In order to analyze the problems and processes in Georgian-Russian relations, we should, first of all, find out what exactly has caused their aggravation. Almost all versions of the Georgian-Russian crisis just theorize about the extent of the US’ complicity in aggravating the situation, in “pushing” Georgia towards deliberate, unacceptable steps. However, none of them – in either the Russian or western political literature – analyze the factors that have caused the crisis – they do not even try to chronologically compare the events and processes that have been and are taking place in American-Russian and European-Russian relations. This approach comes from “a priori” rejection of the version about the goals and priorities of the US and its strategic ally, the UK, in the Caucasian-Caspian region. The international expert community refuses to admit that the strategic goal of the US and the UK in this region is to successfully produce and transport oil and, partly, gas to the west, while the priorities are stability and security.

The Americans are the most active deniers of this version as it makes null and void all their declared goals to establish democratic order and acceptable rules in their relations with Eurasian countries. In the same way they deny their goals in Iraq, where they have to reshape the whole Middle Eastern geo-political system for achieving their purpose – to gain control over the local oil resources. The Russian experts, just like the experts from the Caucasus and Central Asia, also reject the “oil & security” version as, otherwise, they lose their propaganda story about “the US’ geo-political, quite unreasoned doctrine” which, even if existent, is of inferior importance. Without considering the “oil & security” version, one cannot undertake a serious analysis of the unusually strong confrontation between Georgia and Russia in 2006.

In 2006 the US-the UK and Russia had serious problems over the procedure of operation of a number of gas and oil fields in the Barents Sea, Eastern Siberia and on Sakhalin. American and British companies have long been building economic and political prerequisites for gaining control over those resources as they are quite essential for their economic welfare and energy security. These problems reflect the new approaches of the Russian authorities to their priority sphere – energy. They affect the interests of such global companies as THK-BP, Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell. This topic has been given wide coverage in the western and Russian press. (Western mass media have attacked Russia as massively as they have never done since the Yukos case).

Besides this problem, the UK and, to a certain extent, the US are seriously concerned over the processes developing within the Russia-Germany-France energy triangle. These processes may result in quite new – special — energy relations between Russia and Continental Europe and may leave the UK outside this vital sphere. That’s why the UK has mobilized its political resources — particularly, is appealing to the principles of rather obsolete European Energy Charter. They have two goals: to prevent the failure of oil and gas projects in Russia and to debar Russia from joining some energy alliance in Europe.

Thus, what we are witnessing today is the very critical moment the US and, especially, the UK have long been preparing for — by creating a whole system of political levers, stimuli, counterbalances, propaganda tricks and footholds in the South and North Caucasus – a kind of “British Caucasian Project.” Unlike the US, the UK does not much care – at least, does not look like caring – for some moral principles in its policy in this particular region and on Russia, in general. “The British Caucasian Project” provides for various ways to pressure Russia in the Caucasus. The technological core of the Project is to create “basic forces” in the region – forces that would comprise local elites, mass media, general and special consulting capacities, NGOs and other “hired civil society” components.

Objectively, the UK policy in the South Caucasus has greatly contributed to “general” stability in the region. At the same time, the British are effectively applying the methods of political pressure. They have almost fully exhausted the foreign political resources of Azerbaijan and have strongly tied Georgia to the terms and tasks of their Caucasian Project. This looks contradictory for some interests in the region but is quite logical for the British interests therein.

2006 has become fatal for “The British Caucasian Project.” The initiatives for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement have failed. However, those outside the Project can hardly see that this year’s fuss over Nagorno-Karabakh was just a deceptive maneuver in the general context of the Project. Even though the long and effective lobbying for the interests of the “family” has turned into the very ineffective lobbying for the interests of Azerbaijan, the priorities have never changed. One can hardly imagine the UK to ignore the interests of its own oil companies. However, these interests also have a price and admissible risk level.

