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RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONS
SERGEI MARKEDONOV,
Head of the International Relations Department of the Institute for Policy and Military Analysis, Russia
I would like to analyze the deadlock crisis in the Russian-Georgian relations and to suggest a way out of this crisis.
Evidently, the Russian-Georgian relations have reached their worst ever since 1991. Even during the Georgian-Ossetic conflict in the early 1990s, or during the Georgian-Abkhaz military confrontation the tension between Russia and Georgia had not gone to such a degree.
Then none of the Georgia’s policy-makers referred to Russia as to a fascist regime, and none of the Russia’s policy-makers suggested changing leadership in Georgia. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was not regarded as a Russian-Georgian war by the Georgia’s policy-makers.
What is happening now is a logic consequence of the policy pursued by Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili. This policy is based on the idea of uniting separated territories around Georgia.
The situation in Ajaria has become the moment of truth in determining the new Georgia’s policy. Saakashvili faced a choice: either to join Ajaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or to focus on the internal policy as it had been done in Azerbaijan.
The Ajaria case shows that Saakashvili decided against making Georgia attractive, as he chose to follow a different policy, which is distinguished by a number of specific features.
Firstly, this is the re-shaping of the conflict with the separated territories. The official policy of the Georgian government is to envisage the conflict as Russian-Georgian and Russia’s policy on the territories’ annexation rather than that of Georgia and Abkhazia, or Georgia and South Ossetia.
The second aspect is the internationalization of conflicts. The actions of Saakashvili’s administration don’t indicate his intentions to keep the peace in the region. It is about joining of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Georgia.
It is worth mentioning that the Georgian diplomacy is winning over the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian Ministry has so far failed to explain why Russia needs those territories. That is why sometimes Russia’s stand looks like that of an “invader”.
I believe that the necessary grounds are quite evident. For Russia the destabilization in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is another flow of refugees and forced migrants. Given the prestige of the Russian federal authorities had significantly gone down after the Beslan tragedy, the new destabilization on the boundaries does not favor Russia.
By the way, the polls show that it’s Russia where the refugees are more than likely to forward to. None of South Ossetia’s residents, within 18-28 age range, advocates integration with Georgia.
The official Tbilisi calls South Ossetia Tskhinvali region and a former autonomy. This point is totally unacceptable for South Ossetia, making negotiations impossible. The fact that the decision about the South Ossetic autonomy’s abolition proclaimed under former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia is still valid, really does stand out.
The Georgian policy-makers’ statements about their ability to settle the conflict with the Ossetians by themselves also make no good for the peace process. The plan of South Ossetia’s integration into Georgia is propagandistic and uncertain.
For example, there are no clear details concerning demilitarization. It is unclear what it means. Is it going to be withdrawal of the Russian peace-makers? May it also mean withdrawal of the Georgians from South Ossetia by force? The wide autonomy for South Ossetia is also spoken about, but this thesis has no details either.
Suppose, we eliminate the Dagomys agreements of 1992. Then comes the question: Does the concrete plan about bringing peace-makers actually exist? Under given circumstances the elimination is seen impossible.
Of course, those agreements partially threaten Georgian sovereignty. But Georgia itself has initiated them having suffered military defeat in South Ossetia. The agreements can be eliminated only if the four signatories (Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, Russia) deem them implemented.
Thus, the logic which guides the territories’ joining makes the Georgian state’s stability impossible.
Russia is not interested to just have a united Georgia, it needs a different Georgia. It is Georgia that will be a federal state. We should realize that Georgia is a polyethnic society.
It is a wrong assumption that the settlement of the Georgia – South Ossetia conflict will automatically solve all the other problems. Still, there are problems of Djavakhetiya, the Armenians, the Turks-Meskhitinians, and of the Azerbaijani minority.
So, the Georgian authorities can do nothing unless the nation-building paradigm is changed and Georgia becomes a federal state. I think that if Ajaria kept its autonomy and Djavakhetia got it as well, it would have been a good point in the negotiations with Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia.
Unfortunately, public opinion polls indicate that the “Georgia for the citizens of Georgia” idea is hardly welcomed by the population. According to the poll held by the Georgian Association of Regional Press, 72% of respondents believe that the best solution for the ethnic minorities’ problem is their deportation.
Therefore, until Georgia has carried out the “Georgia for the citizens of Georgia” project and realized federalization, it will fail to establish itself as a state.
Russia could help the separated territories to be integrated only as part of a civil project not an ethnopolitical one, which had become a cornerstone of Saakashvili’s policy.
As for the way out of this crisis, I would use the term “Azerbaijanization” in this case. In the early 1990s the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan resembled those between Russia and Georgia of today. Heidar Aliyev managed to make the Karabakh’s problem a point of secondary importance in the relations with Russia and to concentrate on such problems as joint policing of borders, cooperation in the Caspian region and the problem of separated peoples.
So, it is necessary to remove the Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s point from the agenda of the Russian-Georgian relations. It’s up to the Georgian authorities to realize that these problems have been called forth by misunderstanding of the nature of these conflicts as well as by the crisis of the Georgian nation-building and state-building strategies.
We also have a quite a list of points where real cooperation can be made possible. It is joint policing of borders and cooperation on establishing centers for fighting terrorism. It is essential to resume negotiations on a framework agreement, which Russia and Georgia still don’t have.
The text is based on Sergei Markedonov’s address at the press-conference “Russia-Georgia: ways of out crisis”.
February 28, 2006
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