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IRANIAN PRESIDENT MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD ON A VISIT TO ASHGABAT AND DUSHANBE
ANDREY GROZIN,
Head of the Institute of the CIS Countries’ Department of Central Asia and Kazakhstan Studies, Moscow
The visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, which lasted four days (July 24-27), should be considered to be a part of the single policy that is formed by the Iranian President.
Iran’s nuclear program is still on the agenda. Due to the Lebanese-Israeli conflict this problem was pushed into the background, but it is temporary. It is confirmed by the latest words of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about necessity to exert strong pressure on Iran.
In other words, American officials and politicians have been absorbed in the Iranian situation. This shows that the possibility of serious pressure on Iran, up to the use of force, is on the agenda of the U.S. Department of State.
Given the current situation, it comes natural that Iran desires to expand its foreign influence. The U.S. tough policy may result in Iran’s turning into a rogue state. Tehran can avoid that through expanding its own influence on the neighboring countries. Therefore, Iran displays so much interest towards Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
It should be said that Turkmenistan has always maintained stable relations with Iran. While Turkmenistan’s relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey were shifting from friendship to tension, its relations with Iran have remained unchanged under the former and current presidents.
Iran has always occupied a certain niche in Turkmenistan’s economy. It is less important than that of Russia or Turkey, but it is stable. True, in terms of investment flows Turkmenistan regards Iran as less attractive than Gazprom and even Ukraine in spite of its debts in the gas supply payments. Ukraine’s payment of the Turkmen gas exceeds the incomes from cooperation with Iran.
As regards Tajikistan, besides the factor of Iran’s foreign expansion in Central Asia, it is essential to take into account the historical and ethnic kinship of the both countries. Among all of the Central Asian post-Soviet republics Tajikistan had little to do with the Turkic countries.
Dushanbe has always considered Tehran to be its serious partner. It is worth remembering that despite Russia’s significant contribution Iran also encouraged the wrap-up of the civil war in Tajikistan. The factor of historical, cultural and ethnic kinship is of importance even at the present time.
I think that the Afghan President’s participation in the negotiations with the Tajik and Iranian leaders is not a prototype of the creation of a triple alliance of the Farsi language states. It is an extremely far prospect since now the Afghan authorities are not independent and they are not able to implement such large-scale geopolitical projects.
The same is true about Tajikistan. Having initiated the creation of the Farsi language alliance and having joined it, Dushanbe will lose many advantages that it receives due to its multi-vector policy. Tajikistan may lose financial aid from Russia, the USA and China. The one-vector course disavows the positive points of the current foreign policy of Tajikistan.
Apart from that, the U.S. active pressure on Iran is sure to concern its partners and, of course, allies against the background of the improvement of the relations between Tajikistan and the USA for the last two years.
Thus, it is ahead of time to speak about the creation of the Farsi language triple alliance. This is also confirmed by the results of the Iranian President’s visit. In general, all of the parties have done their work and reached their goals. Iran applied efforts to expand its influence on its neighbors. Turkmenistan tried to solve the problems connected with the necessity to develop the gas pipeline network. On the eve of the presidential election in November 2006, Tajikistan showed that the country’s leader Emomali Rahmonov and the country itself are big players that are able to hold negotiations on important political problems.
Besides, there are statements on the investment participation in the project of construction of the Anzob tunnel in Tajikistan and expansion of the gas pipeline network with Turkmenistan.
All of those decisions are of no danger to Russia. Iran’s opportunity in those countries is not able to compare with Russia’s role. Russia excels Iran in the volume of gas pumping alone (according to the “Central Asia-Centre”) by a factor of ten. Moscow’s influence in the security sphere cannot be compared to Tehran’s opportunity either. I believe that Iran cannot replace Russia and to oust it from Central Asia and the USA can do.
July 28, 2006
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