It would be quite useful for the Georgian politicians (not only government officials) to analyze the events that took place over Nagorno-Karabakh from the autumn 2005 till the spring 2006 as they were a kind of curtain-raiser to the Georgian, more precisely, Georgian-Russian developments of the autumn 2006. It seems that some political projectors were just much too consistent. An experienced British diplomat says: “The new projectors have much to learn from the old ones, for whom consistency has never been an end in itself… for them, professionalism is not the so-called strategic planning but the ability to take one’s bearings in any situation and to act bravely and decisively.”

The general goal of the Project is to absorb the Eurasian resources; the rest is given minimum of attention. Georgia, with its problems, is one of the key gears of the Project. This is exactly the prism for us to look into the Georgian-Russian crisis and the US and UK policies on Georgia’s internal and external problems. For the British politicians even the American politicians are just “ordinary people.” Great Britain’s political and geo-economic presence in the South Caucasus has certainly contributed to the clear formulation of the regional priorities and has prevented more deplorable scenario. 2006 has shown the Georgian politicians that their country is fatally instrumental at the present historical stage and that it is necessary to search for new niches where liberty would imply the unity of propaganda and real politics. The British policy in the South Caucasus and, probably, in other regions, can be called differently, but never “destructive”– mostly because the UK’s “partners” generally lose their chance to blame the British policy for something. As always, they blame the US — who has “to clear up the mess.”

The actual situation in Georgia

Georgia’s foreign and social policies are rather vague. Some of the achievements in economic and administrative control and social policy may prove quite illusionary and even zero unless the Georgian authorities do something in the coming years to develop the real sector, to ensure tangible employment growth, to raise wages and to increase productive accumulation and consumer demand.

The first achievements of the Georgian authorities were due to improved fiscal control system and substantial foreign assistance. In reality, the state budget and GDP are much smaller than they are in the national currency as the rate of GEL is highly overstated. The national budget growth has been heavily dependent on the privatization program, but this source has been almost exhausted. The tax revenues consist mostly of private money transfers from abroad, which may grow scarce under the present political conditions. The major problem is an almost zero industry growth. In fact, the Georgian authorities are not interested in the industry, have no structural policy and are doing nothing to improve the social and economic life in the province. Under such conditions, the key instrument of the Georgian authorities is administration, which they actively use in the social and political life, first of all, in elections.

President Saakashvili and the leaders of the ruling National Movement party understand that, even if they ensure some economic growth, they will hardly retain power unless they make much more significant accomplishments, particularly, restore control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgian society is not ready for a large-scale military operation and is quite afraid of new war. Georgian experts say that “Abkhazia and South Ossetia are not the problem N1 for the Georgian people — the priority problem is economic development.” Active training cannot raise the fighting capacity of the Georgian army but can just enhance its police functions.

In this contradictory situation, the Georgian authorities are trying to find “niches” or “degrees of freedom” in the policies of their western partners, first of all, the US, so as to have their support should they decide to apply force against the break-away republics.

Well aware that it is a matter of principle for the US and the UK to ensure that no uncontrollable military or social conflict be an obstacle to their key goal in the South Caucasus, the Georgian leaders are trying to adapt themselves to situational problems in the hope that they will further enjoy favorable situation. Being in constant touch with US, EU and NATO representatives, the Georgian authorities could not but see that the US-UK and Russia were heading for another – energy – crisis, where Georgia might also get room for its ambitions.

As a result of our contacts with the expert community in 2005-2006, we have come to a conclusion that the Georgian ruling regime was persistently looking for a favorable moment to take action against Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Saakashvili regime remembers well the sad experience of its military adventure in South Ossetia in 2004, when the US and the UK took them up sharply and made efforts to stop the conflict. This had almost ended in a parliamentary crisis. So, now the Georgian authorities are trying to maximally coordinate their actions with the interests of their western partners. We may assume that at some moment the Georgian leaders might think that they knew the exact time of the planned crisis.

