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POLITICAL SITUATION IN BELARUS BEFORE THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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YAROSLAV ROMANCHUK,
President of the Minsk-based Mizes Center

BELARUS LIVING IN FEAR

The decision to hold presidential elections on March 19, 2006 was not a surprise for the Belarusian opposition. It was one of the predictable case scenarios, which depended on the development of relations between Minsk and Moscow . Aliaksandr Lukashenka could not be luckier. Being an experienced politician, he turned gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine to his advantage. All of a sudden the Union State leaders Aliaksandr Lukashenka and Vladimir Putin announced that they didn’t have any problems with each other, even though not one of the earlier commitments was met.

Lukashenka has once again found a bean in the cake. He should have sent ‘Thank you cards’ to the Russian and Ukrainian governments. This gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine has considerably diminished concerns regarding Belarus. Vladimir Putin who didn’t like Belarus’ policy for years (Lukashenka refused to set up a joint venture on the basis of “Beltransgas”, closed the country for the Russian investors, and refused to put the Russian ruble in circulation in Belarus) has all of a sudden announced that Russia doesn’t have any problems with Belarus.

The Kremlin and the Russian bureaucracy in general needed some ally. And under these circumstances any ally (even Lukashenka) would be good. Belarusian President figured that out pretty quickly and went to the Russian city of Sochi. Earlier his meeting with the Russian President had been put off at least three times. The trick was to meet Putin at the right time. So at the right time Lukashenka was there and “sold” his loyalty to buy what he needed as much as the breath of his life – a blessing for another term of presidency, a blessing for election frauds and their approval from Russia, regardless of what the EU, the U.S. and the OSCE would say. But for the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the government and “Gazprom” could have demanded certain compromise from Lukashenka by threatening that they would deny him political support and raise prices for gas. Just to remind, Lukashenka used a similar emotional momentum (in autumn 2004, right after the tragedy in Beslan) to push through a referendum on his right to once again run for the post of the president. That’s why the first greeting card should go to Moscow, and the second one – to Kyiv. Lukashenka understands that the Ukrainian political and business elites will first and foremost focus on the parliamentary elections in their home country. The U.S. and the EU will watch these elections too. So, who will care about another political campaign in Belarus?

As for the Belarusian opposition, it tries its best. Thanks to the fact that there was elected a single opposition candidate, democratic forces now have over 5000 people ready to help his campaign on. Provided that the candidate headquarters work well, even more people can be involved in the campaign. Offices are set up in the regions. The program is being developed. Resources are being pulled up. There is neither any confusion in the opposition, nor euphoria. The democratic opposition is ready to perform as it is possible under these circumstances: the opposition doesn’t have an access to the national mass media and doesn’t have other recourses at its disposal to carry out a full-fledged campaign. Despite all of that there are good reasons to believe that this presidential election will turn out to be more successful for the opposition than the election of 2001. One thing is clear even now: the confrontation will not end on March 19 for either Lukashenka or the opposition. However, taking into account all the factors that are against Lukashenka this confrontation may continue even to the end of 2006.

Vladimir Putin has provided his support to Lukashenka once again. Not because he likes him, but because Moscow has not developed any clear long-term strategy towards the former Soviet republics yet. When big decisions are made in the heat of emotions, nothing good happens. I am pretty sure that Russia will someday regret this support.

Lukashenka’s decision to hold presidential elections in March 2006 was also influenced by the U.S. policy. Belarusian government is still praying for a good health of George W. Bush and the leaders of the OPEC countries, who caused oil prices to skyrocket as never before. Thanks to that the Belarusian leader together with the Arab sheikhs and the Russian oligarchs could dramatically increase profits from oil processing and sales. But that’s not the only thing that Lukashenka should be thankful to the Americans for.

There is no doubt that the Americans will support the democratic opposition in Belarus more than anybody else. However, in comparison with the other countries, their contribution to the democratic movement in Belarus is negligibly small. The U.S. tried much harder in Georgia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In Belarus, however, Washington helps the opposition to stay alive, but up till now no efforts to cause serious troubles to the current Belarusian regime have been made. Whether America can’t do it or doesn’t want to do it or simply doesn’t care – that’s not that important. Many of the American projects are the long-term plans and they are not necessarily focused on the presidential elections of 2006. However, during the last year the U.S. policy regarding Belarus has become much more coordinated. It seems Lukashenka decided that it was better not to wait any longer in this situation. What if Condoleezza Rice will suddenly take Belarus to heart?

As for the EU, its policy towards Belarus looks very immoral and hypocritical. It’s been long since Belarusian democrats started negotiating with the different structures of the EU. So far the EU prefers to support its missions on Bahamas and in Nepal. The EU successfully uses all kinds of bureaucratic procedures to cut off pro-European forces in Belarus. They arrange conferences, round tables and seminars. They issue resolutions and make statements, but that’s where the European support to Belarusian democrats stops. Somehow the EU still believes that every decision regarding Belarus should be made only in accordance with Moscow’s position. The Baltic states, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia are against such approach but with the silent indifference of Germany, France, Great Britain and Sweden the UE keeps being indecisive when it comes to Belarus. Lukashenka understands it and blesses his star for such a luck. However during the last months even indifferent Europeans have started being somewhat active. Before a capable Euro-American alliance is formed Lukashenka is in a hurry to hold presidential elections. So the EU is also responsible for what will happen in Belarus in spring of 2006. However nothing indicates so far that this fact somehow touches the Europeans.

