BORIS KAGARLITSKY, MOSCOW
THE MITROFANOV ARGUMENT
Why would the State Duma deputy Aleksey Mitrofanov change sides leaving Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) for Sergey Mironov’s “Fair Russia”? Given Mitrofanov’s public image that can only deter voters, it is very doubtful that “Fair Russia” will manage to capitalize on this acquisition. Mitrofanov was fine as Zhirinovsky’s right hand warming up the public every time before the great clown took the lead himself. But the Mitrofanov-Mironov duet is unlikely to arouse any public interest at all.
And still, Mitrofanov has become political headliner of this autumn. The point is that his leaving LDPR is a symptom or even a proof of several theories suggested by political analysts.
Analyzing contemporary political process in Russia is a challenge for the same reasons that made Kremlinology a brain twister back in 1970s: lack of reliable information, extreme formality and hollowness of all public announcements. Just as in the Soviet society, we learn about the plans of the authorities from rumors, media leaks and slips, and we can only guess if the latter are Freudian or intended.
But by the end of summer political analysts have come to a common opinion about the forthcoming elections. They have assumed that the Kremlin bureaucrats know already the comebacks of the parliamentary elections and the name of the successor. The win-win scheme is as follows: the two incumbent First Vice Premiers will hold offices of President (Sergey Ivanov) and Prime Minister (Dmitry Medvedev); ageing and unambitious Mikhail Fradkov will be given a sinecure and Mr Putin will head a large but politically neutral project, like the International Olympic Committee.
Though the parliamentary election is an open issue, it matters only as a rehearsal before the presidential election. The head of the state can’t fail to be elected in the first round with a landslide. For if the second round takes place it will bring popular support and legitimacy both to the President and to his opponent. But the very idea of the managed democracy is that the only legitimate political figure in the state is the President, with all others being bureaucrats, fringe oppositionists, public enemies, clowns – whoever they are, they hardly have any influence on the decision making process.
This is not an easy task. For Putin it was much easier to gain and retain power during the crisis back in 1999 -2000 or later in 2004 when he was an unchallenged leader. In 2008 Sergey Ivanov will have to face another political reality. A period of economic prosperity is a difficult time for making the charisma. Ivanov can be passed out as Putin’s loyal successor, but by no means as Russia’s new charismatic leader.
Given our electoral system, it is not a problem for the bureaucrats to “elect” their candidate. But there are some finer points to be considered: the first round and the bureaucratic mentality. Should the successor loose in any of the regions that would be a catastrophe for the head of that region: he would get off cheap with a rebuke, sleepless nights and wrecked nerves; at worst he would be kicked away. Thereby, they know that they need to make it in the first round and in all regions.
In this connection the parliamentary elections can be very helpful and risky at the same time. For the parliamentary campaign will give platform to all the political forces. Presidential wannabes can take good start at Duma. And though most of the candidates realize that there is little chance for them to carry out the presidential election, they will fight for high ratings during the election campaign and for every percent of the election returns. For this capital can be converted into money from sponsors, bribes and buy-offs. The result is worth the trouble.
Under the circumstances, the Liberal Democratic Party that served the interests of the power during 1990s, discrediting the very idea of parliamentary opposition, now has become a headache for the Kremlin administration. There is a chance that Zhirinovsky despite or thanks to all his buffoonery will get too much votes when opposed to faceless Ivanov. And the Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov can also remind of himself – the Communist Party always shows better results during the presidential election. Besides, there will be minor parties and candidates. Perish the thought, but what if all together they get 52.5% ? Well, subtracting two percent here, adding three percent there is not a new trick for the Kremlin masterminds. But the liberal press and the Western observers will raise a stink about this counting-out. And the Kremlin would like to do without big scandals.
It is much easier to get the fair 52% for the Kremlin candidate in the first round and close the issue. But to do so they have to resolve all the problems beforehand.
And that means that Zhirinovsky is going to have lots of problems during the State Duma elections. If the LDPR fails to overcome the 7 percent barrier, its leader will win less air time and less money. Hopefully, he will get the hint and curtail his political ambitions.
Until recently these assumptions were nothing more than a rumor, a wild guessing. But now it seems that MPs are into it. And Mitrofanov has decided to save his neck leaving his native party and his old political and business partner Zhirinovsky. So Mitrofanov, in order to keep his post, ran with his arms open to Mironov. From time to time Russian politicians, just like the Lewis Carroll’s heroes, have to run fast in order to stay at the same place.
By doing this Mr Mitrofanov has furnished the proof of all the assumptions made by the analysts.
But what if Mitrofanov got it all wrong? Made up of come-and-go politicians, “Fair Russia” has proved to be an ineffective, opportunistic and corrupt political body. There is a chance that despite all the tricks of the Kremlin political consultants this party will go out at the election. All the more that they don’t intend to save it at any price.
To tell the truth, the Communist Party also is not prospering. That is why the Kazakh scenario is entirely possible in Russia: all the parties will get 5-6%, while the “United Russia” will be the only party in the parliament. In Kazakhstan they didn’t intend to get rid of all the opposition parties, the latter just failed to make it.
Is the current situation in Russia really different? And will we grieve if we get a one-party parliament?
The majority of the population won’t see the difference, I am afraid…
Boris Kagarlitsky is Director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements
September 12, 2007
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