The logic and sequence of the US and UK policy on Georgia

American and British experts argue that their countries have no hand in the Georgian-Russian crisis, but their arguments can be easily disproved. The point is that the Anglo-Saxon experts are quite unanimous that their countries are both privy to this crisis, simply, they show different approaches to it. The experts say that the US and the UK have different goals and tasks and solve and coordinate them differently. The analysis of some American, British and Belgian experts brings us to definite conclusions.

The US Department of State has always been strongly against the use of force for resolving the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For the US administration these problems are solved — but for some possible agreements on refugees, security and communications. This is all the US and, in fact, the whole Western community can accept. The Americans made this position known to the Georgian leadership when Shevardnadze was yet in power. After receiving tremendous financial and political support from the US and the EU, Saakashvili still expected them to provide him with support of a different kind – support that would allow him to solve the problems in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And the Americans and Europeans could not but give him hope in the matter.

The chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Frederick Starr says that they in the US administration expected the new Georgian leaders to revise their priorities and to stop their attempts to forcibly resolve the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems. However, this did not happen, and the Americans had to look for ways to restrain them: they offered economic and military assistance and alternatives for keeping their rating high.

Director of the same institute Svante Cornell says that those saying that the Georgian leaders are the US’ puppets are wrong “although, at the initial stage, Saakashvili and his comrades would be quite happy at such a role.” He says that there are serious contradictions between the interests of the US and Georgia and other countries of the region.

The leading US expert on democracy in Eastern Europe, the regional director for Eurasia of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Nelson Ledsky does not believe the reported ratings of President Saakashvili and his party in Georgia: they contain lots of inaccuracies and often disregard current situations. Saakashvili and his party still enjoy high popularity and the President is commended for his position of principle on a number of crucial problems. At the same time, their ratings have substantially dropped due to two-three factors: the bellicose rhetoric of the Defense Minister and the President; the lack of progress in the economic and social spheres; the growing intolerance towards the opposition. Ledsky believes that it is time for the Georgian leaders to reconsider their methods and to abandon their war plans. The period of “childhood diseases” in Georgia is lingering but the local leaders refuse to notice that.

Expert of the NDI Peter Komives is of a different opinion. He says that many of the democratic and social achievements in Georgia are illusionary and skin-deep: they are not based on deep reforms and new political methods. The present Georgian authorities continue the practice of political authoritarianism and are idolizing Saakashvili. They are not just mistaken in the sphere of human and ethnic rights – in fact, they are intolerant. Komives says that these problems are like delayed action bombs.

According to President of the Nixon Center Dimitri Simes, Georgia thinks that by cooperating with the US it has staked a lot and has the right to claim any political support it wants. Washington cannot regard this as a normal regime of relations with such a small country.

The regional director for Eastern Europe of the Brookings Institution Fiona Hill says that the US’ security policy is a more or less harmonious system of international relations. Georgia has misconstrued the US’s attitude and has to understand that close partnership with the US is not just receiving support and assistance but also sacrificing certain interests.

The senior research fellow at the New America Foundation Anatol Lieven says that Saakashvili has realized that he has very little room for comfortable relax and simply has to be adventurous. Each year he gives military performances and each time he hopes that the reaction of the international community will be different.

The OSCE representative to the US Congress Michael Ox says that the problems of the region require the involvement of different US departments and each of them shows different interests when, at some point, the Georgian authorities come out with some irresponsible decisions. The Georgians visit Washington and try to hear only profitable views. As a result, they remember only compliments and forget about other views. Now that not only the leaders but the whole country is hanging in the air, they have simply no time for considering their decisions and can decide anything. “Democratic Georgia in the near future” is a utopia; however, very much money has been invested in the oil pipeline, so, the ordinary post-Soviet swamp will be further advertised as a model of democracy.

Senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council Wayne Merry and political expert at the Venable LLP James Jatras offer the most interesting vision of this problem. They say that the objective of the Kodori Gorge operation was not to solve a specific problem but to exert pressure on Russia – and there were absolutely definite agreements on this. The operation was endorsed by almost all leading US departments (State Department, Pentagon and CIA). The views that in Kodori Georgia acted on its own are just empty words. In fact, the operation had specific agreed-on goals, time, place and tasks. So, it is necessary to see what was going on at the same time with it.

