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DEVELOPING PROFESSIONAL NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS: THE FINAL “KONTRAKTNIKI” EXPERIMENT?
ROGER N MCDERMOTT,
Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC and an Honorary Senior Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University Kent, Canterbury (UK)
Recent statements by Russian Defense Minister, Anatoliy Serdyukov, indicate that the experiment with contract personnel in the armed forces has finally failed. Serdyukov outlined some of the reasons for these failings, ranging from low pay to how they were recruited and noted the problem of retention. Many observers of the development of the Russian armed forces noted in recent years, that there were clear indications that something was going wrong with the Kontraktniki. One example, relating to the experiment to eventually professionalize the entire force structure by first professionalizing units in the airborne forces illustrates this point. Within the elite 76th Airborne Division (Pskov), which has been officially manned exclusively with contract personnel over the past several years, reportedly conscripts were once again being recruited into the division; demonstrating the problems and challenges of popularizing contract service even within such elite structures.
Serdyukov was not isolated in reaching such conclusions, with support offered by the Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister, Army-General Nikolai Makarov as well as the Commander of the Siberian Military District Lieutenant-General Vladimir Chirkin: their message was consistent and clear. Contract personnel numbers will be reduced, and the numbers of conscripts increased.
Nonetheless, while the defense ministry and General Staff work out, elaborate and finally implement such corrective planning, there is a much deeper challenge facing the future of the reform and the Russian armed forces: namely, the task of successfully forming and introducing new professional non-commissioned officers (NCO’s). This will have a more critical bearing on the capability of units than the current debate over the future manning system.
The Backbone of the Army
NCO’s, as many within the higher echelons of the Russian military recognize, were the backbone of the Tsarist army, and any analysis of modern western armed forces confirms that they remain the key component within these structures. Their tasks may vary, depending on which foreign force is examined closely, however in general terms they fulfill certain key functions. NCO’s are the critical commanders at tactical level, and also play a role in forging high standards in training and in boosting morale among their subordinates.
Planning, in the context of Serdyukov reform, involved developing a new type of NCO within the Russian armed forces, and these plans are far advanced and most certainly ambitious. It is clear that when the reform was first announced in September 2008 by President Dmitry Medvedev and then elaborated in more detail by Serdyukov at the defense ministry collegium on 14 October, 2008, that such issues would necessarily be addressed.
Initial efforts to form adequate training centers to train these new NCO’s met with serious challenges, and exposed problems in recruiting the right type of person. This resulted in inevitable delays, and readjustment to the original reform planning. Incidentally, it should be noted, that the reform if it stands any chance of success must do this: demonstrate flexibility and willingness to learn from mistakes or unexpected problems encountered. There is little doubt that Serdyukov’s reform has this special ingredient.
Confronting Challenges
Early problems relating to opening new training centers in 2009, were partly linked to the quality of candidates, many of whom reportedly struggled to handle basic quadratic equations, securing sufficient numbers to enroll, and lack of clarity on which model of NCO would be adopted and precisely how they would be educated.
As these issues were identified, a new broader plan was devised, centering on opening a center in Ryazan that would train professional NCO’s in a course lasting 2 years and 10 months. This was placed under the leadership of the VDV, and clearly not coincidental since the insistence that all students make parachute jumps regardless of which line unit they later serve within, demonstrated that one aim was instill the elite spirit of the VDV in these new NCO’s. In addition, the content of the course was another signal that something fundamentally new was being developed; those enrolled would be taught psychology and management, in addition to their more specific military training. The standards were set at a high mark, and reportedly alluring conditions were also offered, including paying these graduates 35,000 rubles per month, once they take up their new posts.
Nevertheless, there were also problems in the opening the new center in Ryazan. The original plan was to open the center in December 2009 with 1,700 entrants. Thereafter, annually 2,000 would enroll. Yet, by November the numbers were lower than anticipated and finally the center opened on time with only 254 cadets, all of whom had completed their 12 month conscript service.
Allowing for a dropout rate, it is clear that the first graduates entering line units in October 2012 will only represent a modest trickle. Many more will be needed in subsequent years if the plan is to succeed. The first sign of whether there is progress in this crucial aspect of the reform will emerge in December 2010: if there are insufficient numbers, it will point in the direction of another failed experiment.
Ryazan NCO graduates
Hazing, low morale, poor discipline are all features of the line units, which if successful the new professional NCO’s may help to address. Based on the reporting concerning the Ryazan NCO training school and the course, as well as its length, it appears the defense ministry envisages these graduates serving the dual function of junior commanders and morale shapers. This may counterbalance the negative impact of reducing the numerical strength of the education officers, responsible for indoctrination work in the units.
