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GEORGIAN OPPOSITION IS PREPARING FOR SPRING PROTESTS
ZAAL ANJAPARIDZE,
Political analyst, Tbilisi
All sensitive points, including the hint that Russia-Georgia war has not been finished yet, have been removed from the carefully edited annual report, delivered by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in the Parliament on February 12 and published on the presidential Internet site.
However, what local analysts and opposition considered most noteworthy in Mr Saakashvili’s report was his statement that despite the lost war and the lost national territories, he is going to fully serve his presidential term that expires in 2013.
Saakashvili said that interests of the state and the population should not be sacrificed to political infighting and his government had enough resources to maintain political stability in the country this year too. Therefore, Mr Saakashvili made it more than clear to his opponents that the authorities would suppress any efforts to change power forcibly. It appears that Mr Saakashvili and his team have good reasons to feel confidently.
Meanwhile, opposition forces, which are preparing for their “Spring offensive” against the authorities, agree about ousting Saakashvili, but they disagree over ways of doing that.
While the political group “Alliance for Georgia”, led by Irakli Alasania, former Georgian ambassador to the UN, is doing its utmost to act within the constitutional framework and to remove Saakashvili through the referendum, other opposition forces have chosen a more radical way.
Twelve opposition parties and several NGOs believe that a fair referendum is impossible under Saakashvili’s rule and they are going to launch a permanent protest rally on 9 April, which, according to them, will continue until Saakashvili steps down. Nino Burjanadze, former Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, is considered to be the informal leader of this opposition group.
Both Alasania and Burjanadze are regarded as the leaders backed by the West of which they make no secret. It seems that those politicians would like to please the Georgian voters, looking like radical and charismatic leaders, and, at the same time, to meet the demands of the Western circles willing to see a sober politician as Saakashvili’s alternative.
A contention is in progress among the opposition parties and leaders in the assorted opposition camp. The traditional opposition (e.g. the Labor Party) feels wounded as it sees Nino Burjanadze and Irakli Alasania driving weaker opposition parties back or enticing them to their alliances.
Having announced the date for the protest action beginning, the opposition does not tell the people what will happen in the country, even if they manage to oust Saakashvili. The opposition bickering, which is much covered by the TV channels controlled by the government, damps the ardor of many protest voters who would like the opposition to be consistent and to become united.
The ruling party’s strategy is built on its taking advantage of the opposition members’ mistakes, sowing discord in the opposition, stigmatizing the opposition leaders and over-emphasizing their own efforts, which are currently focused on solving the social problems. This strategy worked during the recent presidential and parliamentary elections. While the opposition does the fighting and keeps speaking about Saakashvili’s early resignation without offering the society anything else, most people think that the opposition wants to come to power and nothing but. Given the current situation, Saakashvili and the ruling party are most likely to play a predominant role in the Georgian politics, even with their approval ratings continuing to fall. This will take place unless the opposition changes its strategy and tactics.
It goes without saying, the West, especially the U.S. position will be of great importance. However, it seems that this position has yet to be clarified.
Moscow will not be idle either. There are rumors that a new Russian military aggression against Georgia is possible. The forecasts made by some Russian experts and raising of this issue by the Georgian authorities are flaring up the tensions. Of course, all of that heavily influences Georgia’s internal political processes. If the military threat becomes real, the opposition will have to stop opposing the authorities and to unite against a common enemy, as was the case during Russia-Georgia war in August 2008, and which largely helped Saakashvili to remain in power.
March 4, 2009
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