Merry and Jatras say that the US permits Georgia to use force in its policy – but only for solving local situational problems. Jatras says that the UK also has interests in the region and can act quite independently from the US. Nobody in Washington doubts any longer that London has “stolen thunder” in Georgia as, in fact, it has no formal or factual responsibility for the current events and their possible consequences. British experts in Washington are surveying the moods and positions of relevant employees in the State Department, Congress, Pentagon and CIA. The UK has created a wide informant network in the South Caucasus. They have informants at instances of all levels and their information allows them to project specific political processes.

Director of the Russia/Eurasian Program at the CSIS Celeste Wallander says that the US’ policy on the Caucasian states has a fundamentally Russian orientation. Turkey and Iran also have a place in this policy, but almost all internationally important events in the South Caucasus are linked with Russia. The US’ policy in the region is just part of the US’ policy on Russia. So, Georgia can hardly act in South Ossetia or Abkhazia irrelatively to the US’ interests in Russia. At the same time, Wallander doubts that there might be any specific agreements on these events. Perhaps, there were some consultations with US political circles, for example, in the Pentagon or Senate committees, where you can always find people who would openly advise the Georgian leaders to use force in solving their problems.

Director of the Wilson Center John Sitilides says that for the US Georgia is not a potential NATO member but just a convenient base for carrying out a more effective policy in the Black Sea-Caucasian region. The Georgian problems have proved much harder for the US than they might seem at first glance. They were shocked by the political style of the Georgia leaders and the methods they have recently used in their relations with Russia. Sitilides does not agree with the opinion that Georgia’s confrontation with Russia was coordinated with the US – the facts prove otherwise. At the same time, he admits that this confrontation might be the result of the US’ wrong policy in Georgia: they have assumed responsibility for the South Caucasus, but have failed, so far, to work out any rules for building their relations in the region. The present situation in Georgian-Russian relations is the result of the incompetence of the US State Department, who has failed to coordinate the initiatives of different departments and to explain to some Senators what the US’ interests in the South Caucasus are exactly about.

Most of the experts cannot clearly describe the attitude of the US administration towards the ruling regime in Georgia. Svante Cornell believes that the US administration regards Saakashvili and his team as a temporary regime but he cannot say why. At the same time, Cornell believes that the US will not escalate political processes in Georgia and will not be very critical of the local regime. They in the US State Department believe that this regime still has political resources and can fulfill certain tasks. At the same time, they are said to be considering a possible alternative to it. They in the Pentagon seem to have no problems with the regime: they are successfully cooperating with Tbilisi on the tasks they have got in the region. They in the Senate can hardly be taken seriously: they all support Georgia but none of them actually knows what is going on there or can offer any effective way to improve this situation.

Director for Eurasia of the Nixon Center Paul Sanders is of a bit different opinion. He is an advocate of the “real politics”– which is quite characteristic of the Nixon Center. He says that the change of regime in Georgia is not an urgent politico-technological task for the US. They are certainly considering it — but just as a concept. In fact, the US administration has changed its hierarchy of factors that may require the change of regime in Georgia. To the traditional factors — no democracy and legal guarantees, high corruption, some social problems — they have added a much more substantial factor – unreasonably radical plans to regain control over the break-away republics. In other words, the Americans will have to look for such ruling regime subjects that will not hurry to resolve this problem at the expense of the regional security system.

The director of the Oil Financial Company (Washington) Julia Nanay says that the current fuss in the Caucasus is the result of the failure of two British oil companies in Russia. The UK has presented the US with a fait accompli – an acute political crisis verging on military conflict. As far as Nanay knows, the British and American foreign offices had a “gripe session” over this problem. Officers from the UK General Staff and experts from a British private military advice organization are said to have trained Georgian soldiers in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflict zones. The whole operational part of the 2004 conflict in South Ossetia had been prepared by British military experts.

