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ARMENIA VOICED ITS POSITION TO THE KREMLIN
KIRILL GAVRILOV,
Expert of the Eurasia Heritage Foundation, Moscow
President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan is the first state leader who visited Russia after Moscow had recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence. On September 2, at the meeting with Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev in Sochi Serzh Sargsyan was as cautious about the Russian-Georgian conflict as always: he only expressed condolences to Dmitry Medvedev in connection with deaths of the Russian citizens and peacemakers in South Ossetia and focused on the humanitarian aid issues. He did not give Armenia’s official view on the recognition of the independence of the two republics.
The goals, which the parties seemed to pursue at the negotiations, make the Armenian President’s approach understandable.
At present, Russia tries to persuade its closest allies to follow Moscow’s example and to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence. Armenia, which depends on Russia in terms of economy (Russia is a major investor in the Armenian economy, an exclusive energy supplier, etc), could be the first CIS country to support Moscow's decision. Apart from that, if to recall the words of Speaker of Russia’s State Duma Boris Gryzlov, who called Armenia an outpost of Russia in the South Caucasus, it would be logical to assume that Armenia could become one of the first countries recognizing (after Russia) Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s sovereignty. Since September 5, Armenia holds the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) presidency. If to take into consideration that Russia is going to insist on collective recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by the CSTO member states and on the republics’ admission to this Organization, Moscow should enlist Yerevan’s support.
However, Armenia is extremely interested in keeping its ‘uncertain’ position. Although it is not confirmed officially, one can surmise that Serzh Sargsyan took part in the negotiations first and foremost to make a simple thing clear for the Russian authorities: currently Yerevan cannot afford to recognize the sovereignty of the two republics. There are two main reasons.
Firstly, recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia Armenia will make relations with Georgia worse, which will most likely lead to rupture of the relations and to cessation of the communication between Armenia and Georgia. At a time when Armenia’s frontiers with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed, this will affect the situation in Armenia. The recent events showed that even suspension of the railway service between Georgia and Armenia may deprive Armenia of grain and fuel within days. The Russian gas is supplied to the republic also via Georgia. To all appearances, during the negotiations the Armenian party voiced this stance, as later on Aide to the Russian President Sergei Prikhodko said that the parties had discussed the creation of new transportation routes, the interaction in the fuel and energy sphere and the railway communication. It is said that the project of the building of the railway from Iran to Armenia was discussed. If the relations between Armenia and Georgia worsen, the Iranian-Armenian border would be the only place to break through the transport blockade. The second part of the gas pipeline from Iran is being constructed and an oil pipeline construction is being discussed. But even if those projects are implemented, they will unlikely compensate the possible closing of the border between Armenia and Georgia.
Secondly, recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence may make the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict more difficult for Armenia. The point is that the co-presidents of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) Minsk Group, which settles the conflict, are (besides Russia) the USA and France that condemned Moscow's recognition of the independence of the two republics. The decision of the Russian authorities itself questioned the normal functioning of the OSCE Minsk Group. If Armenia takes similar steps, I doubt that Azerbaijan, as the other conflict party, will have any reason to conduct the talks in the previous format. The issue is said to have been examined at the meeting of the presidents too. Then Aide to the Russian President Sergei Prikhodko said that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue had been raised and Dmitry Medvedev had supported “the direct Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue”. Evidently, if Armenia recognizes the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, such a dialogue is unlikely to be carried on.
Apparently, Armenia’s position has been clearly voiced by former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Vardan Oskanyan: “Armenia must have stated that it was not going to choose between its friends since Russia was Armenia’s strategic ally and Georgia was its natural one. Both the countries are of vital importance to us”. Although it was not reported officially, Serzh Sargsyan might express the similar point of view during the negotiations with Dmitry Medvedev.
Besides the situation in the Caucasus, the Armenian-Russian negotiations might cover some other issues, for example, the economic projects concerning the uranium extraction in Armenia, the extension of the functioning term of the operating Armenian (Metsamorskaya) Nuclear Power Station and the construction of a new nuclear power unit.
It is possible that Yerevan turned to Russia in the process of the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. It is remarkable, that President of Turkey Abdullah Gul visited Yerevan on September 6. Moscow might help Yerevan in the negotiations with Ankara. On the day of the Armenian-Russian negotiations, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived for a short-term visit in Turkey. But whether Russia acted as an informal mediator in the Armenian-Turkish talks is unclear.
It is not known if Moscow has put a question point-blank: either the promotion of investments in the Armenian economy, the following of the loyal energy price policy, the help in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the assistance in solving the problems with Turkey in exchange for Yerevan’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s independence, or nothing. The question was unlikely raised in that way. Because if it was, the answer (regardless of Armenia’s concrete choice) would be highly conducive to catastrophic consequences for the economy and political system of this republic. As a result, Armenia would intensify the cooperation with the West, as many other former Soviet republics did.
September 9, 2008
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