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THE BELARUSIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS
YAROSLAV ROMANCHUK,
President of the Minsk-based Mizes Center, Belarus
PRE-SUMMITSHOW-OFF OR A NEW STRATEGY?
When old schemes keep from new format of interaction
The issue of Gazprom’s gas price increase for Belarus has found a lodgment in the agenda of the Belarusian-Russian relations. Still, serious tensions have not yet emerged. There is an impression that the parties are just warming up and testing each other, like at a hippodrome when horsemen separate before starting a fight.
The conflict is obvious, but still it is unclear to what extent the parties are ready to deteriorate it and whether each of them has a strategy of their own to further mend the situation. No doubt it has nothing to do with the economic confrontation. In the framework of the so-called Union State, Russia has tried to do its utmost to encourage integration process up to unification.
A lot of preferences were offered by Russia: extremely low gas prices, perfectly advantageous schemes of the raw oil supplies, green light for the Belarusian goods in the Russian market, simplified loan procedure granted by the Russian government and a permission for the Belarusian enterprises to sell their commodities through the state purchase system, particularly within the constituents of the Russian Federation. The Kremlin has turned a blind eye to Belarus’ subsidizing its enterprises and dumping its Russian competitors in the domestic market. Without the state’s help, the prices of the latter lose their flexibility.
The political support rendered by Moscow was just as important for the official Minsk. Unconditional support lent by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Duma, the Cabinet, and the Kremlin for the Belarusian domestic and the foreign policy and Russia’s legitimization of all the pseudo-elections in Belarus – all of that may not have had a monetary equivalent, but its contribution to reinforcing and preserving the Belarusian regime.
Information support is another element of the large-scale campaign of backing up the official Minsk by Russia. It is the support rendered by the Russian regional and national mass media during the presidential election campaign in Belarus, the mild neutrality of the Russian television that broadcast the right people speaking the right words at the right time for the Belarusian electorate. Finally, it is the Russian politicians who stand out for the Belarusian regime. Not did leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhironovsky, Russian Security Council Secretary Vladimir Rushaylo, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov, Russian Prime-Minister Mikhail Fradkov, Chairman of the State Duma of Russia Boris Gryzlov, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, Director of the Russian FSB Nikolai Patrushev, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Alexius II have more or less favored Lukashenka, but Russia’s President Vladimir Putin himself has backed him up.
It is difficult to find another foreign-policy aspect which would undergo such a consolidated, and even unanimous Russia’s policy. But what is the reason for that? Is it Slavic friendship or nostalgia for the common past? Perhaps, it is very likely to be accounted for by the desire to become one state. Under Russia’s ferule, not that of Belarus.
The claim about “not mixing apples and oranges” has never been implemented. The time to form the supranational bodies has become a thing of the past. Having got Russia’s unprecedented financial and economic support, Belarus is not willing to give up either economic or political power. The parties have run into a deadlock. Of course, the status quo, that is the policy to change nothing, favors Lukashenka. Having been re-elected as the Belarusian President, he is not going to pay for Russia’s support the way it wants.
The conflict may be aggravated since the parties are interested in it. Putin and the Kremlin may obtain grounds for using the “heavy artillery” in the “dialogue” with Lukashenka. As regards Belarus, it is the world gas and oil prices, as well as the reciprocal trade protectionism in the economy, cessation of backing up the Belarusian regime in the foreign policy and of providing Belarus with the information support. These are the arguments that can result in appearance of a new pro-Russian force in Belarus or in changing Lukashenka’s position. At least, the Kremlin pins its hopes on it. It is important not to go too far, though, since there is a risk of economic, social and political destabilization. There is no point in Russia’s possessing Beltransgaz and gaining control over the oil processing, if the majority of the population and the elites of Belarus will chant the slogan “Russia, get away!” more and more often.
The conflict is advantageous to the Belarusian President as well. The background of his relations with the Kremlin can convince even a non-politician that Lukashenka will not give even a little bit of the sovereignty, he will not sell Beltransgaz, introduce the Russian ruble instead of the Belarus’ own currency, and he will not encourage forming the supranational bodies. As far as the interests of the official Minsk are concerned, Lukashenka’s operation on utilizing Russia and incorporating it in the schemes of realization of his own plans was managed brilliantly. Using the Russian money and resources he has raised the Belarusians’ self-identification immensely, he formed the powerful top bureaucracy clan that controls the entire economy and neutralized political competitors in Belarus – and all of that has been going on not for a year or two, but over the entire decade. The influence of the integration rhetoric, manipulating the Russian policy-makers and officials, who earn money by means of the Belarusian-Russian trade schemes, made it possible to maintain the Kremlin’s generosity.
