JULES EVANS, LONDON
RUSSIA’S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE WEST
President Putin’s trip to London almost got off to a bad start this week, when Kommersant carried a front-page story about a new tax investigation by the General Prosecutor’s office into the British Council.
Last year, it carried out a similar investigation into the commercial activities of the Council, in particular its English language lessons. The probe was seen by the British Embassy as an act of state aggression on its poor defenceless cultural wing. The investigation caused a diplomatic scandal, which only cleared up after the personal intervention of Tony Blair.
It seemed very strange, then, that the Russian government should choose to bring up the issue again, on the eve of Putin’s visit to London. Commentators speculated if it was related to the Kremlin’s attempt to extradite Akhmed Zakayev, but to me, it looked like another diplomatic gaffe by the Kremlin. Why sour relations, right before a diplomatic visit? It was a waste of air fuel.
But then, later that day, the Foreign Ministry rushed out a press release, saying the government had no problem with the British Council, and that the Kremlin was not trying to gain leverage over the Zakayev issue.
Why, then, did the General Prosecutor in St Petersburg brief Kommersant on the investigation? Perhaps the story was old, and Kommersant or the old fox Berezovsky had simply chosen to release it to coincide with Putin’s visit, to spoil the mood.
Or perhaps someone in the General Prosecutor’s office was annoyed with the British government for consistently failing to extradite suspects. The feeling is mutual on this topic, by the way – the British Crown Prosecution Service, which has to bring Russia’s cases for extradition, is “fed up” with flimsily-supported cases for Russian extradition, which it is obliged to defend, at the cost of much time and money and with little chance of winning.
Whatever the reason for the story’s leak, I was impressed with the alacrity with which the MID responded and squashed the story.
It showed the government has learnt something after the PR debacle of last December, when the Kremlin’s sale of Yukos’ key asset and its intervention in the Ukrainian election generated a flurry of critical articles in the western press, and a distinct cooling of diplomatic relations with western governments.
A lot of that cooling in temperature was unnecessary, and caused by the Kremlin’s apparent ignorance of how to deal with the western press, by briefing them, giving them access, and generally trying to persuade them to write what they wanted, rather than merely ignoring them.
This year, the Kremlin seems to be much more pro-active in its attempts to woo the West. In August, for example, the Kremlin invited 30 top foreign experts and journalists on a boat cruise down the Volga, where they met leading Russian figures and afterwards had a three hour meeting with Putin. The event, known as the Valdai Group, actually first took place last year, but is turning into something of an institution. Western experts say the event is very useful, and helpful in improving relations.
Putin is himself taking more trips abroad, and his trips are often accompanied by ‘soft power’ events such as art exhibitions, sponsored by the Kremlin or by some obliging oligarch. In New York, it was an exhibition at the Guggenheim. In Brussels this week, it was an exhibition on avant-garde Russian art.
Putin’s team is showing a new sophistication at how to generate positive news stories abroad. For example, today the president is presenting medals to the Naval officers who helped rescue the sunken submarine in August.
A smart move – rather than stories about Russia’s Chechnya policy or the roll-back of democracy, tomorrow Britain’s newspapers will carry a photo of Putin pinning medals on British servicemen’s chests, looking like Britain’s top security ally.
On the other side, the British government is showing more awareness of what buttons to push with the Kremlin. Putin wants the West to work closer with Russia against terror. Appreciating this, Blair will today show Putin the COBRA anti-terror centre in London, an act of trust that has raised some eyebrows in the London tabloid press.
Behind the diplomatic niceties is an obvious fact – Russia has gas, and Europe needs it, lots of it. Gazprom now provides 25% of Europe’s gas needs, though liquefied natural gas suppliers in north Africa and the middle east are putting up increasing competition.
The UK’s energy sector is now mainly dependent on gas, and as of this year, the country is a net importer. Last winter, the country almost faced an energy crisis when gas supplies ran low. For this reason, relations with Russia are increasingly on a pragmatic, commercial basis.
Of course, Zakayev and Berezovsky are still flies in this warm borsch of reconciliation. But as Bobo Lo, Russia expert at Chatham House, says: “Zakayev is not relevant at all after the death of Maskadov. So hopefully that issue will lose its sting.”
From the EU point of view, the uncomfortable question is what one does about Chechnya in this new pragmatic environment – do we buy Russian gas, and not mention it?
From Russia’s point of view, its PR may be getting more sophisticated, but how can it spin the degeneration of the north Caucasus, of Dagestan and Chechnya? Even its own ministers admit the situation is worsening there.
Both the UK and the EU seem to be offering to get more involved in the region, via educational programmes. The UK pledged £1 million to such a programme, and the EU has pledged another Eu20 million. I suspect that the EU hopes this will be the prelude for a wider European engagement with the region.
But the EU shouldn’t get its hopes up in this department. Russia is no more likely to let international forces police Chechnya than the UK would have been to let Belgians or Germans police Northern Ireland in the 1980s.
Despite the complex and difficult issue of the Caucasus, Russia’s relations with the West have certainly got warmer since the nadir of December 2004. It is not just the warmth of gas imports – Russia and the West appear to be learning how to engage with each other.
Julian Evans is a British freelance journalist based in Moscow. The article is written specially for "Eurasian Home".
October 5, 2005
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