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THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES: FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ORGANIZATION
YAROSLAV ROMANCHUK,
President of the Minsk-based Mizes Center, Belarus
Eurasian Home: “In your opinion, what is the main reason for calling off the CIS anniversary summit? To what degree is it due to deterioration in the Russian-Belarusian bilateral relations?”
It seems that the CIS format no longer satisfies the leaders of the member-states even as a platform where debates could be held. The leaders of the post-Soviet Republics have failed to build working atmosphere, not to speak about friendly relations. Vladimir Putin has more close and trustful relations with President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, while Belarusian leader Aliaksandr Lukashenka stays apart from the decision-making process within the CIS framework. As a result all decisions are generated and discussed in Moscow and Astana. And Lukashenka having wasted his advantageous image of integrator is no longer confident of his role in the negotiation process and within the new integration structure if one is ever to be created.
Vladimir Putin and Nursultan Nazarbayev had their reasons to call off the CIS anniversary summit. Absence of a fixed date of the summit reveals that the future of the Organization itself is under question. Should the meeting take place on October 17 Moscow would feel disadvantaged at least for four reasons. To begin with Lukashenka would use the CIS summit as a chance to bring pressure on Moscow on the issue of the Russian gas price. Making much ado about the oil and gas prices is the last argument for Minsk that doesn’t want to put up with new pricing for the Russian energy resources.
It is evident that Tbilisi would also advance claims to Moscow. And Chisinau would do the same. Like Georgia Moldova has purely economic claims to Russia, but apart from that it wants to finally settle the Transnistria conflict which is impossible unless Moscow changes its stance on the issue. Finally, Ukraine has its list of claims to Russia. President Putin, for all evidence, just was not ready to lend an ear to the claims of his CIS counterparts.
In order to give a more or less adequate ground for calling off the CIS summit Moscow has secured the backing of Kazakhstan charged with elaborating and implementing the CIS reform. On the one hand it is easier for Kazakhstan to initiate transformation of the CIS structure, as it didn’t participate in the CIS legislative genesis in times of the 1991 Belavezha Accords in Visculi (Belarus). But on the other hand the political landscape has been immensely altered since the Soviet Union collapse, and now we are facing a new geopolitical reality. In this new reality the countries forming the so-called CIS block have more conflicts and problems than cooperation initiatives and profit from integration. The CIS failed to prove its effectiveness as a framework for actual economic integration, as an Organization that would maximize benefit from the regional specialization of labor and even as a system of checks in the overt armed conflicts between the member-states.
Kazakhstan is unlikely to propose any bailout reform of the CIS for it is next to impossible to make all the oppositely directed forces work together. For Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova CIS is a temporary shield for the time of negotiations on Euro-Atlantic integration. They are quite satisfied with the existing format of yearly meetings of the state leaders for exchange of opinions. Belarus needs Russia’s cheap resources and access to the Russian markets with the parallel discrimination of the Russian imports in its internal markets.
Minsk will not initiate the secession process on its own – Lukashenka is already in isolation. Alternative vectors of his foreign policy oriented to Venezuela, Cuba, Iran and China don’t prove to be viable projects – all these attempts rather signify the CIS crisis in conditions of a standoff with the West. If Minsk had some guaranteed instruments of coordination with Ukraine and Moldova on the one hand and the EU on the other it wouldn’t need the CIS format. But for the time being there are no such vectors in Lukashenka’s foreign policy.
But two most serious stakeholders need CIS. These are Russia and Kazakhstan. Their economic situations, boosting ambitions in foreign policy make these states seek to create effective integration structures. If Putin and Nazarbayev don’t want to be remembered as political leaders of the high oil prices epoch they will come forward with a CIS reform that would be equal to creating new organization with real obligations of all the parties. If other member-states torpedo this initiative, Russia and Kazakhstan might initiate a new organization in 2007. It is difficult to say what countries would join this new organization – Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan are likely to accept this offer. But there is another scenario: if the Kremlin feels that it is in vulnerable position it will give up all new initiatives, and the cooperation within the CIS will be frozen. Former members will simply neglect the agreement and the organization will employ ex-politicians and bureaucrats.
Eurasian Home: “Is it possible that Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka will accept Russia’s conditions on gas pricing? Are the parties likely to strike a compromise?”
As the things stand today with the gas prices Minsk insists on being charged on the same tariff as the western part of Russia. Lukashenka’s government insists on preserving equal operational environment on the territory of the so-called Union State. In effect, there have never been equal conditions for Russia and Belarus within the Union State.
Lukashenka has been driven into the corner. He has done it himself by means of his political line. He should adopt a resolution and insist on the government to make the 2007 budget considering new gas pricing and new oil supply schemes. The present budget draught is based on the former pricing. For neither Ministry of Finance nor the Council of Ministers dare to say: “It’s high time we face the new reality of economic relations with Russia”. Belarusian government can’t make essential legal and economic decisions. Political establishment of Belarus still hopes that Lukashenka will make Russia adopt his vision. And the President doesn’t even want to think he may fail to do so and thus may disappoint his team.
Under these circumstances it would be logical for Minsk to seek compromise with Moscow, to negotiate asset sales, crediting and further economic cooperation strategy. But there is no serious attempt to start such negotiations. Everyone is waiting for President Lukashenka to give the green light to the process. The valuation of assets of the Beltransgas has already been done. We are not given the numbers but we know the President’s position on the perspectives of the Beltransgas’ sale. Evidently, the gas issue will be debated in the near future and this debate won’t make the Russian-Belarusian relations even more reserved. Calling off the CIS summit makes Lukashenka rethink his pressure tactics towards Moscow. Taking into consideration the current developments in bilateral relations holding the CIS summit till the end of this year is highly improbable.
October 18, 2006
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