Moreover, these graduates will gradually replace the three types of NCO currently serving within the armed forces: conscript, contract and those former officers who have chosen demotion to NCO posts as an alternative to leaving the military. In this sense, from 2012 onward, for an indeterminate period, there will in effect be four types of NCO serving in the army. In itself, this is likely to lead to an additional set of challenges facing defense ministry planners and commanders.
There are also problems inherent in the nature of the current NCO experiment. First, by training these recruits at Ryazan, rather than within or in close proximity to their line units, they may face difficulty in reintegration once they graduate. One plausible justification for this state of affairs, is to avoid “contaminating” these recruits with the bad practices existing in the line units. Nevertheless, although each student in the Ryazan NCO school has completed already his conscript service, by the time he is placed in his new post he will effectively be three years out of date. Within the US and British armies, it is noteworthy that NCO’s are produced from within units, with additional training there and in other centers. When they serve as a sergeant, they are automatically respected by their men, since they are seen as having gone through the same system: “he used to be a private, he know the problems I’m facing.”
One possible corrective measure, aimed at addressing this challenge, might be to determine within the first six to twelve months which unit each recruit will eventually serve within, or at least the type of unit, and then organize regular placements on a rotational basis. Such an approach might also cross fertilize his educational experience, since on return to Ryazan he can explore issues that were only exposed by gaining practical experience within a line unit. This would help provide the third pillar in fostering and harnessing the skills of such NCO’s: education, training and experience. The alternative, if this ignored, is that such “elite” well educated and trained NCO’s will be regarded with suspicion within their units, and in some cases, they may only prove to be “paper commanders.”
There are also challenges relating to their eventual placement, given the existence of other types of NCO in other units. Which units will the initial batches of profession NCO’s from Ryazan be sent to? Which units will be assigned priority? How will these then relate to other units with NCO’s that could be construed to be of lesser value?
Foreign Experience
NCO training within the CIS has also faced similar problems. Such training within Belarus, for example, provides a useful example. Yet, their shorter courses appear to produce the type of NCO required within the Belarusian army, they still lack the fundamental ingredient of successful junior command at tactical level: demonstrating initiative. When the first American and British military assistance was provided to Kazakhstan, the Kazakh’s often felt quite offended “why are they sending sergeants?”: it took several years for them to grasp that western sergeants carry out the type of training that within their armed forces was being conducted by officers.
In my view, the type of NCO currently being developed within Ryazan will prove to be unique and probably of the highest quality within the CIS. This is precisely because he will serve the dual capacity of junior commander and will also help to shape discipline within the line units. Modern warfare is not decided by generals: it is largely dependent on the quality of leadership displayed by NCO’s at tactical level.
While it is understood in the West, that the military reform in progress in Russia is an essentially Russian issue, in other words, there may be sensitivity about any western involvement, it is equally clear that there are western countries willing to assist in such areas. That willingness, which should not be underestimated, since it also reflects concern that this reform, unlike previous efforts, must work. Strategically, it is not in the interests of the West or Russia’s neighbors for this defense reform to fail.
Kontraktniki NCO’s
The risk in the development of a new professional NCO model, is that they will be perceived in their units as only a revamped Kontraktniki. This challenge will demand careful management at the planning level, foreseeing possible problems before they arise, learning from the weaknesses exposed by what General Makarov described as the “mistakes” involved in the Kontraktniki experiment, and demonstrating that these lessons have been learned and are being applied to the future sergeant model.
The Ryazan NCO school, if it succeeds, may prove to be a flagship for replicating and forming additional NCO centers in order to produce professional sergeants in sufficient numbers in future. Accessing foreign experience, adapting and strengthening existing planning, devising innovative methods of forestalling potential weaknesses or failings, will all prove essential elements of ensuring that the latest model in the Russian armed forces to be linked with the word Kontraktniki will not ultimately fail.
The key, however, for a Russian NCO is for officers to learn how to delegate authority. This is a fundamental challenge: it is so important that other features pale in comparison. Officers have little to do with the quality of life in any squad or company: this is handled by NCO’s. Discipline, morale, qualifications are all crucial aspects of the NCO’s job.
As my American colleague, Dale Herspring at the University of Kansas noted when he visited Fort Hood, where his son-in-law was the commander of a tank company. As a retired naval captain, he asked the sergeant-major, “What is your evaluation of John's qualities as an officer?” He replied, “Sir, he is great. He keeps the crap from above, off of me, and lets me run the company.”
That is the correct relationship between a senior NCO and an officer.
April 13, 2010
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