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TBILISI IS WAITING FOR “HELPING HAND”
ZAAL ANJAPARIDZE,
Political analyst, Tbilisi, Georgia
It is as difficult to draw conclusions and make forecasts after a political event as before it. One can say that, in the main, the majority of the forecasts concerning the “Georgian issue” came true during the Moscow negotiations between the U.S. and Russian Presidents. Predictably, the sides stated the difference of opinions on the issue. Only the forecast made by Andrey Illarionov, former adviser to the Russian President, did not come true. He said that another Russia-Georgia war would break out exactly on July 6, 2009. The forecast didn’t stand any chance to come true. There are no political suicides in the Kremlin in spite of all inadequacy, unpredictability and non-transparency of the Russian policy.
The results of the Moscow summit generated as many issues about Georgia. Judging by the public statements by Barack Obama, for the time being Georgia will not be a small change between the U.S. and Russia.
I believe that Barack Obama managed to avert another Russia-Georgia war and now Tbilisi is arguing more confidently that Russia’s war threat has been prevented. The question is for how long.
Meanwhile, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s sudden visit to Tskhinvali right after his meeting with Barack Obama makes it possible to think that the “Georgian issue” was of great importance during the U.S.- Russia meetings in Moscow and the G8 summit. One can expect that the issue will be acute and important on the agenda of the bilateral relations in the foreseeable future as well. This is indirectly shown by the challenging nature of Medvedev’s visit to Tskhinvali. I believe that everyone understands whom, besides Tbilisi, the challenge was addressed.
Despite the fact that Obama’s administration follows more weighed and reserved policy towards Georgia than George Bush’s administration did, this does not mean that the U.S. will penetrate into region in a less intense way, which Obama made it more than clear in Moscow.
The Moscow officials realize it well and they will resist the process to the extent of their abilities that are getting worse and worse. The Moscow officials can do that maintaining the “managed destabilization” in Georgia when the authorities and the opposition would fight against each other to exhaust themselves and creating new seats of tension in the Georgian regions with centrifugal tendencies. The predominantly Armenian-populated Javakheti would most likely be one of such regions.
Given the current situation, Georgia can reckon on maturity of its society and non-admission of civil confrontation on the one hand, and on the assistance from the West and, particularly, from the U.S on the other hand. Now the Charter on the U.S. – Georgia Strategic Cooperation will show how efficient it is.
However, it is more and more difficult for the West to balance between its wish to keep Georgia as its potential ally and its intention to successfully cooperate with Russia in a whole number of the important issues (Iran, South Korea, Afghanistan, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, international terrorism and others).
The statement by Obama that NATO seeks cooperation with Russia rather than confrontation and his words about “secure frontiers” produced a dual feeling about Georgia’s prospects to join NATO in the foreseeable future and about the fulfillment of Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement.
The main question is what Georgia would gain or lose from those geo-strategic games. The clash of interests of the West and Russia in Georgia has already cost Georgia the occupation and actual loss of about 20% of its territories.
July 22, 2009
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