Director of Russian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute Leon Aron appears with quite an interesting opinion. He says that Russia was certainly informed of Georgia’s plans and has made the best of the following events. If we consider this situation in terms of democracy and legality, Russia has lost the game, but this game is not about democracy or legality but about force and geo-political advantages. Russia is speaking with the West, US, EU and NATO in the “real politik” language – American “real politik” in Russian style. The US has understood that it has lost the game and France and Germany has got the upper hand. The game had other — undeclared – goals but the Georgian leaders “have overplayed their hand.”

British experts have different views. Director for Turkey and the Caucasus of the Center for European Reform (London) Mark Leonard says that the events in South Ossetia (2004) and Kodori (2006) were exclusively the initiative of the Georgian authorities and the US, Europe and NATO were simply forced to react. The European community, especially Continental Europe, was shocked by the Georgian-Russian conflict. The UK took it much more calmly. The present Georgian authorities are absolutely inefficient in their relations with Russia — and with the West, likewise. Georgia has got enough from the West and cannot ask for more. It should either show ability to resolve its conflict with Russia or should explain to the US and the EU how it is going to build its foreign policy in the future. The West will not interfere in Georgia’s internal affairs as far as the problem of power is concerned but it must watch and consult Georgia on its major social and political problems.

Expert of the Royal Military Academy Christopher Donnelly says that the incompetence of western politicians and the lack of systematic knowledge of international relations in the Georgian government have put Georgia on the verge of political and economic disaster. The present ruling regime is turning from a team ensuring regional security into a factor of instability. Today, as never before, Georgia needs support – and, first of all, in security. The political situation in the South Caucasus is white-hot. At the same time, this situation does not affect the cardinal interests of Georgia and Russia; that’s why just one visit of the US assistant secretary of state to Tbilisi, Brussels and Moscow proved enough for the conflict to be resolved and for the American, European and Russian mass media to stop whipping up tensions and getting focused on this conflict.

Director of the Eastern Europe program at the Center for European Studies (Brussels) Michael Emerson offers quite original version of the events. He says that, despite its bent for discretionary decisions, the Georgian ruling regime is still controlled by the West. Even more, the EU and the US have easily coordinated their efforts to resolve the conflict between Georgia and Russia and to show the Georgian leaders their mistakes. Despite their failed obligations, the Georgian leaders still enjoy high popularity and have real resources for improving administration and economy. The US and the EU have spent much to support Georgia and are not thinking about changing the ruling team.

Emerson says that the key problem of the Georgian leaders is their foreign policy. Georgia has solved no single problem with Russia, so far. And the West cannot help being concerned. The European community is especially worried as it has got in quite a hard situation. Their forced efforts to support Georgia are losing them points in their relations with Russia. Georgia has become a kind of burden for Europe. The US can afford watching different conflicts breaking out around Russia as it is building its energy policy. However, the US too has got in a fix as the Georgian-Russian conflict has gone beyond the limits of security. The European expert community believes that the Georgian authorities have not enough potential for solving the basic problems of democracy, freedoms, elections, social security and, therefore, are interested in escalating tensions in their foreign policy. In fact, the European community has failed to offer Georgia an economic and social prospect that could divert its attention from the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The attitude of European politicians towards Georgia ranges from delight to disdain, which causes mutual disappointment. Presently, the Europeans are ready to make new efforts to support reforms in Georgia, but if, this time too, they fail to explain to the Georgian authorities the real prospects of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian problems, the situation of the summer-autumn 2006 may recur. Not only the EU but also NATO is quite nervous about the situation. They in the US administration are pretending that they are fully controlling the situation, but they are not. In fact, the Americans were taken aback and have decided to tighten their grip on the Georgian leadership.