Since it is impossible to hold elections in Belarus even according to the not so perfect Russian standards, the results of the political campaign called “presidential election” are easy to predict. Lukashenka will get from 78.3 percent to 84.2 percent of votes. The second in the list will get about 10-15 percent, provided that it is the single opposition leader, or even less than that if it would be MP Siarhiej Hajdukievich, who is very predictable.

The opposition relies on the voters, who don’t support the current regime. But those will be the security services, who will get to know the opposition electorate number. We’ll be able to get this information only if we manage to arrange exit polls.

Lukashenka knows what fear is. There are a number of business groups in Belarus that control considerable money flows and resources. But long ago established rules of profit distribution cannot be satisfactory for everyone. Belarusian oligarchs begin fighting. To punish one and to encourage another Lukashenka has to hold political campaigns all the time. He should constantly prove that he has strong political support. Fear of the homeland oligarchs and their partners abroad was the first factor that led to the decision to hold presidential elections earlier.

Lukashenka is also afraid of his own officials. Both Russia and the opposition started influencing them. Many are tired of their status of faceless officials guarding the riches accumulated by the regime. There is this new generation of young officials, striving for successful carrier, ready to do anything it takes to get rid of their older colleagues. There are lots of place hunters competing for offices and herein there is a critical shortage of professional managers and economists.

Another reason for Lukashenka to have a headache is the workers of the large state enterprises. Without much effort those workers make $ 350-400, which with the reduced utilities cost allows them to have a pretty good life. They are definitely spoilt by the current regime, which forgot to warn them that one is supposed to work hard to earn his living, and that money doesn’t appear out of nowhere. Parasitic attitude is so obvious now that Lukashenka even said he had overdone with the state regulation and it was time to start fighting bureaucracy. Early elections are necessary to stir up officials and to give people a few sacrificial “lambs” for a slaughter. The “lambs” will be chosen from the directors of enterprises and local and republican authorities.

The second reason of Lukashenka’s fear is democratic forces in Belarus. Even though they have to survive in a much harder conditions than those in Georgia or Ukraine, they’ve managed to consolidate their efforts, to choose a leader, to create headquarters all over the country and to start preparing for the election campaign. Even though Aliaksandr Milinkevich is not a charismatic leader, it would be very possible to bring to Belarusian Maidan anywhere from 50 to 80 thousand people at the first stage of fight for power. Young people, entrepreneurs, workers, businessmen, Protestants and Polish community, all these groups could have come to protest against Lukashenka’s regime.

The work has begun. And there are first positive signs. The poll rating of Milinkevich, the candidate from the opposition is steadily coming up. No wonder Lukashenka started being nervous, what if by the middle of summer he would get a much stronger opponent than the one he had in 2001? On top of that there are plans to launch a radio station, broadcasting from Poland to Belarus. The Poles became way too active in Europe, trying to get the resources to support democracy in Belarus via mass media projects.

The third factor of Lukashenka’s fear is the country’s economy. The directors of state enterprises and private companies are good at distorting facts in their reports. But all kinds of upward distortion can neither conceal nor cancel upcoming stagnation. The GDP growth rate is dangerously low. The budgetary gab is getting bigger and bigger. The growth in customer deposits has slowed down. Enterprises and government are trying hard to comply with the order to raise salaries up to $ 250 by the end of 2005. At the same time it is impossible to increase labor productivity with the out-of-date machinery, current tax burden and exceeding bureaucracy. The workers started grumbling. Demographic crisis is threatening the state budget in near future. Soon to support the bank system they will have to print even more money. And there is no reason to hope that the high prices on main export goods (oil products, potash fertilizer, and metals) will grow or at least remain the same. Understanding that unbelievably favorable combination of circumstances will not last long, Lukashenka didn't want to risk and wait until July when it would be extremely difficult to conceal the signs of the upcoming crisis.

The forth reason for him to be worried is Russia. Sooner or later the tension between Russia and Ukraine will go down. The countries will go back to normal relations. With possible decrease of oil price in the world market, prices for gas will go down automatically, which will cause difficulties with the budget in Russia. “Gasprom” will raise prices for gas not only for the inner consumers, but for Belarus as well. With the new economic crises developing, Vladimir Putin will need some political victories on the international arena and a good one would be integration with Belarus. What Russian authorities mean by integration one can get from the Kremlin policy regarding Ukraine during the Orange Revolution and the current gas conflict. Knowing that Moscow’s embrace may cause him suffocation, Lukashenka once again decided to play on emotions of the Kremlin imperialists. It won’t feel right to talk about integration after another political campaign in Belarus with lots of slogans proclaiming independent Belarus.

And finally there is this human factor of Lukashenka’s fear. He is fearful and he is alone. There is hardly anybody in the world whom Lukashenka would trust. He sees plots and crafty designs in everything. Such attitude leads to a life under constant stress. The world is rapidly changing. More and more Belarusian people think it is pure absurd that Lukashenka is still trying to go back to the Soviet ideology, to the oppressing regime with its “Volgas”, its rusty clothes, and strict limitations on the trips abroad. It seems like the current regime in Belarus is doomed to fail. Even if on March 20, 2006 its leader proclaims another “glorious” victory.




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