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THE NEW RUSSIAN PRESIDENT AND BELARUS: SLUGGISH POLITICAL EMANCIPATION, ACTIVE ECONOMIC EXPANSION?
BELARUSIAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, NASHA NIVA WEEKLY, MINSK
Presidential elections in Russia have been an event of international importance. A succession scenario had been implemented, although the former President, Vladimir Putin, still controls power being the Prime-Minister and the leader of the largest faction in the State Duma. What does this mean for Belarus? Participants of the roundtable (May 16, 2008) sponsored by the Nasha Niva weekly and the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies agreed that the new power configuration in Russia would only slightly change the existing character of Belarus-Russia relationships. First, decision-makers responsible for policy development and implementation towards Belarus have not been replaced. Second, the parameters of Belarus-Russia interaction are to a large degree determined by the oil and gas sector situation, where important changes have already occurred. Third, whoever is in Kremlin, Belarus faces some important changes emanating from economic and social developments in Russia.
Putin’s Eight Years and Belarus: Was There a Real Break from Yeltsin?
It is President Vladimir Putin who suggested in 2002 – against the background of gas conflict initiated by Gazprom – to incorporate Belarus by Russia (specifically, six regions of Belarus could have joined Russia). This move of the Kremlin had in fact promoted the formation of the consensus on the necessity to preserve political independence inside Belarus. This is the major outcome of the Putin’s two presidential terms for Belarus. Yet, independence provides sensible economic benefits for the country. Indeed, ‘special relations’ with Russia allow the Belarusian state budget to collect up to one-third of its revenues and to subsidize domestic industry via lower, than in the neighboring countries, gas prices. Although economic rationale is important in constructing relations with Belarus, geopolitical ambitions often prevail in Russia’s reasoning towards Belarus. This reasoning permeates the action of “business-oriented” corporations like Gazprom as well, directly or indirectly connected to the political authority of Russia. Hence, political factors have been firmly entwined with the fabric of bilateral economic relationships. In spite of many predictions politics was not fully dislodged from the Belarus-Russia economic relations under Putin, and “politicization” only increased by the end of his second term as a president. It is premature, therefore, to declare that Putin’s presidency put a complete end to the ‘romantic’ period in Belarus-Russia relations, when promises of integration were traded for economic benefits. Russia may not harbor previous illusions, but new leadership will be forced to engage with Belarus, regardless of liking or disliking of its leader, for more fundamental and structural reasons.
President Medvedev: A New Deal?
A range of factors will slow down implementation of Kremlin’s policy innovations (if there are any) towards Belarus. On the one hand, Russia is locked-in into its own way of modernization from above, so the decisions made (including foreign policy ones) tend to revolve around the chosen developmental path. Some ‘phase’ fluctuations are unable to change the strategic policy orientation. On the other hand, there are spacious regional processes and regional division of labor, which Belarus and Russia are a part and parcel of. These factors tend to cement the character of bilateral relations.
Besides, it is apparent that a new deal is unlikely to emerge. At least, it is too premature to wait for a revision of the policy stance towards Belarus. The reason is that the ‘core’ of the Russian political elite responsible for policies towards Belarus during the Putin’s presidency is still in power. Moreover, Vladimir Putin as the Prime-Minister of the Russian Federation controls economic levers and mechanisms of influence on the policies of state corporations like Gazprom. In addition, the former Deputy Chairman of Presidential Administration and now the Deputy Prime-Minister, Igor Sechin, responsible for industrial complex, and Sergey Prihodko, who is a ‘curator’ of Belarusian policy dimension during both Yeltsin and Putin's presidencies, retain their seats.
Medvedev or Putin: Does it Make Any Difference for Belarus?
Regardless of who is the ‘real ruler’ of Russia, whether he is ‘liberal’ or not by the political orientation, Belarus-Russia relationships will be heavily influenced by a general tendency of the Russian political establishment to refuse treating Belarus as ‘foreign country’ or independent nation, and to consider it as a some proximate territory instead. Besides, the perception of Belarus as a geopolitical ‘shield’ is not to vanish, irrespective of the level and character of the relationships between Russia and Western countries. As soon as these moods and perceptions are available, the politics of economic subsidization of Belarus by providing economic preferences and privileged access to the Russian market would be preserved, although some changes or restrictions could be expected. Perhaps, Dmitry Medvedev, as a representative of new generation of politicians, is less inclined to accept these stereotypes, but his role as a President would force him to embody the views and attitudes of the Russian political elite as a whole. Even one assumes that chances for political and national emancipation of Belarus are higher because of the Medvedev’s presidency (in contrast to all other candidates for successor’s role discussed in 2007), this process would be sluggish at best.
Nevertheless, this support is not cost-free for the Belarusian authorities. Russian companies have a range of plans to occupy the Belarusian economic space. And the attempts to implement these plans are not related to the figure of the real leader of Russia. Most likely, sooner or later these expansionist plans would be realized. Right now Russians are keen to purchase ‘Azot’ company, a largest consumer of natural gas in Belarus, while the company’s survival is directly related to its ability to cope with growing energy costs. Despite the strong interest of Russian companies, few projects have been realized in practice so far. This suggests the lack of efficiency of Putin’s policies of ‘mastering’ of Belarus’ space or the existence of some powerful pro-Belarusian lobby capable of blocking the advancement of the interests of Russian business. Probably, Medvedev’s term could activate lobbying on the Russian side so the Russian companies would acquire property shares in some of their Belarusian counterparts.
At the same time, there are serious changes underway in Russia challenging the Belarusian model in a number of ways regardless of the character of Belarus-Russia relationships. In particular, policies of reduction of red tape and improvement of business climate in Russia make the country more attractive than Belarus as a destination for foreign investors. Moreover, Russia strives for the WTO membership, and, if achieved, this would mean a competitiveness challenge for Belarus whose foreign trade would fall on the WTO member states. It is also important to mention that Belarus today is facing a lack of experienced managers of various kind and even skilled ‘blue collar’ workers opting for a temporary labor migration to Russia (according to various estimates, between 400,000 and 850,000 Belarusians are temporarily employed in Russia). All these factors make the task of enhancing national competitiveness more urgent than before regardless of who controls the Kremlin.
Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) is registered in Vilnius, Lithuania. The BISS mission is the development of public dialogue to formulate positive alternatives for Belarus and to search for the ways of building a healthy, prosperous, and competitive nation. More information about the BISS activities can be found at: www.belinstitute.eu
June 24, 2008
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