The clashes within the ruling bureaucracy are no longer a subject for gossiping. They now fit in the official news reports. Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov is openly scolding with his colleagues during the sittings of the government. The members of the Cabinet are simply debating whether it is possible to carry out the task of doubling the GDP, the objective proposed for them by the President.

But behind all this argument concerning the evaluation of the current economic situation there is a far more strong opposition between the groups preparing to fight for power.

The State Duma can sit any number of political parties. Actually parties don’t even have to exist. All the same, all serious issues are dealt with in a different place. In Russia power belongs to a coalition of two parties neither of which needs to be registered nor is going to try fortune at the election. They are liberals in charge of the state’s economy and security officials (siloviki) striving to gain control over the political process. The two rivaling bureaucratic parties are normally associated with the names of the two leading Kremlin officials, namely Vladislav Surkov and Igor Sechin.

These groupings differ considerably in their culture and psychology. They do not trust each other implicitly. At the same time each of them can’t go on all by itself. Liberals are aware of the fact that their ideas are not welcomed by people, and, therefore, having no support from the part of the security agencies, no later than tomorrow they are sure to turn into a group of analysts with no one willing to listen to them. Siloviki, left on their own, would fail to execute economic and administrative functions. So, to live in prosperity and to secure their share of the public wealth, liberals should act as professional “macro managers” for them.

The Kremlin coalition, just like any other, is not free of contradictions. As Putin’s term in office is coming to an end, these contradictions grow. Liberal technocrats start acquiring political ambitions, while siloviki, having become keen on certain things, are more openly invading economic sector.

The “YUKOS” case, though presented as an economic matter, was started as a purely political one: the ambitions of the strengthening oligarchic clan, which was about to compete with the Kremlin, were to be put to an end. Now big game was at the winners’ disposal. Politics turned into economics. Siloviki had now their concerns in business. At the same time the liberals employed in the Presidential Administration found out they had a lot in common with politics.

It is the process of delegating the power and those it will be delegated to that the future alignment in the Russian political elite will depend on. The liberals suspect that siloviki wish to expand their influence at their expense, and the latter fear to be simply sacrificed at some point. If a new President enters the Kremlin in 2008, he will have to once again establish good relations with the West. He will be tempted to make peace with the liberal opposition and the supporting part of business elite. There undoubtedly should be someone to take responsibility for the hideousness in Chechnya.Why not then to make a sacrifice of several members of the security agencies of the resigning Administration?

Siloviki would choose a scenario “Putin forever”. It’s not by accident that the society is constantly being offered various options of the constitutional reform, which would add at least one more term of office to the President. The problem, however, is not in the Constitution; it is in the political situation. It appears to be quite complicated to impose the new Constitutional Law in the atmosphere of the political stability, at the same time overcoming the resistance of both opposition and part of the Administration. But what’s if a deep crisis happens in the country? Then the alteration of the Constitution will not be needed, as it will be impossible to be obeyed.

The Russian bureaucracy is famous for its ability to produce all sorts of disasters, which they later on successfully fight with by themselves. What will happen, if they are not lucky enough and no disasters will occur? It’s time to think about a successor. The fight for the presidential post has already started. The rivaling groupings are busy choosing candidates. Among the potential successors they name the Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, the Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Northern Caucasus Federal District Dmitry Kozak and even the Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. Sergei Ivanov however might turn out to be just a “false target”, while Fradkov seems to be reluctant to enter the Kremlin. Maybe it is worth taking a closer look at Kozak?

Whoever is to be appointed successor, he will have to gain support of the both clans. If it doesn’t work out, then instead of the smooth transfer of power we’ll get a great scandal with china crash.

Boris Kagarlitsky is a Director of The Institute for Globalization Studies. The article is written specially for "Eurasian Home".

July 1, 2005