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INTEGRATION IMITATION WILL CONTINUE. DMITRY MEDVEDEV AND VLADIMIR PUTIN’S TACTICS AGAINST ALIAKSANDR LUKASHENKA
YAROSLAV ROMANCHUK,
President of the Minsk-based Mizes Center, Belarus
Eurasian Home: “How do you assess the Russian-Belarusian relations during Vladimir Putin’s presidency?”
Vladimir Putin managed to do the things that were of interest to him and his team. He consolidated the control over Russia’s gas, oil and financial sectors after he had set himself this task and had given it priority. Putin managed to neutralize the oligarchs of the Yeltsin era, to take control of the mass media, to create the executive chain of command through abolition of the direct governor elections and by other means.
The Belarusian-Russian relations were very low on Vladimir Putin’s list of priorities. Aliaksandr Lukashenka gained an advantage over Putin and the Kremlin in every way. Here in Belarus ordinary people, high-ranking officials and the opposition have no doubts about that. Lukashenka got everything he had wanted from Moscow, and the Kremlin had to pay for it. The Russian authorities feigned that nothing had happened and only in 2007 (after the 2006 presidential election in Belarus) the Kremlin became a little more active starting to implement a different strategy towards Belarus. But even now it isn’t worked out.
The “Belarus-Russia Union” project remained on paper. Gazprom does not control the Belarusian “Beltransgaz” company. The single currency has not been introduced. The common economic space has not been created. There is no customs union and free trade area between Russia and Belarus. More than that, during the so called “gas and oil war” between Belarus and Russia the Kremlin and the Russian government ranked first among Belarus’ enemies in the Belarusian mass media.
Our governments signed a lot of documents but nobody is going to fulfill them. There are no institutions that would enforce the documents. Sham bodies of the fake Belarus-Russia Union are created and the parties seem to be happy about it.
Lukashenka actively resorted to the help of various lobbying groups in Russia to implement his own strategy in the relations with Moscow. The strategy was simple: to promise the Kremlin to integrate Belarus with Russia in exchange for cheap gas. For the last 10 years Russia has paid Belarus $45-50 billion for nothing. Since Russia is a rich country, nobody cares about losses.
The second scheme of Lukashenka’ strategy is the discrimination of the Russian goods: the Belarusian goods have an access to the Russian market, but the Russian goods are prevented from entering the Belarusian market. As the kickback schemes in the commercial relations between the Belarusian plants and the Russian trade companies, including those to whom Russian governors and mayors provide protection, were adjusted long ago, they were quite efficient. The Kremlin did not want to condescend to this level, so Lukashenka made the best of those schemes.
The third scheme is the admittance of the capitals, which are related to some Russian politicians and companies, to the market in exchange for the political lobbyism. Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov, the businessmen close to Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Russian Communists, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alesksii II and the Russian Orthodox Church, the oil tycoons (Lukoil and Rosneft companies), some Russian key banks, Joint-stock Financial Corporation Systema and Itera International Group of Companies, Boris Berezovsky’s agents are powerful lobbyists who help Lukashenka to implement his schemes in the relations with Russia.
Vladimir Putin was not going to deprive Lukashenka of this support in Russia. If this were done, what would be the results? Maybe, the Belarusian opposition would come into power? Or, there would be destabilization and surge of anti-Russian attitudes? The majority of Belarusians believe that Russia must supply oil and gas to Belarus at low, subsidized prices. The parasitism with which the Russian-Belarusian relations are infected are a powerful tool for the Belurusian President to manipulate the Kremlin’s feelings and emotions. This factor was one of the reasons for Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s becoming the winner.
Finally, Lukashenka obtained cheap and long-term credits from the Russian government without making serious concessions. This financial “drug” helps him to assure the economic growth and to raise the income level of the population. In the medium term this will make Belarus dependent on Russia. But today the authorities are not concerned about that.
In June the Ministry for Economic Development of the Russian Federation stated that at least 23 protectionist measures were taken against the Russian goods in Belarus. It is symbolic that the formal Belarusian-Russian relations boiled down to the informal meetings of the Presidents including those in the Russian resort of Sochi and the Belarusian village of Silichi that is located 40 kilometers from Minsk.
Eurasian Home: “What are the main problems in the Russian-Belarus relations?”
Moscow’s main aim is to stop the parasitical relations with Lukashenka's regime without serious damage to the cooperation, and to establish friendly but, at the same time, pragmatic relations with the Belarusian state, which let the Kremlin keep Minsk in Russia’s sphere of influence. For the last ten years the Kremlin’s policy has consolidated the anti-Russian lobby among the Belarusian high-ranking officials rather than in the opposition. The officials became much more nationalistic and mercenary-minded. They would like to save their money into the shares of the Belarusian enterprises. That’s why the officials look on the Russian businessmen as their competitors who are far richer, more experienced, cruel and cynical than they are. So, another Kremlin’s task is to neutralize those Belarusian officials and to win the loyal politicians’ favour.
The second aim of the Kremlin is to launch the PR campaign in Belarus on necessity to increase the oil and gas prices to the world standards. Vladimir Putin understands that Aliaksandr Lukashenka can address the Belarusian people in a hysterical manner to support him and to come out against aggression of the Russian tycoons and the Kremlin. The Russian authorities cannot neutralize this kind of behavior, that’s why such arguments as “We waged war on the fascists together” or “Belarus is the only trustworthy ally” still exist.
The third aim of the Kremlin is not to frighten off Lukashenka and to continue the aggressive takeover of the Belarusian financial market. The banking system is being seized by the Russians very dynamically. The schemes to turn debts into Belarusian assets are being drawn up. It will take Russia another two years to take control of Belarus’ financial system, and then Moscow will be able to lay down its conditions to Lukashenka before the 2011 presidential election.
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev will try to act as the bad and good cops but there is no reason for believing that Belarus will be of slightly more importance to the new Russian President than it was to Vladimir Putin. So, Lukashenka’s lobbyists in Russia will go on supporting his regime, only at the expense of the Russian budget and discrimination of the Russian small and medium-size business.
Evidently, such boring issues as Belarus-Russia Union, single currency and unification of the laws will be on the agenda of the meetings between the Russian and Belarusian leaders. The parties will come to terms about the fight against NATO enlargement, the trade in arms and the cooperation between their special services and the Ministries of the Interior. Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin and Aliaksandr Lukashenka will certainly agree with each other over our “heroic past”, the actions of the USA and the Estonian revisionists.
If there are no upheavals, the Russian-Belarusian relations will not change until 2011. I want to stress one important thing. At present, time is not on Lukashenka’s side. With his inactivity and dogmatism of the old schemes he loses the initiative and control to Russia. At last, Russia came to realize that it would not place Belarus under its control quickly. That’s why Medvedev and Putin will be patiently waiting until the Belarusian economic “miracle” declines. However, they haven’t decided yet what to do then.
June 26, 2008
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