ZERKALO NEDELI: “WE SHOULD BECOME MORE SOBER-MINDED AND NATIONALLY SELFISH” - VALENTYN NALYVAICHENKO
Valentyn Nalyvaichenko, Acting Chief of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), was officially recalled from vacation on August 14, but he returned to his Kyiv office several days earlier – the morning after the attack on Tskhinvali. The ZN believes that under the Caucasian circumstances the SBU is going to bear the brunt of monitoring and preventive efforts against explosive situations and provocations in this country. Whether the SBU is ready to cope with it is a separate question, but the ZN decided to ask its chief other, no less important, questions.
- Ukrainian authorities have a vague idea about the armament potential, personnel and objectives of the Russian Black Sea Fleet which is stationed on our territory. The use of Russian warships in the military conflict with Georgia may indirectly draw Ukraine into this conflict or any other conflicts unless Ukraine takes effective control over the foreign troops on its territory. Do you see any possibility of Ukrainian authorities imposing such control and certain restrictions on the Black Sea Fleet?
- What Ukrainian authorities should begin with is a comprehensive inventory – accurate, well-organized, and absolutely transparent. Then they should take the military units temporarily stationed on our territory under full and systematic control – the way it is stipulated in the 1997 bilateral agreement and in international laws on the status of foreign vessels in a country’s territorial waters or at a particular pier. This legal basis empowers Ukraine to keep the Russian naval base under complete and regular control. The third step which Ukrainian authorities should take in the interests of national security is to establish the numerical strength, armament status, and functions of the Russian fleet. These steps are outlined in the August 13 resolution by the National Security and Defense Council and in the presidential decree that enacted the resolution. It must be understood that this decision is not anti-Russian and is absolutely consistent with our national interests. In international practice, if an issue is not regulated by international laws or bilateral agreements, then national legislation is applied.
- So you believe that it is possible to implement this presidential decree…
- Yes, by beginning to inspect all ships, including military vessels, entering or leaving the Sevastopol harbor. Moreover, we insist that Ukraine approach the United Nations and the OSCE and initiate the establishment of an ad hoc commission in which Georgia would participate as well. Firstly, such a commission, following international rules, would assess the damage caused by the Russian ships which are temporarily stationed on Ukraine’s territory. Secondly, it would establish a regime of control over the Russian Black Sea Fleet in line with UN and OSCE standards.
The SBU proposes inviting international experts to the BSF sub-commission of the Ukraine-Russia Interstate Commission. Each case of a Russian vessel’s departure from the base must be investigated. It is necessary to check whether Ukrainian authorities were notified about a ship’s movement and what weapons it carried when sailing from and back to Sevastopol. It is necessary to check the log and find out whether the ship was used counter to our legislation and international maritime laws.
-Does Ukraine have any idea of the cargoes delivered to the Russian naval base by air?
- Ukraine must have it, and that’s why I stress again: we must act calmly, considerately, and systematically. We need inventory, control, and expertise. Any movement of the ships and cargoes must be controllable. There is such control at the airports, but since this case is about military cargoes of a foreign state there must be comprehensive and tight border and customs control. Such cargoes are subject to complete certification. The certificates have to be verified and end users checked.
- It is obvious that Russia tries to limit the sovereign right of some post-USSR countries to their own foreign policy. Moscow controls some parts of these countries in various forms. By instigating and supporting separatist movements there the Kremlin may destabilize the situation in almost any CIS country. Ukraine has such a sore spot, too. It is Crimea. Is a similar scenario possible there?
- We are concerned about the activities of radical pro-Russian organizations. As you know, Ukrainian courts have banned most of them. One is Proryv [Russ. “Breakthrough”] headquartered in Transdniestria. Another is the Eurasian Youth Union – an extremist organization with nearly terrorist manifestations. It is banned as well. The organization Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia is now under investigation on criminal charges. It destabilized the situation in Crimea through illegal activities. It deliberately discredited Ukrainian authorities – both central and local. If we mean national security, we need to do away – once and for all –with the presence and provocative activities of such organizations.
- How are you going to do it?
- We have already done it. We only have to close the books on the Sevastopol-Crimea-Russia case and we have the assistance of prosecutors. If we complete this stage and go on to the next we can be sure that no destabilization scenario will work in Crimea. There are no objective grounds for a war in Crimea, and subjective provocative factors can be eradicated from this land by authorities.
But there is another factor – local authorities in Crimea. In this autonomous republic the central government should be represented not only by law enforcement agencies, but all the other ministries as well. The President’s policy should be represented there through the budget, social welfare programs, and a fight against corruption. The Crimean people should feel secure and enjoy all the constitutional rights of a Ukrainian citizen – from health care to education.
- Kyiv does have to formulate an integral policy for Crimea, but there is no unanimity of Ukrainian political forces on that score. Nearly half of them are oriented toward Russia.
- The most influential political forces – those relying on their electorate and national business structures – are for an integral Ukraine. Their business interests are closely tied to Crimea and they have serious investments and plans there. That’s why I say there are no social or economic reasons for increasing political tension in Crimea. At the same time, we understand that if national business structures are with the leadership, they should be motivated to invest in Crimea’s development through transparent tenders. The current practice looks like this: a tender is announced in one small newspaper and the next morning a Moscow company controlled by mayor Luzhkov turns out to be the winner… Such shadow tactics do a lot of harm to Crimea! Its residents should get maximum profit from business. Take, for instance, the piers and harbors: why do proceeds from the rent go anywhere but to the local budgets? The State Tax Service is now investigating two tax evasion cases in which BSF officials are involved. Direct losses sustained by Sevastopol city authorities due to underpaid taxes exceed UAH 6M [$1.3M]. Everything is all too clear: the more the Russian fleet pays the more money the city receives.
