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AS EXPECTED, UZBEKISTAN’S KARIMOV WON RE-ELECTION
ABDUMANNOB POLAT,
Independent Consultant, Washington, USA
Head of Uzbekistan's Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on December 24 preliminary results of the Sunday presidential election in Uzbekistan. Officials claim that the incumbent President Islom Karimov received just over 13 million votes, which gave the incumbent 88.1 percent of the total ballots cast in the poll. The CEC reported that 90.6 percent of the nation's 16.2 million voters cast ballots.
Karimov, Uzbekistan’s leader since June of 1989 until March 1990 as head of the Uzbekistan’s Communist Party, and President ever since, won a new seven-year term.
Three other candidates were Asliddin Rustamov, head of the People's Democratic Party (official successor of the Uzbekistan’s Сommunist Party), and Dilorom Toshmukhamedova, the Adolat Social-Democratic Party leader, and Akmal Saidov, non-partizan legislator and head of the State Center for Human Rights. They were reported to receive around 3 percent of the vote each.
Three candidates that stood in against Karimov found themselves in a very difficult position. They expressed support to Karimov’s policies. As a result of such support, alternative candidates have not been able to explain why they run for this office or what differences exist between the incumbent President and themselves – in their programs and promises. Since all three alternative candidates (and most of voters and observers as well) believed in Karimov’s victory, they clearly did not want to switch to the opposition of Karimov. They tried to avoid any criticism of the current leader’s program and policies.
They did not even dare to take a very modest opposition stand supporting Karimov’s course, promising to continue his policies and course, while suggesting that the current Uzbek leader will turn 70 next month and it is time to grant him status of spiritual leader and father of the nation, like Mahamtma Ghandi and Den Syao Ping in India of 1930-40s and China of 1980-90s, respectively. Only such a tactic could have given an opportunity for alternative candidates to explain why they were running for office and why they asked voters for support.
However, in reality, even such a moderate position could actually be implicitly understood as a way of opposing the country’s head, because Karimov was in the race and wanted to stay President. It is understandable why alternative presidential hopefuls did not go even this way.
Though the race was without fight, even by official preliminary results, about 9 percent of the electorate voted for these alternative candidates, and at least part of the rest 3 percent of voters expressed their disapproval to all candidates, including Karimov. One can imagine what might happen, should the presidential race be organized on the basis of truly free, fair and honest competition. At the same time, it is exactly why Karimov has never allowed really contested presidential elections: like any other his counterpart in the region, Uzbek leader has not wanted taking any significant risk of loosing power. In addition to preventing opposition parties and leaders from gaining strength, Karimov and other leaders know very well that it is very important who counts votes, as Joseph Stalin often quoted. However, we do not know to what extent results of these elections reflect actual choice of the people in Uzbekistan. Though, in this authoritarian country with very limited political freedoms and rival candidates largely unknown to broad public with limited resources and after all loyal to Karimov, the percentage of votes received by presidential hopefuls might be more-or-less close to real situation.
There are serious grounds to believe that Karimov got the majority of votes. Officially announced percentage of votes for Karimov might have been inflated though.
It is believed that we will not know how many percent of voters have actually come to the poll stations on Sunday, December 23, and of those, who have come how many people have voted for each candidate.
As expected, election officials most likely worked for Karimov, while monitors at poll stations from alternative candidates were extremely passive (they or their parties did not report any irregularities). It is widely believed that they were not allowed to monitor the entire voting process, including vote counting.
Handful number of local opposition and human rights activists reported family voting – when one person cast more than one ballot. One should keep in mind that since the Soviet times, family vote was nearly a norm in Uzbekistan, as was the case in many other Republics of the former USSR. Very often the head of the family, the householder, went to the poll station and voted for the whole family. Though technically and legally such voting method should be considered as invalid and unlawful, and other family members may have different choices, such practice was widespread. It is also believed that in the majority of families political sympathies in the family did not differ. This practice was convenient for government and election officials on the one side, and for voters on the other side. Election and government officials got much (sometimes 5-6 times) more numbers of people who voted. It was convenient for voters too – other family members could save their time. Family vote is still there, helping authorities to report that over 90 percent of voters cast ballots.
As usually, in order to report a higher percentage of voters, poll station officials and representatives went to houses reminding voters and calling them to come to vote. Similarly, they also carried voting bulletins and poll boxes, even though law allowed such method of vote only for disabled and very sick people, who requested such service.
Among those Uzbek citizens, who “voted” without casting ballots personally, are estimated 2-3 millions working abroad (of the over 16 million voters total). Very small percentage of these migrant workers actually voted. That is why, Central Election Commission’s report that “over 90 percent voters cast ballots” looks as highly inflated.
Uzbekistan’s election law has highly restrictive provisions for nominating candidates for President: candidate could be nominated for election by political parties officially registered over six months before elections had been announced or by voter’s 300-member initiative group, and later collect signatures of 5 percent of the country’s more than 16 million voters (they should also be spread relatively equally among 14 administrative-territorial entities in the country), while each voter can support nomination of one candidate only.
