidates.
All three alternative candidates found themselves in a very difficult position. They expressed support to Karimov’ policies. As a result of such support, alternative candidates have not been able to explain why they run for this office or what differences exist between the incumbent President and themselves – in their programs and promises. Since all alternative candidates (and most of voters and observers as well) believe in Karimov’s victory, they clearly do not want to switch to the opposition to Karimov. They try to avoid any criticism of the current leader’s program and policies.
They did not even try to use a very modest opposition stand, such as support for Karimov’s course, promise to continue his policies and course, while suggesting that the current Uzbek leader will turn 70 next month and it is time to grant him status of spiritual leader and father of the nation, like Mahamtma Ghandi and Den Syao Ping in India and China in the 1930-40s and 1980-90s, respectively. Only such a tactic could have given an opportunity for alternative candidates to explain why they were running for office and why they asked voters for support.
However, in reality, even such a moderate approach with some nuances was actually a hidden way of opposing the country’s head, because Karimov has been in the race and wants to stay President. It is possible why alternative presidential hopefuls did not go even this way.
Still, even without election campaign with any significance, some people will vote for them – mostly to express their disapproval of Karimov.
It is believed that we will not know how many percent of voters will actually come to the poll stations this Sunday and how many people will vote for each candidate. Election officials will work for Karimov, while monitors at poll stations from alternative candidates are not expected to be active or allowed to monitor the full voting process, including counting.
At the same time, one should keep in mind that since Soviet times prior to perestrojka and glasnost, family vote was nearly a norm in Uzbekistan, as was the case in many other Republics of the former USSR. Very often the head of the family, the householder, went to the poll station and voted for the whole family. Though technically and legally such voting method should be considered as invalid and unlawful, and other family members may have different choices, such practice was widespread. It is also believed that in the majority of families political sympathies in the family did not differ. This practice was convenient for government and election officials on the one side, and for voters on the other side. Election and government officials got much (sometimes 5-6 times) more numbers of people who voted. It was convenient for voters too – other family members could save their time.
At the same time, in order to report a higher percentage of voters who voted, poll station officials and representatives went to houses reminding voters and calling them to come to vote. Very often, they carried voting bulletins and poll boxes, even though law allowed such method of vote only for disabled and very sick people, who requested such service.
Because even such tactics often did not bring desired (or, required by authorities) results, such as “more than 99% of voters - voted!”, casting election bulletins for those, who did not show up, was widespread too.
Regarding number of votes for government-chosen candidate (the only candidate in elections before 1989, and “№1, or more equal, among equals” since 1989), falsifying voting results was widespread too. Not much need for rigging vote result existed during elections with the only candidate because voters’ indifference and apathy led to majority vote for the single candidate. However, in multi-candidate elections it is very important who counts, as Joseph Stalin often quoted.
Many of these Soviet-era practices will be clearly used this Sunday in Uzbekistan, like in previous elections since independence in this country and many other post-Soviet states as well. Number of voters, who come to poll station to cast ballots, and percentage of votes cast for each candidate will be announced soon. However, those who will believe in such numbers, should be extremely naïve or interest-driven. At the same time, there is a serious ground to believe that Karimov will get majority of votes, even if there will be no falsification. Most likely, officially announced percentage of voters who cast ballots, and votes for Karimov as well, will be highly inflated, despite little need for falsification in the second case.
Uzbekistan’s election law has highly restrictive provisions for nominating candidates for nominating candidates for President: candidate could be chosen by political parties officially registered over six months before elections had been announced or by voter’s 300-member initiative group, and later collect signatures of 5% of country’s over 16 million voters (they should also be spread relatively equally among 14 administrative-territorial entities in the country), while each voter can support nomination of one candidate only.
Current authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan made impossible nomination of any openly opposition candidate. Few relatively known (to politically active voters and experts) opposition leaders living abroad were not eligible for nomination at all, because the Uzbek Constitution, like the Russian one, requires a ten-year permanent residence in the country before elections to be elected President. Even without such provision, it was highly unlikely that opposition leaders had any chance to collect required number of over 800 thousand voter signatures (5% of the electorate) in a week or two.
