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IVAN GAYVANOVYCH, KIEV
THE EXCHANGE
Geopolitical influence is an expensive thing. The Soviet Union realized that well supporting the Communist regimes and movements all over the world including Cuba and North Korea. The current Russian authorities also understood that when they agreed that Ukraine would not pay Russia $40 billion for the gas in return for extension of the lease allowing Russia's Black Sea Fleet to be stationed in the Crimea. The most infallible remedy to strengthen the mutual understanding and the relations with a dependent and needy partner is to give it money.
Of course, Russia could build several bases, like that in the Crimea, in its territory for such a sum of money. It is difficult to link Russia’s deliberate losses to the Fleet itself, taking into account the depreciation and obsolescence of the warships, especially if to listen to the experts saying that on the whole, the Black Sea Fleet is of little importance in the military and strategic terms.
The Russians really have an irrational attitude towards Sevastopol, the “city of Russian military glory”, the “city of Russian seamen” and just the “Russian city”. But Russia’s willingness to keep its Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine for any price is based, above all, on the sensible consideration. The reason is that the extension of the term of the Russian Black Sea Fleet‘s stationing in Ukraine for, at least, 25 years, the agreement on which Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yanukovych signed in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv on April 21 means that Russia makes it clear to the West that Ukraine belongs to the “area of Russia’s exclusive interests”, keeps its tangible political presence in Ukraine and keeps a springboard for the activities of its intelligence and counter-intelligence services, propagandistic agencies, etc in Ukraine. As a matter of fact, if the Black Sea Fleet was not regarded as a tool of political influence exerted by a state, whose authorities, majority of politicians and many citizens openly scorn the Ukrainian sovereignty, there would be much fewer questions about the Fleet’s being based in Ukraine (especially provided the rent is adequate). But how to forget Vladimir Putin’s telling U.S. President George Bush that “Ukraine is not a state?”
The Ukrainian authorities were not concerned about that. Ukraine decided against joining NATO, and though Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych did not say officially that Ukraine was willing to be Russia’s “underbelly” (as Soviet writer Aleksander Solzhenitsyn put it), he paraphrased an old saying that has it that “all roads lead to Moscow”. True, the Ukrainian authorities say that they pave those roads only for the good of Ukraine and the Ukrainians.
Ukraine produced two main arguments for the Kharkiv agreements. The first one was recently repeated publicly by Viktor Yanukovych himself and the government officials. It says that the fettering gas agreements, which were signed for 10 years by “Naftogaz Ukrainy” and “Gazprom” companies on January 19, 2009 in Moscow, would stop Ukraine’s chemical and metallurgical industry in this year because of too high gas price, which would adversely affect the whole economy. But now, due to the 30% discount the gas price for Ukraine will be lower for 10 years and Ukraine will get “$40 billion of direct investments” in order to spend them on the economy modernization, according to Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov.
It is known that the housing and communal services expenses are nearly completely defrayed by Ukraine’s gas, so the population will not benefit from the discount. The industrial enterprises, which consume Russia’s gas, will use the discount. It is unclear how the Ukrainian government can persuade the oligarchs owning those chemical and metallurgical enterprises to modernize them, if it was not done even when their products were welcomed in the world markets. There are well-founded misgivings that the people, who grow rich even during the global financial crisis (for example, Rinat Akhmetov has become twice as rich as he was for the past year) will want to use their enterprises to the bitter end rather than to spend money on their modernization.
The second argument of advocates of “Yanukovich-Medvedev Pact” was adduced on condition of anonymity. It says to the effect that in 2017 Russia’s Black Sea Fleet would not go from Sevastopol because it has nowhere to go. Of course, the scenario of forcible “eviction” of the Russian Fleet is ruled out. But it is absurd to be guided by such logic, without even trying to insist on the Black Sea Fleet’s withdrawal from the Crimea. By the way, Article 17 of Ukraine’s Constitution reads that “foreign military bases must not be stationed in Ukraine”. But for some reason the Ukrainian authorities attach greater importance to the Constitution’s Transitional Provisions allowing the foreign military bases to be stationed temporarily in the country under lease. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian citizens are unlikely to know how long “temporarily” means, since, according to Andrey Strizhak, Chairman of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, only the President and the Cabinet can bring an action to the Constitutional Court about the extension of the term of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s stationing in Ukraine. Viktor Yanukovich and Mykola Azarov have no doubt that the signed international agreement is constitutional.
Nevertheless, even if the agreement on extension of the Black Sea Fleet’s stationing in Ukraine is ratified by the Parliament, Ukraine has an efficient and legal way to get rid of the Russian military base in 2042. According to the 1997 treaty on the conditions of the Black Sea Fleet’s stationing in Ukraine, Russia must come to agreement with Ukraine about modernization of its military equipment. If Ukraine does not agree to that, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet will have become worthless by the end of the next 25-year term of the lease. Is this an insidious plan of the Ukrainian authorities? We would like to believe in that, but we can scarcely believe.
Geopolitics is an expensive thing. Like the former USSR, Russia realizes that. It is important that the Ukrainian authorities should understand that the motherland and sovereignty do not sell, even very expensive.
Ivan Gayvanovych is a Ukrainian journalist, laureate of the competitions “MASS MEDIA – for civil society», «Golden Era of the Ukrainian TV”.
April 27, 2010
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