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IN SEARCH OF A FORMER GEORGIAN SSR SETTLEMENT
MICHAEL AVERKO,
New York based independent foreign policy analyst and media critic
The recently scheduled former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) talks broke down because of a lack of diplomatic creativity.
Russia arguably could and should have refrained from deciding on whether to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence. Doing so would have given the Kremlin a more honest broker status, without limiting its ability to implement policies. The continued non-recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence would make Russia more popular with Georgians. Among Georgians, there is a consensus that South Ossetia and Abkhazia are part of Georgia. Overall, Georgians are not as historically antagonistic towards Russia as some other peoples. The Russian game plan is better served by trying to gain influence in the entire former Georgian SSR.
It is difficult for Russia to change its decision to recognize Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. Several options serve as a possible means for reaching a mutually agreed settlement.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia can join a hypothetically created federation of former Georgian SSR territory as independent entities. The Georgians are likely to disagree with that suggestion.
Another option is based on what the Serbs advocate for Kosovo. This involves a settlement based on very broad autonomy as part of what has been understood to be an existing entity. The South Ossetians and Abkhaz have pretty much rejected this scenario.
A theoretical realization of overlapping realities can consider an outcome where South Ossetia and Abkhazia could become full United Nations (UN) and International Olympic Committee (IOC) members, in conjunction with their agreeing to be technically a part of Georgia - in a loosely affiliated status. Recall that Soviet era Ukraine and Belarus had UN membership and that the IOC has several non-nations as members (Chinese Taipai, Hong Kong, Puerto Rico and Palestine).
Russia will not be particularly pleased about this latter mentioned settlement idea because it contradicts Moscow's decision to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetian independence. The South Ossetians and Abkhazia might have reservations about it as well. To make this proposal agreeable, a few provisions could be permitted. They might include a continued Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, along with Russian citizenship rights for these two former Georgian SSR lands.
The last points will not be liked by the Georgian government at large. Their dilemma relates to having a limited ability in achieving a different plan of their liking.
As for the talked about Russia loses the PR war mantra (especially among more Russia friendly circles), it is perhaps time for the high profile Russian government affiliated/quasi-affiliated venues to consider utilizing other viable sources. In addition, Russian government policies can have an impact on how Russia is perceived. When compared to the Russian government's decision to recognize South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence, there is greater sympathy for Russia's counterattack against the August 7 Georgian government strike on South Ossetia. Note the stances taken by the Collective Security Organization (CSTO) and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The CSTO supports the Russian counterattack against the Georgian government, with none of its non-Russian members (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) recognizing Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. Tymoshenko has not criticized the Russian counterattack, while expressing support for the Georgian claims on South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
October 20, 2008
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