Few, recently emerged oppositionists living in the country, perhaps known to no more than to several thousand people at all, tried to get nominated, but were not able to create even required 300-member initiative group. There was no need for authorities to prevent such activities – due to lack of resources what aspirants for nomination possessed and little support from voters.
Not only openly opposition hopefuls, but leaders of the two other official parties failed to collect required number of voter signatures.
Constitutional ban “One and the same person may not be the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan for more than two consecutive terms” has been in place since December 8, 1992 – the day, when Uzbekistan’s basic law had been adopted (co-incidentally, the same day, when I was abducted from Bishkek, where I was in my first exile, after the human rights conference what I co-sponsored and directed, brought to Tashkent and jailed). While all current, officially registered four political parties in Uzbekistan could be easily labeled as “pocket” or pro-Karimov parties (on significant extent, what reflects real situation right now); over time they may move to more independent policies and position, if some political openness occurs.
Karimov most likely will not allow any real competition in a presidential race, if he is in it (as he did in previous elections in 1991 and 2000, and also in current campaign). However, he permitted contested parliamentary elections in 1994, 1999 and 2004. In those elections, four or five candidates were fighting for each seat. While openly opposition-minded (or suspected to be too independent of authorities) individuals were not allowed to take part in these races, nevertheless those elections were clear a step toward broader political participation and competition. The steps were limited – because openly opposition parties and their leaders were barred from process. Moreover, opposition parties have never been legalized in Uzbekistan - with the exception of party Erk (Freedom, or Liberty) registered in September of 1991 as then a pocket party loyal to Karimov. Since spring of 1992, this party slowly moved to more independent and opposition stand, and deprived legal status in 1993.
As far as Karimov will keep his iron-fist upon political system and government, he likely will stay in power. However, nobody knows for how long he will stay healthy and strong enough (physically and politically) to control Uzbekistan and own ruling team. He clearly needs to prepare succession scenarios in order to avoid the fate of Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev, Sharof Rashidov or Saparmurad Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) – the legacies of all had been slowly crashed by their own associates, who succeeded them.
Lt. General Vasilij Stalin, son of the Soviet dictator, had been arrested in less than two months after his father’s death in March 1953. He had been jailed for almost seven years. Svetlana Allilueva, daughter of Stalin, and her children had also complicated life after death of their father and grandfather.
Similarly, fate of Leonid Brezhnev’s legacy and his children and relatives was difficult after death of the Soviet leader in November 1982. Since 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev allowed (if not encouraged) blaming Brezhnev’s era as stagnation responsible (along with Stalin’s era) for all ills of the Soviet system. Brezhnev’s son-in-law - MVD General Colonel Yurij Churbanov - had been jailed for years. Brezhnev’s son had been fired from position of Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.
In Uzbekistan, legacy of Sharof Rashidov, republican leader for almost 25 years, had been crashed in about six months after his death in November 1983.
Karimov may think about following the path realized by late Hejdar Aliev, Azeri leader who was able to install his son Ilham as his successor. Due to extreme importance of this matter, the author plans one of his next articles on possible succession scenarios in Uzbekistan.
It is expected that Western observers (OSCE’s ODIHR small team is in the country) will assess Uzbek presidential elections as far from being fair, free or democratic. Nevertheless, US and European Union’s reaction will be likely limited to critical statements not followed by any significant sanctions or steps. Most of policy makers and observers in right mind - both in Uzbekistan and abroad - understand that currently the major alternative to Karimov’s authoritarian regime is Islamic movement. Due to extreme weakness of the marginal Uzbek opposition with secular-democratic-nationalistic rhetoric fully dependent of financial and political support from the West. At the moment, opposition to Karimov within ruling elite and wealthy is cautiously silent. Though no one leader is fully protected from court coup, such scenario is highly unlikely while head of Uzbekistan is able to maintain his control over government, including security service and power ministries. It looks like that Karimov still rules and will rule in near future.
December 20, 2007
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