After the events in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova the official Minsk came to realize that it’s about time to pay. To avoid this, they needed a conflict. The new gas prices, revision of the raw oil supply schemes give rise to shifting all the responsibility onto Russia. The pretext is already found: the price increase is a violation of the Treaty on the common economic space and which implies its collapse. The cause for withdrawal from the Treaty might just as well be the change in order of the VAT payment early in 2005, but Lukashenka wanted two years more of unprecedented good world state of market for oil products, cheap gas and the open Russian market. He has received it and, apart from that, he has been backed up at the referendum, then at the presidential elections, with simultaneous maintaining stringent protectionism policy towards the Russian goods in the Belarusian market.
No matter what Russia’s new price policy towards Belarus can be, the official Minsk will interpret any changes as a betrayal of the integration idea. The official Minsk will get opportunity to reestablish the customs boundary, to accuse Russia of everything, and to start the privatization (transformation of the political power into the economic) without Russia taking part in it. The former is likely to be held in form of the distribution of assets among the politically loyal people rather than through an open and fair auction. It is possible that Lukashenka’s lobbyists in the Kremlin will receive a certain share in return for lobbying the interests of the Belarusian authorities.
Lukashenka seeks an elegant way out of the socialist planned economy, as the Belarusian regime will soon run out of the sources which have been feeding it. On the other hand, it is necessary to look for new sources and adherents. Lukashenka is likely to share the economic power with the Belarusian bureaucratic establishment and the big private and state businesses. It would be more expensive for him to make compromises with Russia or the West in order to preserve his political power. When many decision-makers in Russia and Belarus need a conflict, it is sure to come. Any scheme of receiving political and economic annuity sooner or later wears itself out. At the present moment there are a lot of signs of the upcoming changes. However, one cannot say clearly that they will come. What is more, one cannot say how intense they will be for sure. So, it is difficult to exactly forecast the consequences of Russia’s changes in conduct. If reconsiderations occur solely in the gas sector, Belarus will see no dramatic changes. The authorities are preparing the enterprises and households for increase in gas prices. Those responsible for the upcoming tightening of the belts are known. The authorities assume it to be the consolidating factor in the years 2007 – 2008. If the increase in gas prices is accompanied by revision of the oil schemes, the blast of the Belarusian economy may reach 15 – 20% of the GDP. Such a blast would tell on any of the world’s economies (even the most competitive ones). The Kremlin certainly realizes that, so it will try to avoid the critical situation. However, it is very hard to control the force of the blast, therefore overkills are possible.
For 12 – 18 months after the increase in gas prices the Belarusian authorities will have to revise their budget and the exchange rate policy. They will face the problem of inflation and aggravation of the financial situation in the banking sector. As a result, thousands of enterprises will not be able to pay salaries, to manufacture their commodities in time and assure stability (the present Belarusian regime is based on it). As intensity of too many factors may not be predicted, there is no point in guessing how many months or years the Belarusian economy will keep floating. Thousands of small and medium enterprises today are incapable of handling the pressure. Right after the number of those enterprises reaches a sort of a critical mass, the country will surely witness political changes. The Kremlin would like to be in charge of this process, but as a matter of fact, there exists no one to actually be in charge of it. It looks like the perestroika (restructurization of the USSR’s economy in the years 1985 - 1991). They decided to improve the socialism. As the saying goes: “We tried our best, you know the rest”.
Each of the parties will be acting by the best of Byzantine policy traditions. Anybody will hardly dare to call things by their right names and to declare death of the Belarus-Russia Union (Union State). Unfortunately, there are virtually no brave policy-makers with the clear vision of the future in Russia and Belarus. The issue of the Union relations will be open, as long as it causes political and image damage to one of the parties. By the G8 Summit in St.-Petersburg the Belarusian-Russian relations will hard aggravate to the point when Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will share the G7 opinion. But the intercession cannot be expected, either. The Belarus issue will be examined at the level of the Foreign Ministries, but apart from stock phrases nothing can be expected from this discussion. There is still inertness in the policy of the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry. When Putin and his officials have no strategy of developing the relations with Belarus, there is nothing else left for them to do but to persist in their point of view: “Belarus is our issue. It’s non of your business. We will come to grips with the situation by ourselves”. As the West has no such strategy, either, the parties will hold on to their stands: the West will continue to make its political declarations and render minimum assistance to the Belarusian opposition, the Kremlin will keep the gas-oil and information “guns” loaded.
It is possible to avoid severe confrontation. Firstly, Lukashenka’s lobbyists in the Kremlin are not going to give up their rent. Secondly, when the severe political and psychological conflict is evident, the parties may come to think about the real partnership in the framework of the relations between two democratic and market states rather than to do the thinking in terms of the Soviet Union that ceased to exist many years ago. In any case, there will be a great number of the information sore points in the Belarusian-Russian relations until the end of 2006.
June 15, 2006
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