Current authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan made impossible nomination of any openly opposition candidate. Few relatively known to politically active voters and experts opposition leaders living abroad were not eligible for nomination at all, because the Uzbek Constitution, like the Russian one, requires a ten-year permanent residence in the country before elections. Even without such provision, in current conditions, it was highly unlikely that opposition leaders had any chance to collect required number of over 800 thousand voter signatures (5 percent of the electorate) in about a week.
Few, recently-emerging oppositionists living in the country, perhaps familiar to no more than several thousand people at all, tried to get nominated, but were not able to gather even required 300-member initiative group. There was no need for authorities to prevent such activities – due to lack of resources that the aspirants for nomination possessed and little support from voters.
Not only presidential hopefuls from the opposition, but the leaders of the two other official parties failed to collect required number of voter signatures.
Constitutional ban “One and the same person may not be the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan for more than two consecutive terms” has been in place since December 8, 1992 – the day, when Uzbekistan’s Basic Law had been adopted (the same day, when I was abducted from Bishkek, where I was in my first exile, after the human rights conference what I co-sponsored and directed). However, this limitation did not prevent Karimov’s stay in power since. Authorities had largely ignored this sensitive issue, while some advocates for the government claimed that recent amendments to Uzbek basic law meant that he would be elected in 2007 to his “first term”, according to a “new Constitution”. Even much more open and democratic Kyrgyzstan, with the similar constitutional provision about a two-term limit, used similar, more than doubtful, interpretation of the Basic Law, when Askar Akayev had been elected in popular vote for his third 5-year term.
While all the four officially registered political parties in Uzbekistan could be easily labeled as “pocket” or pro-Karimov parties (to significant extent reflecting real situation right now); over time they may move to more independent policies and position, if some political openness occurs. One should keep in mind that Angela Merkel, current leader of Germany, was a member of the Christian Democratic party in Eastern Germany – at the time labeled (with significant grounds) as pocket party.
While Karimov did not allow any real competition in the presidential race, since he was in it (as he did back in 1991, 2000), he permitted contested parliamentary elections in 1994, 1999 and 2004. In those elections, four or five candidates were running for each seat. While openly opposition-minded (or suspected to be too independent of authorities) individuals were not allowed to take part in those races, nevertheless those elections were a step toward broader political participation and competition. The step was limited – because openly opposition parties and their leaders were barred from process. Moreover, opposition parties have never been legal in Uzbekistan - with the exception of party Erk (Freedom, or Liberty) registered in September of 1991 as then a pocket party loyal to Karimov. Since spring of 1992, that party slowly moved to more independent and opposition stand, and deprived legal status in 1993.
As long as Karimov keeps his iron fist upon political system and government, he is most likely to stay in power. However, nobody knows for how long he will stay healthy and strong enough (physically and politically) to control Uzbekistan and his own team. He clearly needs to prepare succession scenarios in order to avoid the fate of Joseph Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev, Sharof Rashidov, Askar Akayev or Saparmurad Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) – the legacies of all had been slowly crashed by their own associates, who succeeded to them.
Lt. General Vasilij Stalin, son of the Soviet dictator, had been arrested in less than two months after his father’s death in March 1953. He had been jailed for almost seven years. Svetlana Allilueva, Stalin’s daughter, and her children had also complicated life after death of their father and grandfather.
Similarly, fate of Leonid Brezhnev’s legacy and his children and relatives was difficult after death of the Soviet leader in November 1982. Since 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev allowed (if not encouraged) blaming Brezhnev’s era as stagnation responsible (along with Stalin’s era) for all ills of the Soviet system. Brezhnev’s son-in-law - MVD General Colonel Yurij Churbanov - had been jailed for years. Brezhnev’s son had been dismissed from the post of Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.
In Uzbekistan, legacy of Sharof Rashidov, republican leader for almost 25 years, had been crashed in about six months after his death in November 1983.
Karimov may think about taking the cue from Hejdar Aliev, Azeri leader who was able to install his son Ilham as his successor. Due to extreme importance of this matter, the author plans one of his next articles on possible succession scenarios for Karimov. The author believes that in the near future, succession scenarios in Uzbekistan are much more important than elections.
Not surprisingly, Western observers and media (small team of the OSCE’s ODIHR – Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) assessed Uzbek presidential elections as far from being fair, free or democratic. Nevertheless, the USA and European Union’s reaction will be likely limited to critical statements not followed by any significant sanctions or steps. Most of right-wing policy-makers and observers, both in Uzbekistan and abroad, understand that currently the major alternative to Karimov’s authoritarian regime is Islamic movement. Due to extreme weakness of the marginal Uzbek opposition with secular-democratic-nationalistic rhetoric fully dependent on financial and political support from the West. At the moment, opposition to Karimov within ruling elite and wealthy is cautiously silent. Though no leader is fully protected from court coup, such scenario is highly unlikely while the head of Uzbekistan is able to maintain his control over government, including security and law-enforcement ministries. It looks like Karimov still rules and will rule in near future.
December 25, 2007
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