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SHADE OF KOSOVO OVER GEORGIA
ZAAL ANJAPARIDZE,
Political analyst, Tbilisi
The pending recognition of independence of the Serbian province Kosovo by the United Nations and attempts by Russia to apply the “Kosovo precedent” to the conflict zones in the post-Soviet space might reverberate negatively for Georgia. Two secessionist Georgian regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia have long been claiming that Kosovo precedent must contribute to the recognition of their independence.
President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed the Russian attitude to the Kosovo and the conflicts in the former Soviet Union during the meeting with his Georgian counterpart Mikheil Saakashvili in St. Petersburg on June 9. Putin boldly stated that ignorance of the principle of territorial integrity of the state in Balkans “creates problems for us [Russia] in the post-Soviet space.”
By this “introduction” Putin more than clearly communicated to Saakashvili Moscow’s plans and simultaneously gave the Georgian leader a room for political bargain when stated “I think we will be able to return back to this issue during our conversation now and also tomorrow [at an informal CIS summit].” Actually, Putin invited Saakashvili for a political bargain. It is an open secret that Russia is using conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as one of the means to prevent Georgia’s accession to NATO. Perhaps, Russia will continue to pressure Georgia by this method.
Hardly the Putin’s “provocative” statement in St. Petersburg could surprise Saakashvili because Putin aired the same attitude to Kosovo and the conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia on June 1, during the interview with foreign journalists before the G8 summit. On June 4, at a joint news conference in Moscow, a symptomatic fact itself, Sergey Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoity, self-styled presidents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, only reworded Putin’s thoughts when stated that Kosovo precedent creates favorable conditions for independence of these secessionist regions.
The placatory statements and comments by Georgia’s Western allies and some pundits about inadmissibility and impossibility of applying “Kosovo precedent” to breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia must not calm Georgian political leadership. The reason for a legitimate concern is that the ”Kosovo model” evidently creates a precedent of the ethnic conflict settlement, which is no longer based on the previously inviolable principle of preservation of territorial integrity of the state where these conflicts had erupted.
The intention of the Western community to award Kosovo independence obviously doubles problems for Georgia in its efforts to find a negotiable political solution to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists are highly likely to use the ‘Kosovo precedent’ at their negotiations with Tbilisi.
The new approach, which the West has opted for the ethnic conflicts settlement dealing loosely with the principle of states’ territorial integrity, has put Georgia and its pro-western government in a quite awkward situation and might become a source of political destabilization in the country.
Noteworthy, after looking over situation in Georgian conflict zones, the influential International Crisis Group has offered to set up an informal consultative group with participation of the US, EU and Russia to assist the parties to renew a dialogue. However, if this group is set up indeed, the "Kosovo precedent" will obviously be present on the agenda. Nowadays Georgia behaves like Serbia and offers its breakaway regions only wide autonomy within the Georgian state. Tbilisi is trying to achieve this goal by creating pro-Georgian provisional administration in South Ossetia’s Georgian enclave and reanimation of the exiled pro-Georgian Abkhaz government in the Georgia-controlled Kodori valley of Abkhazia. Tbilisi risks pushing for changes too fast and its assertiveness in this direction can contribute to a dangerous rise in tensions and play into the hands of Russia, which is nurturing a plan of luring Georgia into an armed conflict. Though Tbilisi is eager to change the peacekeeping format as well as the status quo in the secessionist regions, its efforts still lack the needed level of international support.
International political situation and correspondingly interests of the major political players are changing rapidly bringing changes to once untouchable principles of the international order, including national borders. Hardly anyone, including Georgia’s newly acquired allies can and will grant Georgia the “immunity,” which could have protected the country from changing its national borders. The realities and challenges of globalization era dictate new rules, which among other changes might lead to the new political geography in the visible future – the issue, which is extremely sensitive for the small states like Georgia suffering from existing and potential territorial disputes.
The emerging new challenges with regard to Abkhazia and South Ossetia must logically lead Georgian leadership to the understanding of the urgent need of the genuinely new ideas and proposals for settlement of these conflicts. These proposals must be acceptable for the Abkhazians and Ossetians simultaneously comply with the interests of the international players. Georgian national interests have long become a hostage of the interests and aspirations of international players and this factor significantly influences the country’s domestic and foreign policies.
June 13, 2007
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