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MOSCOW’S REALITIES AND THE FUTURE OF GEORGIAN SOVEREIGNTY
GEORGETA POURCHOT,
Director, OLMA/NCR, Political Science, Virginia Tech; Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC
The current Russian military operation in Georgia marks the beginning of the end for Georgian sovereignty.
The peace deal brokered by France contains the seeds of further chipping away at Georgian territory, by allowing Russian troops the right to patrol “a few kilometers” beyond the conflict zone. Apart from the fact that the deal does not establish exactly how many “few kilometers” the Russians are permitted inside the sovereign space of another country, this clause stands in internal contradiction with other provisions of the deal: Russian troops are supposed to return to their pre-conflict positions and Georgian troops are supposed to return to their permanent place of deployment in South Ossetia. If Russian troops are allowed to patrol outside the zone of conflict even by a meter, not by a few kilometers, their return to pre-conflict positions is moot. The proposition that Georgian troops are to return to their pre-conflict positions is similarly laughable, under conditions where the Russians control most access roads. Moscow’s recent rejection of a UN resolution calling for the withdrawal of troops from Georgia is based precisely on this inherent flaw of the French-brokered deal. Moscow claims it has the right to a “buffer zone,” outside the zone of conflict, that is the “few kilometers” granted last week. It is therefore rejecting full withdrawal and does not see any reason to justify the destruction of Georgian property within or outside the zone of conflict. Georgia is essentially left with no military power to counter this invasion.
The French-brokered deal is a Western concession to Moscow demands in order to secure a rapid cease fire and enable humanitarian assistance to the affected population. This muddled deal gives the Kremlin a legitimate, internationally accepted military presence in Georgia, a country whose leadership has dared defy Moscow on several counts in recent years. Moreover, this bad deal, agreed in order to stop the fighting has not even met its humanitarian assistance purpose. Russian troops have not permitted OSCE monitors or humanitarian aid to enter South Ossetia. As such, the deal has only served one side: the Russians.
The so-called withdrawal of Russian troops already indicates what the Kremlin is prepared to do, versus what the Euro-Atlantic allies think Moscow agreed. Russian troops remain within twenty-five miles of the Georgian capital, and they control road access to cities throughout the country. In the city of Gori, even if there are no Russian tanks, citizens depend on food and water supplies, whose entry is also controlled by Russian posts outside the city. Police stations that should be busy with officers defending the rule of law are deserted. The citizens of Gori are de facto left to take care of themselves. The control of access roads gives Russia the real power inside Georgia. This is not sovereignty, this is occupation.
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s sudden and unexpected support for Georgia’s NATO aspirations suggests that her visit to Tibilisi must have been self-explanatory. She lived in East Germany for most of her adult life and can recognize an occupation tank when she sees one. Considering that she was the one European leader who opposed Georgia’s and Ukraine’s bid at the April NATO summit, that she appeared the most inclined to accommodate Moscow’s demands in the current crisis, her sudden support for Georgia in NATO marks a fundamental shift in the current crisis. Her support indicates that she understands the real stakes, that Georgia is in danger of losing its sovereignty.
In order to understand the current situation between Russia and Georgia, one needs to understand Moscow’s assumptions about its relationship with the former communist bloc. In a nutshell: Russia thinks of countries from Central Europe to Central Asia as if they are still in its former sphere of influence. As such, if these countries make sovereign decisions that Russia dislikes, it reacts either by using diplomatic rhetoric, or economic pressure, or since August 8, 2008, resuming its Cold War military intervention. Poland, the Baltic countries and Ukraine who expressed strong support for Georgia in the current crisis have already been warned by Russian military leaders that their allegiances will not go “unpunished.” At stake is something called “Russia’s traditional interests in the region,” a phrase much used in the Kremlin and among common Russians.
To be fair, Russia refrained from military intervention in almost two decades since the end of the Cold War. It did not invade Central European or Baltic countries when they joined NATO. It did not respond with fire to the color revolutions. It did not interfere in Central European and Central Asian domestic affairs the same way the Soviet Union used to. That said, the march to Euro-Atlantic integration by increasing numbers of countries that used to be Soviet territory is perceived as “Western encircling” in order to render Russia weak and humiliated. The fact that Georgia and Ukraine have been more vocal about joining NATO in recent years is threatening to political circles in Russia. These circles have long advocated for a more forceful approach to reclaim Russia’s former sphere of influence, and these circles now seem to gain the upper hand.
