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BELARUSIAN - RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION
YAROSLAV ROMANCHUK,
President of the Minsk-based Mizes Center
EURASIAN HOME: “The visit of Belarusian opposition leaderAliaksandr Milinkevich to Russia in the beginning of November was not advertised. How do you assess this visit? Did Milinkevich meet with the Russian authorities or just with businessmen and the right liberals?”
The format of meetings is usually determined by two parties. Since Aliaksandr Milinkevich needs publicity (he needs to introduce himself, promote his team and his election program), it was definitely the Russian party, who had chosen not to advertise his visit. And it is logical. Firstly, it was the first high-level meeting of the Belarusian presidential candidate from democratic forces with the Russian policymakers. Secondly, the meeting was held before the summit of the Russian and Belarusian Presidents. There is a chance that the Kremlin will use ‘agreements’ with Milinkevich to make Lukashenka sign the most favored in Moscow Constitutional Act version of the Belarus-Russia Union.
As a matter of fact, the Kremlin is not ready to acknowledge the Belarusian democratic forces as its partner and to render them assistance. I believe that the situation may change if Milinkevich’s poll rating hits 25-30%.
Milinkevich faces a very difficult task. He has to dispel some common myths. The main myth is that the Belarusian democratic opposition is an anti-Russian force. It is not true. This force is ‘pro-Belarusian’. These people just want to live in their country, speak their language, develop national economy, cooperate and be on friendly terms with the West and the East. There is nothing anti-Russian in their program. The recognition of the right to pursue national interests of Belarus (different from those established by Lukashenka) – that is the main demand of the Belarusian democratic forces nowadays. The fact that Milinkevich’s visit to Moscow hasn’t been brought to public’s attention shows that Russia is not yet ready for such a deal.
As for the Belarus-Russia Union, the attitude to this amorphous and ineffective establishment cannot be positive. The main problem is it does not exist de facto. There exist only ambitions of some politicians. I’d say the Belarus-Russia Union is an integration phantom, which is advantageous for some powerful Russian and Belarusian oligarchs who make money on trade flows between Russia and Belarus. They do not need competitors. So, those people who are against the trade barriers between Russia and Belarus and who advocate the four freedoms principle (free movement of goods, services, money and labor) are not satisfied with the current format of the Belarusian-Russian relations.
Two countries have lately moved away from each other, and it is necessary to start building the relations from the very beginning. I cannot speak for the whole Belarusian opposition. I believe that the creation of the Belarusian-Russian joint venture on the basis of Beltransgaz is a very profitable width=100% project for democratic and free Belarus and even for that part of Belarus which strives for joining the EU. I’m not afraid of the Russian investments in Belarus, on the contrary, I welcome them. The very important thing which needs to be done is the laying down of the single set of rules for all the investors. More than that, I would offer Russia to construct one more gas pipeline though the territory of Belarus that would be entirely Russian. It is advantageous for Belarus to become the center of the Russia’s gas transit.
Relations with Russia will be one of the topics in Milinkevich’s election program. No doubt, he is a patriot of his country. It means that he will encourage the four freedoms principle implementation. It would be an excellent test of the quality of Russian and Belarusian political systems and a good drill before entering a more competitive European market.
EURASIAN HOME: “What is the opposition’ rating in Belarus?”
The electoral preferences in Belarus are quite stable. Lukashenka has his firm supporters (about 20-25% of voters). Now his poll rating is between 45 and 48%. At first sight, it is high, but it will never reach 75–80%, which the Belarusian authorities hope to get in each presidential campaign. As for Milinkevich, for the time being his poll rating is zero. There are about 20% citizens who stand for democratic changes. These people are ready to vote for the single opposition candidate right now. Milinkevich needs to promote his image. It’s been one month and a half since his election as a single opposition candidate. His promotion campaign has just started.
EURASIAN HOME: “How would you characterize Milinkevich as a leader? How popular is he?”
Aliaksandr Milinkevich is a cultured, intelligent and decent man. He is a zealous advocate of democratic changes, supremacy of law and market-oriented reforms. As Milinkevich feels he is not good at Economics, he prefers to rely on the opinions of the professionals in the field of the structural economic reforms. He is an active advocate of the civil society and one of the founders of the NGOs network “Resource centers”.
Milinkevich knows how to manage organizations and to work with people, as he was the Deputy Mayor of the city of Grodno. During the election campaign of 2004 he easily collected over 10 thousand signatures (the district comprised about 70 thousand voters) in his support in a rural region that was supposed to vote for Lukashenka. He would win the elections if they were actually held. Milinkevich has also experience in taking part in a presidential campaign as well. In 2001 he was the head of the stag of one of the democratic candidates.
EURASIAN HOME: “It is believed that the vote count will not be fair. What will be the Belarusian scenario after the elections?”
Very few Belarusians believe in fair elections and transparent vote count. The fraud schemes are well known and already tested. That is why it is naive to hope that the Belarusian elections would be held even according to the Russian standards that are either not so good. So, Milinkevich would have to take pains to encourage people to support. 17% of the Belarusians say that they are ready to go into the streets in order to protect their democratic choice. But it is unknown how many people would actually do that and whether there would be anybody at all who would do that.
There is one more scenario – that is to arrange meetings against Lukashenka’s standing in the elections. That would also require mobilization of democratic forces. The opposition is intended to work on this scenario as well. The Belarusian post-election political development would to a large extent depend on decisions that are now being made in Moscow. If Russia sets market prices on gas, electrical power and oil for Belarus, if oil prices come down, and if Russia adopts similar to Belarus’ protectionist measures, the financial situation in Belarus would no doubt worsen. A question on rising utilities rates would be raised. There would appear a lack of money to pay pensions. The budget would be short of money to implement investment programs. And only then the voters would alter their attitude towards the current Belarusian authorities. There is some possibility that it might happen before the elections, but it is really teeny. Anyway, time works against Lukashenka. Lately he has issued a lot of decrees in order to concentrate power. If the external economic and political trends worsen dramatically, the only thing he would be able to do is to carry out reforms. Even though today it seems to be unlikely, the country might simply run out of money to peruse the current policy.
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