US Ambassador to Georgia John Tefft has confessed to some diplomats that they were constantly consulting the Georgians, but the latter decided that the support from the west meant their full independence. Emerson believes that the Georgian-Russian conflict was the result of the US incompetence. As far as he knows, during his Oct 2006 visit to Brussels, US Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried was forced to answer very unpleasant questions in the European Commission and to explain to them why such a situation had emerged in the first place. Fried faced similar questions in NATO, where they were extremely displeased with the events in Georgia. While speaking at a closed meeting in the Center for European Policy Studies (Brussels) Fried explained that the US had to raise mutual confidence in the regions of Eastern Europe.

The members of the Republican Party of Georgia, who are not only politicians but are also professional experts, particularly, the leader of the party David Usupashvili, were present at Fried’s meeting with Georgian oppositionists during his visit to Tbilisi. MP and the “intellectual leader” of the Republican party Ivlian Khaindrava says that the meeting was both formal and significant. Fried behaved as a typical American administrator: he preferred listening to the interlocutors and just making remarks. At the end of the meeting, he expressed some general views. At the same time, the meeting was meant to show that the US continues to trust President Saakashvili. Fried kept pointing to the tasks the US has to solve together with the Georgian leaders. He said nothing that could imply that the US is displeased with the ruling regime and Saakashvili.

He just outlined some “proposals” for cooperation between the opposition and the ruling regime. The strong signal of the meeting was the fact that there is no anti-American and anti-NATO party in Georgia; there is just a positive political class consisting of ruling party and opposition. At the same time, the meeting has shown who will be in the possible ruling coalition and who will not. The leader of the Labor Party Shalva Natelashvili was absent from the meeting: he would hardly miss the chance to meet with such a high-ranking guest from Washington, but his comrades explained that “the invitation from the US embassy was not urgent enough.” At the same time, Fried could not but react to the problem of local elections and was explicitly critical of them – he said that the elections were far from what was expected.

One of the leaders of the Republic Party David Berdzenishvili has a different vision of the objective and consequences of the meeting with Fried. Fried clearly said that the future government should be formed through the enlargement of the social and political basis of the present regime. Everybody knows that the Americans do not have any special plans for changing government in Georgia. They will hardly venture to repeat the experience of the autumn 2003 when they planned just to form a parliamentary democratic majority and a coalition but got the overthrow of Shevardnadze. The Americans would like to increase the number of actual sympathizers in order to improve the political style of the Georgian leadership. In any case, one of the US’ tasks in Georgia is known: to remove Okruashvili and his supporters. The general task of the Americans is to remove radicalism and aggression from Georgia’s foreign and domestic policies. Berdzenishvili says that the Americans will temporize, like they did before 2003, and this will result in one more revolution.

Conclusions

Analyzing the events and the views of different experts, we can conclude:

1. The US and its partners think it possible to escalate tensions in the South Caucasus to a certain limit and to use force for resolving more global problems concerning energy, the access to big oil and gas sources in Eurasia, nonproliferation of nuclear technologies and missile defense. At the same time, they think it inadmissible to escalate tensions and to use force for resolving the problems of the break-away republics.

2. The US and its partners believe that the present ruling regime in Georgia, particularly, President Saakashvili, have not exhausted their political resources, including people’s confidence, but, at the same time, they are considering rotating the ruling team and enlarging the social and political basis of the regime in power. They have already selected certain parties and political groups that may form a ruling coalition. Despite their material and propaganda support of Georgia, they in the western community have come to a conclusion that the US was mistaken about that country and is ready to develop new approaches towards the South Caucasus, as a whole. The main source of disappointment is Georgia’s domestic policy, particularly, legal problems, disrespect for the rights of ethnic minorities and the problems of elections. The ruling regime in Georgia is tending to prefer administrative methods to social and economic management.

3. The growing confrontation in relations with Russia and the break-away republics has resulted in serious revision of the approaches of the leading western countries and the NATO bureaucrats towards Georgia’s possible integration into the EU and NATO.

Vano Tumanishvili, expert of Caucasus Analytical Center (Tbilisi)

REGNUM, Russian Information Agency, November 1, 2006 

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