Our analysts like to speculate over the “2008 problem”. Really, who is to be elected President of Russia in a few years, whether Vladimir Putin is going to head for the third term of office, and if yes, then how the Constitution will be changed?

By a weird coincidence the year of 2008 will be the 30^th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. We, being too preoccupied with the problems of our own, are unlikely to pay much attention to this date. However, watching the history of the Shah’s Iran collapse closely would considerably clarify the processes we are currently witnessing in our country. It’s a false assumption that revolutions have to necessarily break out in the midst of the military defeats or economic crisis. The 1917 example had such a profound impact on people, that numerous political crises, having unwrapped according to completely different scenarios, were simply forgotten.

The Shah’s Iran, just like Putin’s Russia, was a country, displaying relatively decent rate of economic growth with stable incomes from oil and gas exports. This however, could not change the nation’s peripheral position in the world capitalist system, but provoked conceit and ambitions in its ruling circles, which sometimes even gave hints to the United States about having their own opinion!

The last Iranian Shah, being a supporter of the bourgeois modernization, made no bones around the capitalists. Some of the Soviet Orientalists even pointed that the Shah’s government had slightly choked the business sector—but did it for entrepreneurs’ own good. The business circles consisted of irresponsible people, corrupted and inefficient. “The revolution of managers” was being imposed by the state, the latter struggling to overcome the continuous resistance of the proprietors.

It is worth saying that the government took up the task of educating the ruling elite. As a strict teacher should, the authorities weren’t afraid to use the birch-rod, while some of the “students had even to be dismissed from the class”, both literally and figuratively.

Putin also happened to be seen as a tough teacher with a stick by Russian oligarchs. His punishment for misbehavior is ruthless, but who can accuse him of reluctance to live under capitalist rules? Just the other way around: these are exactly the rules he is trying to stuff in his students’ idle and thick minds.

The oligarch economy structure also remains unchanged. The market reforms are still in progress. The substitution of one oligarch by another may just make this policy work better. Technology development, national projects and modernization are much spoken about. The middle class should be satisfied by comfortable consumption conditions and well-paid jobs. The system’s work, however, is more of a show rather than of the efficiency. The glamour conceives the undecided problems. The superficiality of the ruling elite will sooner or later become obvious to an impartial observer. The Iranian capitalism under the last Shah, just like the Russian capitalism under Putin, had too narrow social and economic basis, leaving two thirds of the population at nothing. The oil prosperity maintains the illusion of stability. Just illusion, that’s it. As we look closer, we see the clouds in the horizon gathering.

Shah’s biggest success was fighting the opposition. The left was successfully destroyed, and the authorities didn’t think too much over choosing a method of doing it (in the given circumstances Russia is simply the kingdom of freedom). To the political wilderness was thrown the liberal opposition, mourning the times when a clique of the major dealers and their bureaucrat buddies could solve all of their issues in a casual atmosphere over the hooka in the top coffee shop. Now they had to cooperate with a real bureaucratic corporation, which demanded respect and was ready to dictate its own rules.

Censorship and special police forces did their job. Opposition no longer existed. The civil society, both its left and right version, was eliminated. But the general discontent remained, centered in the mosque—the only place where one could speak freely without fearing to be immediately arrested. The social protest embodied itself in the religious feelings. If the mosque substituted opposition, then clerical fundamentalism couldn’t but substitute the revolutionary ideology, while a well-weld corporation of mullahs and ayatollahs had become the only stable alternative to the Shah’s bureaucracy. It was gaining prestige, nourished by the public protest and was preparing to step in the government’s place when it collapses. It came to the light at the right moment, not only pushing the bureaucrats and the old regime elite aside, but also devastating the adherents of other opposition movements, including liberal and left Islamists.

In this very case Iran of the 1970s doesn’t seem to look much like Russia of the 2000s. We don’t possess such a center for attracting fundamentalist forces. All possible groups, inspired by clerical, nationalist, racist ideology, have not yet become a unified social movement with a single recognized political authority.

Anyway, increasing number of the nationalist and fascist groups is starting to seriously worry the Kremlin. If our authorities are actually capable of learning at least some lessons from the past, then that would be it. They are doing their best to keep the nationalist bloc from consolidation, limiting its emerging leaders’ ambitions, preventing formation of the solid structures. “Rodina” was shown its place. Orthodox church is not a Shiite mosque, it will not object to the state. Numerous fascist groupings, from the killer skinhead to the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (MAII) are a serious trouble for citizens with “non-Aryan” looks, still not being a political force and are unlikely to become one. Even if the Communist Party turns all of its meetings into propaganda hang-outs for the racist MAII, this is still not enough to make the fascist movement highly influential. However, the authorities got a problem: it is kind of complicated to fight the right extremism and at the same time stand out for the civil society. The war at the two fronts demands considerable efforts, resources and attention, which they just might be too short of. Besides, keeping up appearances is also on the agenda, i.e. avoiding extremes while pursuing policy of repressions or at least having devices at hand to cover it. At the beginning of the 2000s nationalist movements in Russia were in a crisis. Even the Communist Party (which, regardless its name, is the major nationalist party) was wavering. In the party, especially in its youth sector, communist movements were emerging, modestly trying to appeal to the name and the history of their organization. By mid-decade however, the racist and nationalistic forces in Russia have gotten their second chance. Successful “mop-up” of the civil society created favorable conditions. Putin was doing such a good job pulling the flowers in his garden that had made plenty of room for the weeds.

Such political garden is not needed even to the administration. The state machine is slowly changing fronts. “The fight against fascism” is becoming a popular ideological tune, and the Kremlin is even willing to pay overtime to those ready to sing it. No wonder that the number of struggling with the fascist menace is multiplying. But all of them are not quite right people. If you have been systematically cracking down on the civil society don’t be surprised to see different sorts of crooks being the only ones coming to your call.

The Shah’s Iran collapsed under blasts of the fundamentalist riot, which put together revolutionary enthusiasm and a consistent reactionary program. The Russia of Putin is heading towards its own crisis, its features vaguely looming in the distance. But the general dynamics of the process is relatively clear. The only force to fight the growing nationalist reaction is the civil society. And given our social, economic and cultural circumstances, the real civil society might end up being left instead of liberal.

Boris Kagarlitsky is a Director of The Institute for Globalization Studies.

April 12, 2006