- There is a practicable idea: Ukraine pays out the rest of its state debt to Russia next year, and then Russia will have to pay the rent for its naval base directly. Of course, the land plots and facilities leased by the Russian BSF cost a lot more than the annual $97M which is subtracted from Ukraine’s debt. In nine years [remaining until the BSF deployment agreement expires] Ukraine could get nine times more than the $1.3 billion that remains to be cleared. Do you think this idea is expedient?
- It would be if we had objective data. I know a few people who negotiated the 1997 agreement with Russia and I know for sure that the sum of the debt allegedly accumulated between 1991 and 1997 was actually spun out of thin air… It’s high time we accepted civilized terms of relations. If we really are good and equal neighbors, then the rent must certainly correspond to actual economic and environmental costs. There must be true information about the leased land plots and facilities in Crimea and Russia must pay adequate rent.
- Moscow explained the invasion of South Ossetia by a need “to protect Russian citizens who were killed or endangered there.” Are there many citizens of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and Crimea in particular?
- The SBU does not control the number of foreign citizens. We are not the KGB and we don’t have such powers. We don’t supervise passport offices or consular departments of the Foreign Ministry. If you want to know the number, better ask them. As to the level of security of Russian citizens on Ukraine’s territory, it meets international standards. The Russians who spend their vacations at Crimean, Carpathian, and other resorts feel safe and secure. They have no problems when crossing the Ukrainian border – they cross it without visas or foreign travel passports. Ukraine is able to ensure the safety of foreigners on its territory and needs no help from outside, let alone military intervention. Those who respect Ukrainian laws feel quite comfortable in this country. So do foreign businesses. Look how they prosper in Kyiv! We don’t need any help from foreign special services or troops.
- In 2001 one of your predecessors told me about a plan to split Ukraine. Then such plans looked like fiction, but in 2004 they were in the focus of public debates. Do you think such plans are feasible today and is anyone working at them?
- Some special services resort to “dirty schemes”: they make up a menace, feed it to mass media, and then proudly report on “a successful preventive operation.” But that’s not our style. Your newspaper as well as many others exposed the authors of the “big split” scenario who showed provocative canvassing reels during the presidential race. That process involved more Ukrainians than foreign secret agents. In my opinion, attempts to split Ukraine began long before 2004. Ukraine was split by organized famines, and then the OUN and the UPA [Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists; Ukrainian Insurgent Army] tried so hard to reunite the nation. From archival documents I see very clearly that the scenario was written by the Stalin regime which starved to death and deported almost the entire Ukrainian population in the eastern part of the country and then moved people from other parts into the vacated houses. Deportations of Ukrainians to Kazakhstan and other USSR republics continued until the 1970s. The Soviet propaganda told everybody that the UPA was a small guerilla group that terrorized western Ukraine. We studied the archives and made calculations. As it turns out, up to half a million people took part in the liberation movement led by the UPA, but the scenario written by the NKVD [predecessor of the KGB] suggested two different parts of Ukraine. In fact, this country was one and with one idea of national liberation. The OUN operated in Donetsk, too. There never was any split. It was invented by Stalin’s ideologists, and then the country was bombarded by myths and terror.
- But some “country-splitting” myths are still used to enlist electoral support…
- We will do everything we can to dispel those myths and prevent such a scenario. So will other law enforcement agencies. But I believe that a lot more depends on the “civilian” agencies like the ministries of justice, education, culture, and others. If they do their job well, no scenarios will work and we will forget about them.
- What impact do you think the events in Georgia may have on Ukraine?
- It’s too early yet to make conclusions, but one thing is clear: we should become more sober-minded and nationally selfish.
- Do you provide timely and objective information?
- Reports are sent twice a day – at 8 a.m. and 8 p.m. If necessary, updated information can be provided at any minute. The SBU and the intelligence service collect and provide information, but then there is the question of responsibility for high-level decisions made on the basis of this information and their execution at the local level.
- That’s where you have problems…
- A presidential decree is not one man’s product. Before it is issued, it undergoes numerous preparatory stages in different offices. It is inadmissible to disregard presidential decrees. They are binding for all. How can it be that one half of the country complies with a law and the other half ignores it? The Sevastopol City Council is going to meet to decide how to help the western regions that suffered from the flood and, at the same time, to adopt a resolution on the situation in Georgia. What do the authorities of Sevastopol have to do with this issue of interstate relations? How can any city council raise the issue without taking into consideration the position of the Foreign Ministry, the President, and the Parliament? This is nothing but sheer ignorance of rules and norms of foreign policy.
- Do you think the events in Georgia kind of gave an answer to the question “Does Ukraine need an army at all?” Further developments are unpredictable and the future looks far from rosy. Maybe Ukraine should spend more on the army and tighten control over this spending?
- I won’t waste time on banal answers like “the army is part and parcel of the state.” Our army must be financed sufficiently and meet all European standards – from salaries and housing to weapons and equipment. Of course, the government must provide enough funds for modern defensive material – in keeping with the national defense strategy.
- We the SBU are ready to help by… becoming a non-military agency. The SBU and other special services could relinquish their military status and thus formally reduce the numerical strength of the Ukrainian army. Then the army would receive more funds and enjoy clear and favorable terms of subsistence.
- And still, is the Georgian scenario possible in Ukraine?
- I’m sure it’s impossible. Welfare, peace, and calm in Crimea make the point of synergy where Ukrainian and Russian interests coincide. All the rest is secondary.
Yulia MOSTOVAYA
“Zerkalo Nedeli”, Ukraine’s International Social Political Weekly, № 30 (709), 16 — 22 August 2008
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