It is worth noting that Russia has legitimate security concerns, and that its overreaction to Georgia’s attempt to take back control of South Ossetia is justified in the name of Russia’s security. It is also worth noting that when Chechnya demanded independence, Russia reacted forcefully, bombing the small republic in the name of “Russia’s domestic interests.” Neither Georgia, nor any other country came to the aid of Chechens, and Russia ravaged the republic for a decade. When Georgia tried to bring back into the fold its separatist republic using the same methods that the Kremlin used in Chechnya, Georgia’s action was deemed “genocide” in Moscow.
Much has been made in Russia of the fact that Georgia attacked first in South Ossetia, and that “Russian citizens” were the subject of genocide. Moscow has kept quiet about the fact that the so-called Russian citizens in South Ossetia are largely local citizens who were afforded Russian passports by Moscow, in contravention to a number of international laws. Several years ago, Mikhail Saakashvili brought to the attention of the UN the fact that his country was being slowly, quietly and surely the subject of annexation by the Kremlin authorities via the issuance of such illegal passports. Moscow responded, again, claiming special interests in the region and continued the process of colonizing South Ossetia with Russia-friendly citizens.
Georgia’s chances to regain control over the separatist republic, as well as of the “few kilometers” that Russian troops now occupy is complicated by the fact that the Euro-Atlantic community has no real leverage over the Kremlin. Short of going to war with Russia to defend Georgian sovereignty, neither the Europeans nor the Americans have the means to force Moscow to withdraw from this daring republic. NATO foreign ministers have met, president Sarkozy “threatened” to convene an extraordinary session of the European Council if Russia does not withdraw immediately, but this is just saber rattling. Moscow is not afraid of another EU meeting in which its actions will probably be “strongly condemned” by its Euro-Atlantic partners. It is not afraid that NATO will send the military to defend Georgian positions, because it knows NATO will not take such action. It is equally not afraid of whatever sanctions the EC or NATO might place against it. All the “strong” words and stern faces are the equivalent of a tempest in a teapot, and Russia knows it. Since Moscow sees itself entitled to do whatever it takes to secure its “traditional interests in the region,” Georgian sovereignty is very much under a question mark.
August 20, 2008
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Expert forum
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The guns are bellowing now in South Ossetia and Georgia, and muses of those who might mull over the solution of the grave crisis, are still silent. Many things including the people’s lives depend on how long the diplomats and policy-makers will be inactive.
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What will Abkhazia do, if Georgia joins NATO? Abkhazia will do nothing. Let Georgia join NATO even tomorrow. We do not care about that.
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The treatment of leaders ousted in the recent "color revolutions" in some CIS states is directly related to the way in which power was seized. Kyrgyzstan has meted out the most brutal treatment, followed by Ukraine and Georgia.
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Russia's relations with Georgia are one of the most cute and problematic aspects of foreign policy in the Caucasus. Previously "fraternal," i.e. former Soviet republic, Georgia has become one of Moscow's most intractable partners in the former Soviet space.
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There has been ample speculation about the nature of Putin’s State of the Nation Address due in the Parliament on May 10.
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NATO’s most recent informal summit in Sophia underscores a decade and a half of balancing act between two former adversaries, the North Atlantic Alliance and Russia.
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20 March 2006
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The current political crisis in Ukraine is not unexpected and should not be cause for skepticism regarding the future of democracy in Ukraine. The sacking of the Yuliya Tymoshenko government by president Yushchenko, high-level resignations starting with State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko’s over the week-end followed by Security and Defense Council head Petro Poroshenko and Vice Prime Minister Mycola Tomenko, widespread allegations of corruption and coalition n-fighting, disagreements over the “right” course for Ukraine’s reforms and increasing popular dissatisfaction with the pace and depth of economic, political and social transformation are all manifestations of the domestic turmoil that accompanies transitions to a democratic environment.
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